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A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
lohn C. leffries,

Jr.*
James E. Ryan**

Now pending before the Supreme Court is the most important
church-state issue of our time: whether publicly funded vouchers may
be used at private, religious schools without violating the Establish
ment Clause.1 The last time the Court considered school aid, it over
ruled precedent and upheld a government program providing comput
ers and other instructional materials to parochial schools.2 In a
plurality opinion defending that result, Justice Thomas dismissed as
irrelevant the fact that some aid recipients were "pervasively sectar
ian. "3 That label, said Thomas, had a "shameful pedigree."4 He traced
it to the Blaine Amendment, proposed in 1875, which would have al
tered the Constitution to ban aid to sectarian institutions. At the time,
"it was an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for 'Catholic.' "5 Of
course, said Thomas, the word could describe schools of other relig
ions, but the Court "eliminated this possibility of confusion" by coin
ing the phrase "pervasively sectarian" - a term applicable almost ex* Emerson Spies Professor, Arnold H. Leon Professor, and Dean, University of Virginia
School of Law. B.A. 1970, Yale; J.D. 1973, University of Virginia. - Ed.
** Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A. 1988, Yale; J.D.
1992, University of Virginia. - Ed. We are grateful for the comments of Vince Blasi, Barry
Cushman, Kim Forde-Mazrui, Michael Klarman, Douglas Laycock, Daryl Levinson,
Elizabeth Magill, William Lee Miller, and participants in workshops at the University of
Virginia and the University of California, Davis. Carter Burwell, Charles Marr, Elizabeth
Polzin, and Matt Traupman provided valuable research assistance, as did the staff of the
University of Virginia Law School Library.

l.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, No. 00-1751, 2001 WL 576235 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2001).

2. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
3. The phrase originated in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (noting that none
of the four colleges allowed to receive federal aid in Tilton v. Richardson was "pervasively
sectarian"). Reliance on this factor can be seen, for example, in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 610 (1988) (explaining that a factor in determining whether aid has the impermissible
effect of advancing religion is "whether, and to what extent, the statute directs government
aid to pervasively sectarian institutions"); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412 (1985) (strik
ing down a program because aid was provided "in a pervasively sectarian environment");
and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 636-37 (1971) ("A school which operates to commin
gle religion with other instruction plainly cannot completely secularize its instruction. Paro
chial schools, in large measure, do not accept the assumption that secular subjects should be
unrelated to religious teaching.").
4. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828.
5. Id.
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elusively to Catholic parochial schools.6 The exclusion of "pervasively
sectarian" schools from otherwise permissible aid to education was,
Thomas concluded, not a neutral interpretation of constitutional
command but a doctrine "born of bigotry."7
Justice Thomas did not attack the ban against aid to "pervasively
sectarian" schools merely as a misunderstanding of text or original in
tent. He charged, rather, that the hostility to "pervasively sectarian"
institutions reflected political conflict and popular prejudice. This is
not the usual stuff of Supreme Court debate. Perhaps for that reason,
Justice Souter's dissent did not so much answer the accusation as
make fun of it, noting only that some "pervasively sectarian" schools
are not Catholic and that some Catholics oppose school aid.8 Never
theless, Thomas's account is at least partly true. The constitutional dis
favor of "pervasively sectarian" institutions is indeed a doctrine born,
if not of bigotry, at least of a highly partisan understanding of laws
"respecting an establishment of religion."9 The first and narrowest
ambition of this Article is to document that assertion.
More broadly and more importantly, we contend that the entire
body of Establishment Clause jurisprudence can profitably be viewed
from a political perspective. The title of the Article signals the intent.
We analyze Establishment Clause decisions as if they were political.
More fully, we analyze Establishment Clause decisions as if they were
products of political contests among various interest groups, both re
ligious and secular, with competing positions on the proper relation of
church and state. The "as if they were" qualification is important, as
we do not claim that the justices thought of themselves as political ac
tors, still less as representatives of religious interests, or that they con
sciously desired to conscript the Constitution to such ends. On the
contrary, we believe that many justices would be shocked by this de
scription of their work and would protest, in all sincerity, that they
tried to elucidate, without favoritism or prejudice, the principles that
they understood to be enshrined in the First Amendment. We accept
that representation completely. But it requires no flight of imagination
to believe that the justices' views of what the Constitution should
mean powerfully inform their views of what it does mean, and that
normative beliefs often reflect prevailing attitudes. In this Article, we
6. Id. at 828-29.
7. Id. at 829.
8. Id. at 912-13 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The plurality nonetheless condemns any en
quiry into the pervasiveness of doctrinal content as a remnant of anti-Catholic bigotry (as if
evangelical Protestant schools and Orthodox Jewish yeshivas were never pervasively sectar
ian), and it equates a refusal to aid religious schools with hostility to religion (as if aid to re
ligious teaching were not opposed in this very case by at least one religious respondent [a
Roman Catholic]) . . . . ) (footnotes omitted).
"

9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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assume that mechanisms exist by which political id.eology and domi
nant attitudes find their way (after the generational delay occasioned
by age and longevity of the justices) to the Supreme Court We make
no effort to probe the subjective motivations of individual justices. In
stead, we aim to reveal the correspondences between constitutional
doctrine and popular sentiment in the area of church-state relations.
Put crudely, this is an exercise in post hoc, ergo propter hoc, which is
famous as a fallacy only because it is so often true.
Looking at the Establishment Clause in this way yields a more
complete and coherent account of modern constitutional doctrine than
can be derived from the conventional sources of text, history, and
structure. Indeed, one good reason to analyze the Establishment
Clause in this way is the lack of plausible alternatives. Whatever the
modern decisions may be thought to represent, whether for good or ill,
they cannot persuasively be attributed to original understanding, ex
cept perhaps at a level of generality largely devoid of meaning. They
do not derive from the "intent of the Framers" or from any "constitu
tional moment," 10 such as the Civil War, that might be thought to have
replaced the original understanding. In terms of the conventional
sources of "legitimacy" in constitutional interpretation, the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause decisions are at least very venturesome,
if not completely rootless. It makes sense, therefore, to look at estab
lishment cases as the products of a subconstitutional - which is to say,
political - contest among religious and secular interests with (often
self-serving) ideological commitments on separation of church and
state.
To preview the argument briefly, the modern Establishment
Clause dates not from the founding but from the mid-twentieth cen
tury. At that time, the Supreme Court adopted a rhetoric of radical
separation of church and state. That rhetoric had as its defining appli
cation and chief consequence a constitutional ban against aid to relig
ious schools. Later, the Court also moved to purge religious obser
vances from public education. These two propositions - that public
aid should not go to religious schools and that public schools should
not be religious - make up the separationist position of the modern
Establishment Clause.
We begin with the ban against aid to religious schools. The modern
no-aid position drew support from a broad coalition of separationist
opinion. Most visible was the pervasive secularism that came to domi
nate American public life, especially among educated elites, a secular
ism that does not so much deny religious belief as seek to confine it to
a private sphere. This public secularism appears on the face of
Supreme Court opinions and is deeply embedded in Establishment

10. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 409 (1998).
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Clause doctrine. Additionally, the ban against aid to religious schools
was supported by the great bulk of the Protestant faithful. With few
exceptions, Protestant denominations, churches, and believers vigor
ously opposed aid to religious schools. For many Protestant denomi
nations, this position followed naturally from the circumstances of
their founding. It was strongly reinforced, however, by hostility to
Roman Catholics and the challenge they posed to the Protestant he
gemony, which prevailed throughout the nineteenth and early twenti
eth centuries. In its political origins and constituencies, the ban against
aid to religious schools aimed not only to prevent an establishment of
religion but also to maintain one.
Today, much has changed. Anti-Catholic animosity has faded, and
the crucial alliance between public secularists and Protestant believers
has collapsed. Public secularists, whose devotion to public schools has
declined in recent decades, now divide over the question of funding
religious alternatives. More importantly, so do the Protestant faithful.
While mainline Protestant denominations continue to demand strict
separation of church and state, fundamentalist and evangelical opinion
has largely deserted that position. 1 1 Today, fundamentalists and evan
gelicals have moved from the most uncompromising opponents of aid
to parochial schools to its unlikely allies.
In origin, this about-face had less to do with theology than with
politics and self-interest. The defection of fundamentalist and evan
gelical opinion from the separationist coalition flowed initially from
their embrace of the private schools that sprang up throughout the
South (and elsewhere) in the wake of court-ordered desegregation.
Originally, these schools were secular. They were created purely and
simply to escape integration. Most of them, however, were soon trans1 1 . By "mainline" Protestants, we refer chiefly to Episcopalians, Methodists, Presbyte
rians, and most Baptists until the 1980s, when fundamentalists gained control of the South
ern Baptist Convention. See infra text accompanying notes 397-415. Fundamentalists and
evangelicals refer generally to those who share a core set of beliefs that include faith in Jesus
Christ as their personal savior; the need for a conversion in order to be saved; and the need
to proselytize. Evangelicals also regard the Bible as an infallible source of religious author
ity, and for some, this means interpreting the Bible literally. Most, but not all, evangelicals
are conservative. Fundamentalists, a strictly conservative subset of evangelicals, also believe
in the literal truth of the Bible, including belief in the devil, miracles, and hell. They also (or
at least used to) adhere to the Biblical command from 2 Corinthians 6:17 to "come out from
among them and be ye separate." For a particularly insightful description of fundamentalists
and evangelicals that captures the complexity of both movements, see GEORGE M.
MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FUNDAMENTALISM AND EVANGELICALISM 1-6 (1991). For
additional discussions of fundamentalists and evangelicals, see ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER ET
AL, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FAITH, CULTURE AND STRATEGIC CHOICES 3741 (2d ed. ] 999) [hereinafter FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS]; GODFREY
HODGSON, THE WORLD TURNED RIGHTSIDE UP: A HISTORY OF THE CONSERVATIVE
ASCENDANCY JN AMERICA 159-61 (1996) [hereinafter HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE
ASCENDANCY]; and A. James Reichley, The Evangelical and Fundamentalist Revolt, in
PIETY AND POLITICS: EVANGELICALS AND FUNDAMENTALISTS CONFRONT THE WORLD 72
(Richard J. Neuhaus & Michael Cromartie eds., 1987).
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formed into, or succeeded by, Christian academies specializing in
faith-based education. Today, virtually all of these schools say that
they practice nondiscrimination, and many - perhaps most - enroll
African-American students. Nonetheless, private academies remain
havens for whites seeking to avoid minority status in public school sys
tems dominated by persons of color.
Additionally, Christian academies are energized by antipathy to
the triumphant secularism of public education and by the desire to
maintain or recreate in the private sphere the unselfconscious Protes
tant establishment that once dominated public life. Allegiance to these
schools and sympathy for the financial burden that they place on de
vout parents have moved many fundamentalist and evangelical Chris
tians to rethink their traditional opposition to aid to religious schools.
As a consequence, strict separationism is opposed today by true be
lievers of many faiths, not just Roman Catholics (and a few other sects
with a history of religious schools), but also by the nation's largest
Protestant denomination (Southern Baptists) and by the great weight
of opinion among the variety of churches called fundamentalist or
evangelical.
Against this new coalition, we predict, the constitutional barrier
against financial support of religious schools will not long stand. We
see the current judicial uncertainty on this subject not merely as a con
tinuation of the blurred and shifting margins that have plagued the
field for years, but as a crack that goes to the core. We see the Court
and the nation in the midst of a sea-change that ultimately will contra
dict past practice as clearly and fully as Brown rejected Plessy. This
prediction does not depend (except in timing) on a guess about future
appointments to the Supreme Court. It arises rather from the current
realignment of the political forces historically arrayed against constitu
tional toleration of aid to religious institutions. Old coalitions have
collapsed, and new alliances are demanding change: We think it likely
that the emerging political combination in favor of government aid to
religious education will prove, sooner or later, to be irresistible.
We do not, however, foresee an end to secularism in public educa
tion. In contrast to the political revolution on school aid, no new coali
tion has formed to overturn the Court's decisions outlawing school
prayer and Bible reading. Religious exercises in public schools are en
dorsed today, as they were forty years ago, by the Catholic leadership
and by conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists. They are op
posed today, as they were forty years ago, by public secularists, main
line Protestant clergy, and most Jews. Moreover, increasing religious
pluralism reinforces the secularist position. While the growing relig
ious diversity of private schools makes government funding seem
more "neutral" and hence more acceptable, the growing religious di
versity of public school students makes it more and more difficult to
envision any religious exercise that would not favor some faiths and
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offend others. We therefore predict that the constitutional prohibition
against religious exercises in the public schools will remain intact.
The argument proceeds in three stages. Part I describes the two
policies that have dominated the modern Establishment Clause. Part
II places those doctrines in historical context. It traces the political an
tecedents of the separationist policies and identifies the constituencies
of their support. Part III addresses the current instability in Estab
lishment Clause doctrine and analyzes the underlying realignment of
political forces that are now deploying in favor of radical change.
The reader will notice in the pages that follow the little heed paid
to the internal structure and logic of Establishment Clause decisions.
That does not mean that we think such questions unimportant. We do
not doubt that precedents matter or that reason and doctrinal analysis
are forces in the law. We largely ignore such matters not because they
are unworthy of attention, but because they have already received sus
tained attention from every conceivable point of view in a literature
too varied to summarize and too voluminous to cite in full.12 We aim
here to examine the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions
from an external (or political) perspective, which has not yet been
done in any comprehensive manner.13 We think - and hope to show
- that this approach yields an explanatory and predictive account of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is useful and informative re
gardless of general jurisprudential commitments on the relative
autonomy of law.
I.

THE MODERN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The modern Establishment Clause dates from Everson v. Board of
Education,14 decided in 1947. In the preceding century and a half, the
Supreme Court decided only two cases under that provision, and nei
ther cast a long shadow.15 Everson, in contrast, set the course of Es
tablishment Clause decisions for t"".o generations.
12. For those interested in a sampling of this literature, see infra notes 64-81.
13. Michael Klarman recognized as much when he expressed bewilderment that a thor
ough "social and political history of the transformation of Establishment Clause doctrine"
had yet to be written. Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 47 (1996) [hereinafter Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions].
This Article responds to that invitation.
14. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (upholding federal administration of an
Indian trust fund that used tribal money to support education of Native Americans at sec
tarian schools); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding federal appropriations
for construction of new hospital wards in the District of Columbia, notwithstanding the re
ligious affiliation of a recipient hospital). See also Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Edu
cation, 281 U.S. 370 (1930), which upheld state provision of textbooks to students in all
schools, including private sectarian schools, against the claim that taxation to support that
program constituted a taking of private property for a private purpose. The Establishment
Clause was not mentioned, perhaps because it was not yet clear that it applied to the States.
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At issue in Everson was the validity of a New Jersey statute
authorizing school districts to provide transportation to and from pub
lic and private schools, so long as the latter were not for profit.16 Pur
suant to this statute, Ewing Township, which operated public schools
only through the eighth grade, reimbursed parents for bus fare to and
from schools in neighboring communities, including both public and
Catholic parochial schools.17 In many States, plaintiffs could have
challenged that action under state constitutions explicitly prohibiting
aid to parochial schools,18 but New Jersey had no such provision.
When the highest state court found no state-law problem,19 the issue
came to the Supreme Court for an interpretation of the federal Consti
tution. The justices held, five-four, that the township's action did not
violate the Establishment Clause, but the division of opinion on the
result proved far less consequential than the commonality of ap
proach. Both majority and dissent agreed that the Establishment
Clause bound the States to a policy of strict separation of church and
state, that the policy condemned neutral support of all religions as well
as favoritism of any one of them, and that, as the defining application
of that policy, no tax dollars could be used to aid religious activities or
institutions.20
The Everson Court not only ascribed to the Establishment Clause
separationist content; it imagined a past to confirm that interpreta-

See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (regarding all clauses of the First
Amendment as applicable to the States).
16. New Jersey Laws, 1941, c. 191, at 581, N.J. Stat. Cum. Supp., tit. 18, c. 14, § 8 (1937),
quoted in 330 U.S. at 3 n.1.
17. In an aspect of the case that preoccupied Justice Jackson, the township resolution
authorized reimbursement of bus fare to "Trenton Catholic Schools," without provision for
similar treatment of other nonprofit schools. Record at 8, Everson v. Bd. of Educ. , 330 U.S. 1
(1947). From all that appears, Trenton Catholic schools were the only nonpublic, nonprofit
schools attended by township students. Certainly, no challenge was raised by anyone who
wanted to go elsewhere. Nonetheless, Justice Jackson characterized the resolution as specifi
cally and exclusively aiding students attending Catholic schools and excluding schools of
other faiths. 330 U.S. at 20-21 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Thus, under the Act and resolution
brought to us by this case, children . . . are to be aided if they attend the public schools or
private Catholic schools, and they are not allowed to be aided if they attend private secular
schools or private religious schools of other faiths."). On this interpretation, the resolution
was obviously invalid.
18. The prototype was the Blaine Amendment of 1875, which failed to pass at the fed
eral level. See Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEG. HIST.
38, 47-57 (1992) [hereinafter Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered] (describing ori
gins of the proposal). By 1890, however, twenty-nine States had incorporated similar provi
sions in their state constitutions, often as a condition for admission to the Union. See Joseph
P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State Constitutional
Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 672-75 (1998) [hereinafter Viteritti, Blaine's Wake]
(describing Republican response to Senate's failure to approve the Blaine Amendment).
19. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 44 A.2d 333 (1945).
20. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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tion.2 1 Both majority and dissent treated the history of the United
States as if it were the history of Virginia. Despite dissimilarity of lan
guage, the justices equated the Establishment Clause with Virginia's
statute on religious freedom,22 thereby appropriating for the federal
provision the separationist message and rhetoric of the state enact
ment. It was "sinful and tyrannical," wrote Jefferson, "to compel a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves."23 To avoid that evil, "no man shall be compelled
to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry what
soever. "24 This language and Madison's soaring Memorial and Remon
strance against Virginia taxation to support the Episcopal Church25
provided an impressive pedigree for the separationist philosophy that
Everson now engrafted onto the First Amendment. On the fundamen
tal point, there was no dissent. Writing for the Court, Justice Black
said that the Establishment Clause meant "at least" that "[n]o tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious ac
tivities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. "26 Speaking for the four
dissenters, Justice Rutledge agreed that "the Amendment forbids any
appropriation, large or small, from public funds to aid or support any
21. "Imagine the past" comes from Sir Lewis Namier by way of Alexander Bickel. See
LEWIS B. NAMIER, CONFLICTS: STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 69-70 ( 1 942)
("[W]hen discoursing or writing about history, [people] imagine it in terms of their own ex
perience, and when trying to gauge the future they cite supposed analogies from the past: till,
by double process of repetition, they imagine the past and remember the future."); see also
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 13 ( 1970)
(quoting Namier).
22. Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, enacted January 19, 1786, 12 Hening, Statutes of
Virginia 84 (1823 ) , quoted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1947) ; see also 330
U.S. at 28 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Both opinions focused on Virginia. See id. at 11-13 (de
tailing the "great stimulus and able leadership" provided by Virginia in arousing the "senti
ment that culminated in adoption of the Bill of Rights' provisions embracing religious lib
erty"); id. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (describing the "long and intensive struggle for
religious freedom in America, more especially in Virginia, of which the Amendment was the
direct culmination") (footnote omitted).
23. The language quoted in Justice Rutledge's dissent, Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.
(1947) , reads as follows:
Well aware that Almighty God hath created the mind free; ... that to compel a man to fur

I, 28

nish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful
and tyrannical; ....

We, the General Assembly, do enact, That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, mo
lested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his relig
ious opinions or belief ....
Justice Black quoted somewhat more. Id. at 12-13.
24. See id. at 28 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting the Virginia provision).
25. 2 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (1 900) (quoted in its
entirety in an appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson, 330 U.S. at 63-72) .
26. Everson, 330 U.S. at 1 6.
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and all religious exercises."27 No one stumbled over the fact that the
history relied on was not directly applicable. The origins and purposes
of the Virginia statute were adopted for the Establishment Clause, and
on that borrowed foundation, Everson began the modern edifice of
separation of church and state.
For half a century, the Supreme Court followed Everson's lead.
The years 1947-1996, inclusive, provide a convenient survey of the
modern Establishment Clause, both because that period covers the
great majority of all Establishment Clause decisions and because it
stops just short of the first clear signal of change in 1997.28 From 1947
through 1996, the Court decided fifty-two cases under the Establish
ment Clause. More than half involved education. In six cases the
Court considered - and in all six cases upheld - government aid to
religiously affiliated institutions or activities in higher education.29 This
hands-off attitude contrasts sharply with the rigor of the twenty-six Es
tablishment Clause cases concerning elementary and secondary educa
tion. The number of Supreme Court Establishment Clause decisions
concerning elementary and secondary schools during these fifty years
exceeds the total of decisions from all other sectors of society, includ
ing prisons, the military, selective service,30 employment,31 taxation,32
27. Id. at 41.
28. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985)).
29. See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding, inter alia,
that the Establishment Clause does not bar disbursement of funds from student activity fees
to religious organizations); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar state aid in the form of voca
tional assistance to a blind student seeking to become a pastor); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981) (holding, inter alia, that the Establishment Clause does not bar religious groups
from meeting on state university property); Roemer v. Md. Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736
(1976) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar state funding of religiously affili
ated institutions of higher education); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (holding that the
Establishment Clause does not bar state issuance of revenue bonds for construction of new
facilities at religiously affiliated institutions of higher education); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971) (holding that the Establishment Clause does not bar federal funding of new
facilities at institutions of higher education).
30. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding statute according con
scientious objector status to persons whose religious beliefs led them to oppose all war but
not to persons who opposed only a particular war).
31. E.g. , Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding civil rights
act provision exempting religious organizations from prohibition on religious discrimination
in employment); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (invalidating state law
that gave employees an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath).
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), held that the NLRB did not
have jurisdiction over parochial schools, on the grounds that extending such jurisdiction
would constitute an impermissible entanglement with religion. This case is included in the
census of decisions dealing with elementary and secondary education.
32. E.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990)
(upholding state sales tax as applied to religious articles); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S.
680 (1989) (upholding IRS policy of disallowing income-tax deductions for payments made
to churches for training services); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invali-
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church governance,33 Sunday closing laws,34 zoning laws,35 religious
displays in public places,36 public prayer in noneducational institu
tions,37 and all the other practices that might be interpreted as gov
ernment endorsement of religion.
These cases show that the strict separationism of Everson did not
apply universally or uniformly. On the contrary, Establishment Clause
invalidations coalesce around two specific themes: one that flowed di
rectly from Everson, and another that Everson may have influenced.
The Supreme Court's first concern during this period (1947-1996)
was to inhibit aid to parochial schools. In thirteen cases, the Court
considered various programs that would have eased the financial bur
den on parents who sent their children to church schools. The Court
allowed reimbursement of transportation expenses,38 loan of approved
textbooks,39 reimbursement for the costs of state-mandated testing and
record-keeping,40 state income tax deductions for private-school ex
penses,41 and provision of a sign-language interpreter for a disabled
child in parochial school.42 None of these programs offered much more
than incidental support to church schools.43 Perhaps for that reason,
dating a state law that exempted religious periodicals from generally applicable sales tax);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding state property tax exemption
for religious organizations).
33. E.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (disapproving
state court intervention in a dispute between church and a dismissed bishop); Presbyterian
Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (holding that state courts cannot consider eccle
siastical doctrine in resolving property disputes arising when a local congregation secedes
from its national organization).
34. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing law).
The Court upheld similar provisions in companion cases decided the same day. Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two
Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
35. E.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating state law that
gave schools and churches the power to prevent issuance of liquor licenses to establishments
located within 500 feet of the school or church).
36. E.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (holding
that state was not barred from granting a group's request to display a cross on the statehouse
grounds); Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (allowing city
display of Nativity scene if accompanied by non-Christian symbols); Lynch v. Donnelly, 475
U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing city display of Nativity scene).
37. E.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (allowing legislature to begin every
session with prayer by state-paid chaplain).
38. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
39. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
40. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
41. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
42. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
43. The only arguable exception to this statement is Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
which approved state tax deductions for parochial school tuition. If it had been extended to
federal taxation, with its much higher marginal rates, deductibility of tuition would offer
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they survived Supreme Court scrutiny, but just barely. Only the text
book loan program had a vote to spare; the others, like Everson, di
vided five-four. More often, the Court struck down attempts to help
church schools. Specifically, the Court prohibited state supplements
for the salaries of nonpublic school teachers,44 tuition reimbursement,45
maintenance and repair of schools serving low-income students,46 re
imbursement for expenses of state-mandated and nonmandated test
ing,47 provision of school services and educational equipment,48 aid for
instructional materials and field trips,49 and loan of public-school
teachers to teach secular subjects in parochial schools (twice ).50
As has often been remarked, including by the justices,51 the consti
tutional line between the permissible and the impermissible was thin
and wavering. It would take an exceptionally nimble intellect to dis
cern the difference between transportation and textbooks, which were
permitted, and field trips and instructional materials, which were not.
Nevertheless, the blurred margins of the no-aid policy should not dis
guise its effect. Everson drew the line between permissible support for
education and impermissible aid to religion very far to one side. None
of the programs struck down in this period could convincingly be
characterized as endorsing religious belief, which the Court now
stresses,52 and none explicitly favored one religion over another. Alsubstantial aid for high-income taxpayers. For low- and middle-income taxpayers, deducti
bility of parochial school tuition would be much less valuable. It seems likely, however, that
the result in Mueller flowed not so much from the (probably correct) perception that the aid
would be insubstantial, but from the fact that settled doctrine permitted deduction of contri
butions directly to churches, seminaries, and religious missions. Tax deductibility of paro
chial school tuition could scarcely be disapproved without calling into question the entire
structure of deductibility of charitable contributions. See 463 U.S. at 396 n.5 (noting that
state law allowed deductions for direct contributions to religious institutions and that Walz v.
Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), approved that practice).
44. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
46. Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (also invalidating tuition reimbursement for income-qualified families).
47. Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
48. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
49. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
50. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985).
51. E.g. , Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.) ("It is not at all easy,
however, to apply this Court's various decisions construing the [Establishment] Clause to
governmental programs of financial assistance to sectarian schools and the parents of chil
dren attending those schools."); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (Burger, C.J.)
("Candor compels acknowledgment, moreover, that we can only dimly perceive the lines of
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.").
52. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609 (1992) ("[O]ur cases have prohibited government
endorsement of religion, its sponsorship, and active involvement in religion, whether or not
citizens were coerced to conform.").
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though there was always a constituency, both on and off the Court, for
a more nearly absolute approach, the wall of separation between gov
ernment funds and church schools remained high. Legislatures
searched for exceptions to the constitutional prohibition and occa
sionally found one, but in the main they had to live with it. The cases
prohibited direct and substantial government support of religiously af
filiated primary and secondary education.
The Court's second policy complemented the first. If aid to relig
ious schools was (more or less) strictly proscribed, public schools had
to be suitable for persons of all faiths. Of course, there was no way to
make public schools suitable for all faiths if some of them demanded
faith-based instruction, but at least public education should not play
favorites. Given the increasing diversity of religious practice in
America, the only way to avoid choosing sides was to remain silent.
Thus, the Court's second great project in the years 1947-1996 was to
make the public schools secular. In ten nonaid cases, the Court struck
down laws dealing with primary and secondary education. These deci
sions directly promoted public secularism as an accommodation to re
ligious pluralism. Specifically, the Court disallowed religion classes in
public schools53 and prohibited officially sponsored student prayer,54
graduation prayer,55 Bible reading,56 and silent meditation.57 The Court
also barred display of the Ten Commandments58 and struck down laws
banning the teaching of evolution59 and mandating the teaching of
creationism.60 In all these decisions, the Court severed ties between
the public schools and particular religious beliefs or practices.61
Today, change is underway. Although the Court remains commit
ted to secularism in public education and shows no signs of wavering
in its hostility to school prayer,62 the no-aid policy is faltering. Four
53. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
54. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
55. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
56. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
57. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating law mandating a daily minute of
silence for meditation or voluntary prayer).
58. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
59. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
60. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
61. The other nonfunding invalidations involving primary or secondary education were
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (striking down a state law
that created a new school district for a single religious community), and NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1 979) (holding that NLRB jurisdiction did not extend to
teachers in parochial schools).
62. E.g. , Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking down student
initiated and student-led prayer at school-sponsored football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down officially sponsored prayer at graduation).
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justices have rejected it outright and declared their willingness to ap
prove any secular aid uniformly available to adherents of all faiths and
none.63 Two additional justices have chosen narrower grounds to allow
some forms of aid that would have been forbidden only a few years
ago.64 The question is whether the recent decisions merely continue
the small-scale inconsistencies that have long characterized Establish
ment Clause jurisprudence or whether they signal something more. As
noted, we think the current uncertainty reflects a radical realignment
of political opinion that is already well advanced and that is likely sooner or later - to overturn the separationist project begun in
Everson. This necessarily speculative claim about the future is ad
dressed in Part III.
In Part II, we look to the past. Stated most simply, the questions
we address are: Where did the modern Establishment Clause come
from? What are the ideological and political antecedents of the ban on
aid to religious schools? And what moved the Supreme Court to
secularize public education? Though the Court attributed both poli
cies to the Framers, we think they are better explained by modern po
litical history. In particular, we believe, as Justice Thomas charged,
that the constitutional prohibition against aid to religious schools is in
some measure the sanitized residue of nativism and anti-Catholic ani
mosity. As we hope to show, the modern Establishment Clause aligns
less closely with the constitutional text and history of the framing than
with the political conflict and sectarian rivalry of the more recent past.
To that task we now turn.
II. THE POLITICAL HISTORY
A. Pre-History
The Everson Court embraced three propositions about original in
tent: first, that the Establishment Clause mandated a substantive pol
icy of separation of church and state; second, that the policy con
demned neutral support of all religions as well as favoritism among
them; and third, that the Fourteenth Amendment extended that policy
63. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("[I]f the govern
ment, seeking to further some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms,
without regard to religion, to all who adequately further that purpose, then it is fair to say
that any aid going to a religious recipient only has the effect of furthering that secular pur
pose.").
64. Id. at 838-39 (O'Connor, J., with whom Breyer, J., joined, concurring) ("I do not
quarrel with the plurality's recognition that neutrality is an important reason for upholding
government-aid programs against Establishment Clause challenges . . . . Nevertheless, we
have never held that a government-aid program passes constitutional muster solely because
of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distributing aid."); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 225 (1997) ("[W]e have departed from the rule . . . that all government aid that directly
aids the educational function of religious schools is invalid.").
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to the States. Given these premises, the only question was whether
reimbursing the expenses of parents who chose to send their children
to parochial schools constituted aid to religion. On this issue - and in
many subsequent disputes about degrees of indirection - the justices
divided. In fact, however, none of the three propositions that united
the Court in Everson can confidently be said to be true. Each step is
debatable. By founding its thinking on three historical assertions, each
of which can be challenged, the Court has cumulated improbability
past the point of any meaningful connection between the modern Es
tablishment Clause and original intent.
Begin with the bedrock proposition that the Establishment Clause
requires separation of church and state. The provision bars Congress
from making any law "respecting an establishment of religion."65
The phrasing suggests that Congress can neither establish nor dises
tablish religion. On this reading, the Establishment Clause adopts no
substantive policy regarding separation of church and state but merely
divests the national government of authority on the subject. Contem
porary practice confirms this interpretation. At the time the First
Amendment was adopted, seven of the fourteen States maintained
government-sponsored churches, and several others used various
means to advance the Christian religion.66 With the barely arguable
exception of Rhode Island, no American state could have been found
in compliance with the modern understanding of separation of church
and state.67 It seems odd to think that the States would have adopted,
with little discussion and less dispute, a constitutional provision con
demning their current practices.68
65. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
66. GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 13 (1987)
(hereinafter BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS] ("Each of the thirteen original
states generously aided and promoted religion and should therefore . . . be called establish
ment regimes."); id. at 20 (reporting that contemporary scholars agree that several estab
lished churches existed when the First Amendment was adopted but noting discrepancy as to
numbers); LEONARD w. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 76 (1986) [hereinafter LEVY, ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE] ("In 1791, when the
First Amendment was ratified, the addition of Vermont to the Union brought the number of
states authorizing establishments of religion to seven."); Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on
the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) [hereinafter Amar,
Notes] ("In 1789, at least six states had government-supported churches.").
67. LEVY, ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 66, at 74 (noting that neither as a col
ony nor as a state did Rhode Island ever have an establishment of religion). However,
Rhode Island did exclude Catholics and Jews from full citizenship, which, under modern
conceptions, would be struck down as an establishment of religion. See BRADLEY, CHURCH
STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 66, at 29 ("If one accepts the Supreme Court's definition
of establishment, then Rhode Island, that polar star of religious liberty, maintained an es
tablishment at the time it ratified the First Amendment.").
68. See BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 66, at 1 13-14 (noting
that the records of state ratification debates, which are almost completely silent about the
Establishment Clause, "speak in loud, unmistakably clear voices that in ratifying the Estab
lishment Clause, they forbade sect preference by the national government and in no way im-
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It may be, therefore, that the original Establishment Clause em
braced no substantive conception of the proper relation of church and
state, but merely reflected a determination that the issue be settled lo
cally. This was the understanding of Joseph Story,69 and it has been
endorsed by competent scholars,70 though of course opposed by oth
ers.71 Although Everson made no mention of the states'-rights inter
pretation of the original intent, that view of the matter remains his
torically plausible. The foundational premise of the modem
Establishment Clause thus turns out to be irreducibly speculative.
Even if it were clear that the original Establishment Clause man
dated church-state separation, it would remain questionable whether
that policy, as originally conceived, possessed anything like the sub-

paired the government's authority to aid, encourage, and support religion on a non
discriminatory basis").
69. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
1873, at 731 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co., 1833) ("Thus, the whole power over the
subject of religion is left exclusively to the State governments, to be acted upon according to
their own sense of justice and the state constitutions."); id. (noting the denominational diver
sity among the States and concluding: "It was impossible that there should not arise perpet
ual strife and perpetual jealously on the subject of ecclesiastical ascendancy, if the national
government were left free to create a religious establishment. The only security was in extir
pating the power.").
§

70. E.g. , STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 17, 18 (1995) [hereinafter SMITH,
FOREORDAINED FAILURE] (arguing that the original meaning of the religion clauses was
"purely jurisdictional," that is, that they were "simply an assignment of jurisdiction over
matters of religion to the states - no more, no less"); Amar, Notes, supra note 66, at 3 ("The
original establishment clause . . . is not anti-establishment but pro-states' rights; it is agnostic
on the substantive issues of establishment versus non-establishment, and simply calls for the
issue to be decided locally."); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment
Clause, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1088-89 (1995) [hereinafter Lash, Second Adoption] ("[T]he
original Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit federal power over the subject of
religion, reserving the same to the states. In this way, the original Establishment Clause ex
pressed the principle of federalism: The federal government could neither establish religion
at the federal level, nor disestablish religion in the states."); William K. Lietzau, Rediscover
ing the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1 191 (1990) [hereinafter Leitzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause] ("[T]he es
tablishment clause embodied a structural safeguard to . . . preserve religious liberty by fos
tering local decisionmaking authority on church/state issues."); Michael A. Paulsen, Relig
ion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 317 (1986) ("The original intention behind the
establishment clause . . . seems fairly clearly to have been to forbid establishment of a na
tional religion and to prevent federal interference with a state's choice of whether or not to
have an official state religion."); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Four
teenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 379 ("[T]he establishment clause was meant to
reserve powers to the several states.").
71. E.g. , Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About
Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 878 (1986) (arguing that the Establishment
Clause embodied a substantive conception of church-state separation); Douglas Laycock, A
Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 411-14 (1986) [herein
after Laycock, Survey of Religious Liberty] (arguing that the legislative history shows that
the Framers intended to prohibit the federal government not only from favoring one religion
over another but also from nonpreferentially aiding religion in general).
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stantive reach of modem decisions. The kind of religious "establish
ment" familiar to the Framers involved direct governmental financial
support of a favored church.72 Modem school-aid cases are twice re
moved from that paradigm. For one thing, the benefits of school-aid
programs flow indifferently to all private schools, not exclusively to
adherents of one faith. The Framers might have intended, contrary to
modem doctrine, to forbid government sponsorship of a favored
church while allowing neutral support of education affiliated with re
ligion. 73 We can only speculate, because the Framers did not focus on
schools. They did not live in a world of government-funded education,
so positing what they would have thought of school aid requires ex
trapolation of reasoning beyond its historical foundation. The point is
not that the Court was necessarily wrong in expanding the original
meaning of establishment to reach (some forms of) indirect aid to re
ligious education, but only that the historical record does not demand
that result. In moving beyond the historically grounded concept of "es
tablishment" to forbid lesser connections between church and state,
the Supreme Court has further attenuated the connection between
modem doctrine and original intent.
Finally, the Everson Court's assumption that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Establishment Clause and made it ap
plicable to the States compounds these eighteenth-century indetermi
nacies.74 Perhaps the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to
incorporate some or all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, or per
haps not.75 For the Establishment Clause, this familiar dispute has a
72. At the time of ratification of the First Amendment, paradigmatic "establishments"
still existed in Massachusetts and Connecticut, where a formal structure supported general
taxation of the public and disbursement of revenue to churches and ministers. Originally,
these systems supported only Congregationalist churches and ministers, but gradually this
restriction was softened to allow disbursal of some funds to other state-certified Protestant
denominations. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 66, at 20; LEVY,
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 66, at 29-42, 45-49.
73. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 66, at xiii ("The intuitively
plausible conclusion - that government interaction with religion be conditioned on a neu
trality among sects - is the historically demonstrable meaning of nonestablishment, and
represents the fundamental alternative to what the Court has wrought."); id. at 135 ("A rig
orous historical inquiry into the adoption of the Establishment Clause has shown that it pro
hibits sect preference . . . . ).
"

74. Though Everson was the first Supreme Court decision to apply the Establishment
Clause to the States, the Court's opinion does not specifically address that issue beyond
noting that prior cases had incorporated the First Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15 & n.22 (1 947).
75. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 138-39 (1949) (arguing that the legislative history of the Four
teenth Amendment disproves an intention to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the
States); cf RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 134-35 (1977) (supporting Fairman's analysis); William
Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History, " and the Constillltional Limita
tions on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1954) (disputing Fairman's conclusion).
But see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
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special twist. If the original Establishment Clause aimed to confirm
the exclusive authority of the States over religion, invoking that provi
sion to disallow state aid to religion is paradoxical and perverse. In the
words of Akhil Amar, "to apply the clause against a state government
is precisely to eliminate [the state's] right to choose whether to estab
lish a religion - a right clearly confirmed by the establishment clause
itself. "76 In this respect, incorporation of the Establishment Clause
presents difficulties additional to, and distinct from, those that attend
the general issue.77
Recognition of the special difficulty of incorporating the Estab
lishment Clause has spawned inventive attempts to recover a suitable
pedigree for modern doctrine. Although conceded originally to have
been concerned with states' rights, the Establishment Clause is said by
some to have acquired a substantive meaning in the years before Re
construction, when the separationist philosophy that by then had be
come engrafted onto that provision was applied against the States.78
As an attempt to specify historical antecedents for current doctrine,
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57-91 (1986) (rejecting Berger's analysis); Michael
Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor
Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 100-01 (1980) (same). But cf RAOUL BERGER, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 45-142 (1989) (rejecting Curtis'
analysis). See generally Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 58-61 (1993) (summarizing the academic debate over incor
poration and concluding in its favor).
76. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 3334 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS).
77. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 76, at 41-42, which distinguishes the Establishment Clause from other First Amendment guarantees on the following ground:
The First Amendment, then, was not agnostic on whether speech, press, petition, assembly,
and free exercise were liberties of citizens and good things. By contrast, the amendment was
indeed agnostic on the issue of establishment. Congress had no more authority in the states
to disestablish than to establish. Both actions were equally beyond Congress' delegated
powers; and the unfettered choice between establishment and dis-establishment was given to
the states. As a more pure federalism provision, then, the establishment clause seems con
siderably more difficult to incorporate against states.
See also Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1 113, 1 142 (1988) ("The language of the fourteenth amendment, coupled with the
federalistic motivation for the establishment clause, make it exceedingly difficult to argue
that the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment intended to incorporate the es
tablishment clause for application against the states."); Lietzau, Rediscovering the Estab
lishment Clause, supra note 70, at 1210 ("While many specific Bill of Rights incorporations
have been criticized, none are so thoroughly contradicted by the historically discernible in
tentions of our forefathers than that of the establishment clause.").
Of course, if the Establishment Clause was not a purely states'-rights provision but in
stead adopted a substantive policy of church-state separation, then incorporation would be
less problematic. See Laycock, Survey of Religious Liberty, supra note 71, at 414-16.
78. The best presentation of the story of the reinvention of the Establishment Clause is
Lash, Second Adoption, supra note 70, at 1 135-37 (arguing that the "popular interpretation"
changed from federalism to personal freedom). Something in the same direction appears in
Justice Brennan's opinion in Abingdon School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-55
(1963) (Brennan J., concurring) (asserting that freedom of state involvement in religion was
among the "panoply of new federal rights" created by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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such reasoning is plausible and ingenious. It may even be true. But
equally plausible arguments can be made the other way, starting with
the fact that Congress in 1876 approved (though not by the required
supermajorities) a constitutional amendment that repeated the words
of the Establishment Clause and explicitly made them applicable to
the States.79 This would have been unnecessary if the Fourteenth
Amendment had already accomplished that result. The point may not
be conclusive, but it compounds the difficulty of applying a straight
forward incorporation theory to the original prohibition of federal
laws respecting an establishment of religion.
All these historical issues are debatable, in part due to changed cir
cumstances and in part due to the uncertain evidence regarding origi
nal intent. The Framers said almost nothing about the Establishment
Clause, and the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment even less.80
Perhaps the safest inference that can be drawn from the historical rec
ord is a "lack of interest amounting virtually to apathy toward the es
tablishment clause. "81 Against this background, historical assertions of
the sort made in Everson remain essentially speculative.
The conclusion that we draw from this prehistory is modest and
(should be) uncontroversial. When the Everson Court reached back to
Virginia for the pedigree of modern separationism, the justices were
not obeying a command from the Framers. They were making a
79. The Blaine Amendment began, "No State shall make any law respecting an estab
lishment of religion . . . . " Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 60.
The full text is quoted infra note 1 1 5.
80. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, D EBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 59-62 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (revealing only a few exchanges over the meaning
of the Establishment Clause in the House and none in the Senate). Even scholars who find
meaning in the shards of original history admit its inadequacy. E.g. , LEVY, ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE, supra note 66, at 79 ("The debate [as unreliably reported] was sometimes irrele
vant, usually apathetic and unclear."). For the lack of record from the Fourteenth Amend
ment, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1 131, 1 158 &
n.132 (1993) (noting that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment often omitted any ref
erence to the Establishment Clause in their discussions of individual rights); and Leitzau,
Rediscovering the Establishment Clause, supra note 70, at 1208 (noting that the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment consistently ignored the Establishment Clause).
81. DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: MAKING
SENSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 71 (1991):
In fact, all of these suggestions about how to interpret the establishment clause based on the
framers' intentions are just short of complete speculation because they are based solely on
the extremely sparse and highly questionable historical records. The records simply contain
too little evidence. To the extent that we can broadly read the sense of the secondhand his
torical documents, they most clearly show a lack of interest amounting virtually to apathy
toward the establishment clause.
Others have suggested, however, that the evidence is thin only if one is seeking support
for a substantive interpretation of the Establishment Clause. If, however, one is open to the
possibility that the original meaning protected only states' rights, the evidence may be more
than sufficient. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 70, at 47-48 ("(Tjhe original
meaning is not relevant in principle but unknowable in practice, as scholars like Drakeman
suppose; it is, rather, knowable but unresponsive to present demands.").
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choice. The past they imagined in Everson seemed obvious, natural,
and clear to them because it fit so readily what they expected the Con
stitution to say. The opinion itself suggests as much. It displays little
research and zero interest in conflicting evidence, competing infer
ences, or alternative interpretations.82 The casualness of the Court's
history and the confidence of its pronouncements signal the lack of
dependence between the two. In our view, Everson reflects less a clear
directive from the Framing than the conventional understanding in
mid-twentieth century America. The real origins of the modern Es
tablishment Clause lay not so much (or at least not only) in the utter
ances of Madison and Jefferson but in the political experiences and
values that made aid to religious schools so problematic.
B.

The Protestant Establishment

The immediate reality faced by the Supreme Court in the mid
twentieth century was the collapse of the Protestant establishment.
For most of its history, public education in America had been un
abashedly patriotic and unmistakably Protestant. Whatever the state
of faith at the time of the Framing, by the middle third of the nine
teenth century, when the common-school movement took hold, the
nation had experienced a massive evangelical resurgence.83 Protestant
ministers and churchmen led the common-school movement and took
for granted "a congruence of purpose between the common school
and the Protestant churches. "84 Civic leaders assumed "that Ameri
canism and Protestantism were synonyms and that education and
Protestantism were allies."85 Early common schools featured Bible
reading, prayer, hymns, and holiday observances, all reinforced by the

82. See SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 70, at 5 (dismissing Everson as a
"dismal historical performance"); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Ex
ercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1991) ("As a matter of judicial craftsmanship, it is striking
in retrospect to observe how little intellectual curiosity the members of the Court demon
strated in the challenge presented by the task of adapting, for application to the states, lan
guage that had long served to protect the states against the federal government."); Note,
Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1700, 1702 (1992) ("Significantly, Everson is devoid of any analysis justifying the incor
poration of the Establishment Clause . . . . ").
83. 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 242 (1950)
[hereinafter STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE] (describing the importance of the Great Awak
ening); David B. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers: Religion in the American Common
School, in HISTORY AND EDUCATION: THE EDUCATIONAL USES OF THE PAST 212, 217
(Paul Nash ed., 1970) [hereinafter Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers].
84. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 217.
85. Timothy L. Smith, Protestant Schooling and American Nationality, 1800-1850, 53 J.
AM. HIST. 679, 680 (1967) [hereinafter Smith, Protestant Schooling].
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exhortations of the teacher and the pervasive Protestantism of the
texts.86
The problem was that Protestantism was not one religion but
many. In an age when genuinely secular public education was "simply
inconceivable,"87 common-school advocates had to find a way to keep
religion in the public schools but keep controversy out. They did so by
promoting least-common-denominator Protestantism and rejecting
particularistic influences. The architect of this strategy was Horace
Mann, secretary of the nation's first board of education (in
Massachusetts) from 1837-1849 and the leading figure in the common
school movement.88 Mann himself was a Unitarian, and hence person
ally liberal and latitudinal, but in Massachusetts, he had to contend
with orthodox Congregationalists, Baptists, Methodists, and other
Christian sects.89 Mann waged fierce battle with conservative critics,
deriding their demands for more pronounced religious content as "sec
tarian." Under that label, he banned doctrines "peculiar to specific
denominations but not common to all. "9° Charges of "godlessness"
were answered with a strategy described as "a stroke of genius."91
Mann insisted on Bible reading, w ithout commentary, as the founda
tion of moral education. In his own words, "our system earnestly in
culcates all Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis of relig
ion; it welcomes the religion of the Bible; and, in receiving the Bible, it
allows it to do what it is allowed to do in no other system
to speak
for itself "92
-

86. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 218. The first textbook widely
used in the United States was the Hornbook, which contained only the alphabet and "the
prayer the Saviour designed to teach, which children use, and parsons, when they preach."
Later texts included the New England Primer and Noah Webster's Spelling Book, both of
which included stories with religious and ethical lessons. 2 MARK SULLIVAN, OUR TIMES:
THE UNITED STATES 1900-1925, at 88-89 (1927). Even math textbooks contained Christian
propaganda, asking students, for example, how to ensure that when "15 Christians and 15
Turks" are caught at sea in a storm and half need to be cast into the sea to save the other.
half, one could devise a "random" lottery to make sure that all of the Christians are saved.
PAUL BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS: THE GREAT CONTROVERSY 15 (1963)
[hereinafter BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND TH E SCHOOLS].
87. STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTI
CULTURAL DEMOCRACY 57 (2000) [hereinafter MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST].
88. ROBERT MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 72, 73 n.9 (1970) [hereinafter
MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL] (summarizing and citing sources on Mann's
life).
89. Id. at 71.
90. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 218; see also DONALD E. BOLES,
THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 23-27 (1965) [hereinafter BOLES, THE
BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS] (describing Mann's role as the "great crusader against sec
tarianism in the public schools").
91. MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 69.
92. Horace Mann, Twelfth Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board of Education,
TWELFfH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION TOGETHER WITH THE
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Though Protestants clashed on many questions, they agreed on the
Bible. Bible reading in public school became the basis for a pan
Protestant compromise, a vague and inclusive Protestantism that,
when augmented by specific doctrinal instruction at Sunday school,
proved acceptable to all.93 Consequently, "most Protestant churches
declared a truce with each other at the doors of the common school. "94
The instruction behind those doors was nondenominational but em
phatically not secular.95 A generalized Protestantism became the
common religion of the common school. From its inception, therefore,
American public education was religious but nonsectarian. Both char
acteristics were essential to the consensus of support for the common
school.96
Of course, that consensus did not include Catholics.97 At the time
of the Revolution, 30,000 Catholics lived in the new United States,
barely one percent of the population.98 By 1830, that number had in
creased to 600,000.99 By 1850, there were 1 .6 million U.S. Catholics,100
and twice that many ten years later.101 The number quadrupled to

TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD 1 16-17 (Mass. Bd. of
Educ., Boston 1 849) (emphasis in original).
93. MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 78-79 ("By stressing
Bible reading in the school Mann detonated the heaviest bombs of his conservative critics.
Few Protestants opposed that practice. The Bible, then, became a major symbol for common
religion around which liberal and conservative Protestants could rally.").
94. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 218.
95. ROBERT T. HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
IN AMERICA, 1 880-1920, at 15 (1991) [hereinafter HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT]
("The schools were understood to be nondenominational but certainly not nonreligious.");
Smith, Protestant Schooling, supra note 85, at 687 ("[I]t was not secularism but nondenomi
national Protestantism which won the day.").
96. MACEDO, 'DIVERSITY AND D ISTRUST, supra note 87, at 57 ("A remarkably broad
consensus supported the new common schools, which could only succeed in a religiously plu
ralistic environment if they were viewed by the vast majority of people as religious but non
sectarian; that is, as capable of inculcating basic moral precepts rooted in religion while
avoiding sectarian impulses.").
97. Timothy L. Smith, Parochial Education and American Culture, in HISTORY AND
EDUCATION: THE EDUCATIONAL USES OF THE PAST 202 (Paul Nash ed., 1970) [hereinafter
Smith, Parochial Education].
98. ROBERT T. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND
HISTORICAL REALITIES 58 (1971) [hereinafter HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA). See also
Philip Gleason, American Identity and Americanization, in CONCEPTS OF ETHNICITY 69
(Stephan Themstrom et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter Gleason, American Identity], who places
the figure at 35,000.
99. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 58.
100. Gleason, American Identity, supra note 98, at 69; see also H. Frank Way, The Death
of the Christian Nation: The Judiciary and Church-State Relations, 29 J. CHURCH & ST. 509,
521 n.26 (1987) [hereinafter Way, The Death of the Christian Nation] (giving the figure of 1 .7
million as of 1850).
101. Gleason, American Identity, supra note 98, at 69.
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twelve million in 1900, and doubled again by 1930.102 This population
was mostly immigrant, in the early days mostly Irish, and mostly
poor.103 They found the public schools unfriendly and inhospitable.
Unaccompanied Bible reading, which was the cornerstone of the Prot
estant consensus, was to Catholics an affront. Public school students
read from the King James Version, which the Catholic Church did not
recognize. Indeed, the very fact of a direct and unmediated approach
to God contradicted Catholic doctrine. The Douay Bible provided not
only the officially approved English translation of the Scriptures, but
also authoritative annotation and comment. Reading the unadorned
text invited the error of private interpretation. As one cleric put the
point in 1840: "The Catholic church tells her children that they must
be taught their religion by AUTHORITY - the Sects say, read the
bible, judge for yourselves."104
Religious conflict over Bible reading grew intense. In Maine and
Massachusetts, Catholic students suffered beatings or expulsions for
refusing to read from the Protestant Bible,105 and crowds in
Philadelphia rioted over whether Catholic children could be released
from the classroom during Bible reading. 106 Above the level of the
street, the most important consequence of Protestant religiosity in the
public schools was to confirm the determination of Catholics to go
elsewhere. If the public schools were Protestant, the Catholics wanted
their own schools, and for that, they needed money.
The earliest confrontation over public funding came in New York,
where by 1840 Catholics had considerable sway. Bishop John Hughes
argued that if the State planned to educate all children under one roof,

102. MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 24 (1990); Way, The Death ofthe Christian Nation, supra note 100,
at 521 n.26.
103. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 48-49.
104. VINCENT P. LANNIE, PUBLIC MONEY AND PAROCHIAL EDUCATION 30 (1968),
quoted in MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 69; see also THE BIBLE IN
.
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CINCINNATI IN
THE CASE OF MINOR V. BD. OF EDUC. OF CINCINNA TI 64 (1870) ("[T)he Catholic appre
hends danger from the uncommented and indiscriminate reading of the Bible."), quoted in
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 70. The same point was made in
1840 by the Fourth Provincial Council of Baltimore, which included among Catholic objec
tions to Bible reading that each child was habituated to the idea of private interpretation and
invited to rely on his or her own understanding. RICHARD J. GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 275-76 (1937).
105. Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 391-92, 398-400 (1 854) (upholding the power of
school officials to expel a student who refused to read the Protestant Bible); Commonwealth
v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417 (Mass. Police Ct. 1859) (holding that beating a student who re
fused to read the Protestant Bible was within the discretion of public school officials).
106. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 68-69. Anti-Catholic riot
ing also broke out in Charlestown, Massachusetts, and Louisville, Kentucky, where twenty
people were killed. Lash, Second Adoption, supra note 70, at 1119-20 (citing sources).

November 2001]

Establishment Clause

301

then it should exclude religion "in every shape and form. "107 Knowing
that was impossible, however, he campaigned instead for state support
of church schools. The Bishop's efforts so outraged Protestant and na
tivist opinion that in 1842 the New York legislature prohibited funding
of any school where "any religious sectarian doctrine or tenet shall be
taught, inculcated, or practiced."108 This episode united Protestants in
defense of public education and against government funding for
Catholic schools.109 The two sides refought the funding battle several
times, until a state constitutional amendment in 1894 squashed a tem
porary Catholic victory in New York City by banning any public
money for church-related schools.U0
For the remainder of the nineteenth century and into the twenti
eth, the Protestant position was that public schools must be "nonsec
tarian" (which was usually understood to allow Bible reading and
other Protestant observances) and public money must not support
"sectarian" schools (which in practical terms meant Catholic). The
self-interested underside of these propositions surfaced repeatedly.
The Know-Nothing Party arose in the 1850s to fight immigration and
Catholic influence.111 Their 1856 platform demanded public education
free from denominational influence, but simultaneously declared the
Bible "the depository and fountain of all civil and religious freedom"
and condemned any effort to remove it from the classroom.112 In 1869
the National Teachers Association (forerunner of today's National
Education Association) resolved both that "the appropriation of pub
lic funds for the support of sectarian schools is a violation of the fun
damental principles of our American system of education" and that
"the Bible should not only be studied, venerated, and honored . . . but
devotionally read, and its precepts inculcated in all the common
schools of the land."113 Most revealing is the Blaine Amendment, pro-

107. MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 87 (quoting Bishop
Hughes and citing sources).
108. JOHN WEBB PRATT, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY: THE CHURCH-STATE
THEME IN NEW YORK H ISTORY 187 (1967), quoted in MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 88.
109. MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 88.
1 10. N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. 9, sec. 4, quoted in JOHN WEBB PRATT, RELIGION,
POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY: THE CHURCH-STATE THEME IN NEW YORK HISTORY 252
(1967). On receipt of public funds by the Catholic diocese of New York City, see Green, The
Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 42-43.
1 1 1 . 1 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 83, at 833-35.
1 12. 2 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 83, at 67-68. In 1854, Know-Nothing
Party members won the governorship, every state senate seat, and all but two House seats in
Massachusetts. The Massachusetts legislature then passed laws restricting elected office to
native-born citizens and requiring the reading of the "common English" version of the Bible
in public schools. 1 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 83, at 836-37.
113. Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 221.
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posed in 1875, which in 1876 passed the House of Representatives but
fell just short of the two-thirds majority required in the Senate.1 14 The
final version laboriously attempted to close every possible loophole
through which public money might flow to religious schools, then
added that nothing in this elaborately separationist provision should
"be construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or in
stitution . . . . "1 15
The divide between Protestants and Catholics was not merely
theological; it was also political, cultural, and in some sense racial.
American Protestants saw their faith as allied with republicanism116
and feared Catholicism as inimical to democracy. As Stephen Macedo
noted, Americans
could see that the still-young republic's core principles of individual free
dom and democratic equality were at odds with the church's authoritar
ian institutional structure, its long-standing association with feudal or
monarchial governments, its insistence on close ties between church and
state, its endorsement of censorship, and its rejection of individual rights

. . 1 17
Rome hampered attempts by American Catholics to abandon the
Church's legacy by issuing reactionary pronouncements ideally suited
to confirm the rankest prejudice. The Vatican "rejected, proscribed,
and condemned" the possibility of genuinely secular public educa
tion.118 Gregory XVI "greatly deplore[d] the fact that, where the rav
ings of human reason extend, there is somebody who studies new
to freedom of conscience and worship

.

.

1 14. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 59-67. On the per
sonal political background of Blaine's proposal, see Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, The Blaine
Amendment of 1875: Private Motives for Political Action, 42 CATH. HIST. REV. 15 (1956)
(discussing Blaine's presidential ambitions and his desire to resolve doubts about his Protes
tantism).
115. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra
read:

note

18, at 60. The full text

No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; and no religious test shall be required as a qualification to any office or
public trust under any State. No public property and no public revenue, nor any loan of
credit by or under the authority of the United States, or any State, Territory, District, or
municipal corporation, shall be appropriated to or made or used for the support of any
school, educational or other institution under the control of any religious or anti-religious
sect, organization, or denomination, or wherein the particular creeds or tenets shall be
taught. And no such particular creed or tenets shall be read or taught in any school or insti
tution supported in whole or in part by such revenue or loan of credit; and no such appro
priation or loan of credit shall be made to any religious or anti-religious sect, organization,
or denomination or to promote its interests or tenets. This Article shall not be construed to
prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution, and it shall not have the effect
to impair the rights of property already vested.

1 1 6. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND D ISTRUST, supra note 87, at 57 ("Many people viewed
Protestantism as inseparable from the American republican idea.").
1 17. Id. at 61.
1 1 8. Papal Encyclical of 1864 ("reprobatam, proscriptam atque damnatam"), quoted in
MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL, supra note 88, at 123.
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things and strives to know more than is necessary, against the advice
of the apostle."119 And Pius IX ridiculed freedom of conscience as the
"liberty of perdition."120
The perception of Catholics as somehow un-American was forti
fied by the fact that they were overwhelmingly immigrant, urban, and
poor. All three characteristics threatened defenders of Protestant, ru
ral America. For example, Josiah Strong, a prominent evangelical and
author of Our Country, a best-seller of the 1880s, freely mixed relig
ious and social issues in his list of seven perils facing the nation. They
were, in order: immigration, Catholicism, Mormonism, intemperance,
socialism, wealth, and the city.121
Finally, the shift in origin of nineteenth-century immigration from
Ireland to central and southern Europe reinforced the racial element
in anti-Catholic animosity.122 As the nineteenth century advanced,
Protestants increasingly trumpeted their Anglo-Saxon heritage. Thus,
the Reverend James M. King, a Methodist from New York, opined
that the "most important lesson in the history of modern civilization is,
that God is using the Anglo-Saxon to conquer the world for Christ by
dispossessing feeble races, and assimilating and molding others."123
And the Southern Baptists spoke for white Protestants on both sides
of the Mason-Dixon line when they said, in 1890, that God had com
mitted the world's salvation to the "Anglo-Saxon race."124
All these swirling sentiments came to a point in controversies over
the public schools. Catholic educational separatism challenged the
Protestant vision of a Christian America. 1 25 Protestants responded by
trying to keep Bible reading in the public schools and to interdict

1 19. Gregory XVI, Singulari Nos, Jun. 25, 1 834, quoted in MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND
DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 61.
120. Pius IX, Quanta Cura, Dec. 8, 1864, quoted in MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND
DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 61.
1 2 1 . JOSIAH STRONG, OUR COUNTRY: ITS POSSIBLE FUTURE AND ITS PRESENT CRISIS
30--144 (New York, Baker & Taylor Co., 1885); see also HANDY, UNDERMINED
ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 95, at 17-18 (describing Strong's views).
122. See RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 47 (1972)
[hereinafter MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION] ("The nineteenth century
was pockmarked by this virulent fusion of hostility to the newcomer and inherited No
Popery . ).
"

123. James M. King, The Christian Resources of Our Country, in NATIONAL PERILS
AND OPPORTUNITIES 272 (1887), quoted in HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98,
at 106.
124. RUFUS B. SPAIN, AT EAST IN ZION 125 (1967), quoted in HANDY, A CHRISTIAN
AMERICA, supra note 98, at 106-07 ("[T]he religious destiny of the world is lodged in the
hands of the English-speaking people. To the Anglo-Saxon race God seems to have commit
ted the enterprise of the world's salvation.").
125. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 104 ("Criticism of the public
schools seemed to most Protestants to eat away at the foundations of the Christian America
they envisioned.").
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funding of sectarian education. These efforts were basically defensive.
As the nineteenth century advanced and Catholic power grew, Protes
tants sought to entrench their former dominance in constitutions and
statutes.
For Bible reading, such efforts were only marginally successful. As
early as 1869, the school board in Cincinnati, then one of the most re
ligiously heterogeneous of American cities, voted to ban Bible read
ing, hymns, and religious instruction in the public schools.126 The re
sulting firestorm of protest prompted litigation all the way to the Ohio
Supreme Court, which eventually ruled that the school board was
permitted to omit religious instruction if it wished.127 Some urban cen
ters with large Catholic populations followed suit. In the 1870s, New
York City, Chicago, Buffalo, and Rochester banned Bible reading in
the public schools.128 Indeed, by the early twentieth century, a few
state courts had outlawed Bible reading and other religious obser
vances in public school as violative of state constitutions,129 though
most courts continued to approve these practicesY0 In rural areas and
throughout the South, Bible reading remained commonplace, but con
troversies in northern cities made many Protestants aware for the first
time of the assault on their religious and cultural hegemony.131 Where
they could, conservatives responded with coercive legislation requiring
daily Bible reading in public school, but Protestant opinion on that
question was never unanimous,132 and such laws passed in only a mi
nority of jurisdictions.133
126. This episode is recounted in detail in MICHAELSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL,
supra note 88, at 89-98. The school board was said to comprise eighteen Protestants, ten
Catholics, two Jews, and ten "others." Id. at 93 (citing sources).
127. Bd. of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872) ("The Constitution [of
Ohio) does not enjoin or require religious instruction, or the reading of religious books, in
the public schools of the state.").
128. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 47 (citing sources).
129. For decisions forbidding assigned Bible reading in public schools, see People ex rel.
Ring v. Bd. of Educ., 92 N.E. 251 (Ill. 1910); Herold v. Parish Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 68 So. 1 1 6
(La. 1915); State ex rel. Freeman v . Scheve, 91 N.W. 846 (Neb. 1902); State ex rel. Finger v .
Weedman, 226 N.W. 348 (S.D. 1929); State ex rel. Dearle v . Frazier, 173 P. 3 5 (Wash. 1918);
and State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. No. 8, 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890).
130. See G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73, 102 n.162
(1989) (citing decisions, approving Bible reading, from Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Texas).
131. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 47.
132. Illustrative of the lack of Protestant unanimity on Bible reading were the state Re
publican conventions held in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont in March 1876. All three
supported the Blaine Amendment, but declined to take a position on Bible reading in the
public schools. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, supra note 18, at 56.
133. ALVIN JOHNSON & FRANK H. YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 33 (1948) (identifying Massachusetts as the only state to legislate manda
tory Bible reading in the nineteenth century, followed by Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Tennessee, New Jersey, Alabama, Georgia, Maine, Kentucky, Florida, Idaho, Arkansas, and
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Efforts to lock in the other half of the Protestant position proved
more successful. Though the Blaine Amendment failed, many States
incorporated similar provisions in their state constitutions, often be
cause Congress required them to do so as a condition for admission to
the Union. By 1890, twenty-nine of the forty-five States had strongly
worded constitutional prohibitions on the use of public money to sup
port sectarian schools.134 Long before anyone realized that the Estab
lishment Clause embodied a rigorous substantive policy against state
aid to religious schools or that the Fourteenth Amendment had ap
plied that policy to the States, state courts banned public funding of
"sectarian" education under their versions of the Blaine Amend
ment.135 These provisions no doubt reflected many ideas and agendas,
but prominent among them were religious rivalry and anti-Catholic
prejudice. In Everson and its progeny, the Supreme Court applied this
legacy to the nation. At least in its historical antecedents, the constitu
tional ban against aid to sectarian schools was indeed a doctrine "born
of bigotry."
C.

Post-Protestant America

By the mid-1930s, according to historian Robert T. Handy, " [t]he
Protestant era in American life had come to its end."136 Supplanting
the informal Protestant establishment of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries was the recognition that real Americans now came
in three varieties: Protestant, Catholic, and Jew.137 Protestants re
mained the most numerous and continued to dominate many political,

the District of Columbia in the twentieth); BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra
note 90, at 51 (same information).
134. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake, supra note 18, at 673 (1998).
135. 2 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 83, at 70 (noting that, between 1 876
and 1913, thirty-three States passed constitutional amendments prohibiting state aid to paro
chial schools).
136. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 213; see also BLANSHARD,
RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 86, at 6-7 (describing 1940 as the beginning of the
"Post-Protestant" period); MARTIN E. MARTY, THE NEW SHAPE OF AMERICAN RELIGION
72 (1958) [hereinafter MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION] (arguing that Protestant America, by
the 1950s, had become "as obsolete as the side-wheel showboat, the cigar-store Indian, or
the Fourth of July oration").
137. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (1955) [hereinafter HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW] (de
scribing how the three religions became equal parts of a larger, common faith in the "Ameri
can Way of Life"); MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 125
("In contrast with the 19th century public religion, that of the mid-1940s was increasingly
referred to as the distillation of 'Three Great Faiths.' "); Klarman, Rethinking the Revolu
tions, supra note 13, at 53-56 (describing how the influx of Jewish and Catholic immigrants
eventually dismantled the Protestant consensus and hegemony of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries).
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social, and economic institutions,138 but the identification of America
as a specifically Protestant nation was becoming harder and harder to
maintain.139 For the most part, Protestants understood and accepted
the new religious pluralism. As one observer reported in 1955, Protes
tants "are particularly conscious, perhaps, of their coexistence with the
Roman Catholics, but they are also generally ready to acknowledge
the legitimacy of the Jewish community as a thoroughly American in
stitution. "140
At the same time, many Protestants continued to fear Catholic
power.141 By the mid-1940s, Catholics were the country's largest de
nomination.142 In an increasingly urban nation, they dominated many
major cities.143 In addition to growing in number, Catholics also ad
vanced socially and economically, reaching by the mid-1930s "a posi
tion of respect and integration in public life in the United States."144
With this growth and assimilation came newfound confidence, which
surfaced in the increased assertiveness with which Catholics de
manded aid for parochial schools. 145
In the 1920s and 1930s, Catholics had convinced some state legisla
tures to help parochial schools pay for textbooks and bus transporta
tion. By the time the Court decided Everson, twenty-two States had

138. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 227 (reporting that, as
of 1955, roughly 68% of Americans self-identified themselves as Protestants); Ronald James
Boggs, Culture of Liberty: History of Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
1947-1973, at 5 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (on file with
the Ohio State University Library) [hereinafter Boggs, History of Americans United] (not
ing that Protestants maintained a "disproportionate share of economic, social, and political
power and status in the 1940s. As individuals, they dominated most of the important
American institutions and established norms for American culture").
139. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 206-08.
140. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 139. Of course, in ru
ral areas and small towns, Protestantantism remained "virtually identical with the American
people," id. , and many Protestants continued to identify American culture as essentially
Protestant. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 5-6.
141. Will Herberg, The Sectarian Conflict over Church and State, 14 COMMENTARY 450,
453-55 (1952) [hereinafter Herberg, Sectarian Conflict]; Boggs, History of Americans
United, supra note 138, at 11-12.
142. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 6.
143. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 168 ("The great cen
ters of Catholic strength were the cities, some of which (Buffalo, Boston, New York) showed
an actual majority, or very nearly a majority, of Catholics, and other very strong minori
ties."); MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 74 ("Catholicism controls the ur
ban centers with few exceptions outside the South and America is now a nation of urban
dominance."); cf. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 208 (noting that by the
end of the 1930s, "there were few American cities in which Protestant forces had a signifi
cant hold on the larger community to speak for it religiously").
144. GEORGE Q. FLYNN, AMERICAN CATHOLICS & THE ROOSEVELT PRESIDENCY:
1932-1936, at 240 (1968).
145. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 10-11.
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authorized transportation for children attending parochial schools.146
Although even this limited aid caused controversy, it was relatively
muted, in part because most States enacting aid legislation had size
able Catholic populations.147 In 1937, the issue became national and
intensely controversial. In that year, the nascent drive for federal aid
to education showed signs of strength, and the Roman Catholic
Church switched from opposing federal aid to religious schools (out of
fear that it would lead to federal control) to asking for federal tax
dollars to support parochial schools.148 The Catholic schools question
would dominate discussion regarding federal aid for nearly two dec
ades and transmute the issue from one of state choice to one of na
tional constitutional law.
The third group in the triad of American religions was the smallest.
Although the Jewish population increased threefold in the first two
decades of the twentieth century, Jews in the 1930s and 1940s re
mained a tiny minority, between two and three percent.149 Like Catho
lics, they made great strides economically and socially during the first
half of the twentieth century, beginning a march of progress that
would make Jews "the most successful minority group by almost any
standard."150 Jewish achievement stemmed in part from their emphasis
on education. Jewish parents "were passionately concerned with giv
ing their children an education," and they insisted that the education
be secular.151 Perhaps as a consequence, Jewish opinion on church
state relations was intensely separationist, and Jews would play a
prominent role both in resisting aid to religious schools and m ex
cluding religion from public education.152

146. FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
OF CHURCH AND STATE 27-32 (1976) [hereinafter SORAUF, WALL OF SEPARATION];
Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 53-54.
147. Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 53-54.
148. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 23.
149. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98, at 164.
150. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 47 ("Jews are the most
successful minority group in America by almost any standard. . . . By every measure - edu
cation, income, professional status - Jews are disproportionately well off."); MARTY,
AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 75 ("Jewish culture [by the 1950s] has come [like
Catholic culture] to take a similarly responsible place in political life, in the entertainment
world, in literature and the arts, nearly controlling them in many urban centers."); Klarman,
Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 51-53 (describing social and economic integra
tion of Jews in first several decades of the twentieth century).
151. On the importance that Jews placed on education, see HERBERG, PROTESTANT
CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 22, 203-04. On Jewish insistence that public education be
secular, see id. at 254-55.
152. BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 231-35; FOWLER ET
AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 48-49, 76; MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 125-26; Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at
457-59.
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Their prominence in these debates sprang not only from their posi
tion in society and from their commitment to the issue, but also from
the special weight given Jewish views on religious freedom in the af
termath of the Holocaust.153 As the enormity of the crimes against
Jews began to sink in, claims by Jews on issues of religious freedom
gained special resonance. Jews thus not only were motivated to pro
tect public schools from religious influences; they also had special
clout in advocating church-state separation. Even if they did not con
stitute anything close to a third of America's population, on church
state issues Jews laid an equal claim to America's conscience.154
The splintering of a Protestant nation into three great faiths also
reinforced a growing public secularism, especially among educated
elites. That secularism usually did not deny or condemn religious be
lief.155 On the contrary, most persons we would call secularists were af
filiated with a church.156 But increasingly, many Americans took the
view that in a nation of diverse belief, public observances and gov
ernmental policies should respect all faiths. As one prominent Protes
tant leader asked in 1937: "On what ground can we expect the gov153. Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Holocaust and Public Discourse, 11 J.L. & REL. 591,
594-601 (1994-95); Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 54-59.
154. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 40-55; Klarman, Re
thinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 56.
155. Exceptions included John Dewey, an important figure in philosophy and especially
the philosophy of education, who argued as early as 1908 that religion and morality could
indeed be separated. For Dewey, morality was properly considered a secular concept, which
flowed from social interaction rather than divine will. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST,
supra note 87, at 139-45; Harvey G. Neufeldt, Religion, Morality and Schooling: Forging the
Nineteenth Century Protestant Consensus, in RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLING 21 (Thomas C. Hunt & Marilyn M. Maxson eds., 1981). Dewey specifically
urged that public schools should not teach any religious dogma, but instead should promote
democratic ideals as if these ideals were themselves religious. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND
D ISTRUST, supra note 87, at 142 ("Dewey's great aim, therefore, was to promote a society
unified around a progressive democratic religion."). Dewey was not alone in his quest; other
public intellectuals made similar arguments, and in 1933, a number of them signed the Hu
manist Manifesto, which argued that America should be a strictly secular society. See
RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 23 (1984). As Paul Blanshard, one of the signers of the Manifesto and later quite
active in Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State,
explained: "We have an obligation to expose and attack the world of religious miracles,
magic, Bible-worship, salvationism, heaven, hell, and all the mythical deities. We should
[specifically attack] such quack millenialists as Bill Graham and such embattled reactionaries
as [the pope] because they represent the two greatest humanist aggregates in our society."
Id.
156. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 13-16, 52-54 (de. scribing mid-century paradox of pervasive secularism coexisting with sign of pervasive re
ligiosity, including high church membership and attendance). Even those who were not ad
herents of any religion were, as one commentator aptly observed, "imperfectly irreligious,"
WILLARD L. SPERRY, RELIGION IN AMERICA 256 (1948), insofar as they "tend(ed) to re
gard religion as vaguely a 'good thing.' " ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN SOCIETY: A
SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 346 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, AMERICAN
SOCIETY].
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ernment of a country in which half the people are not even nominally
Christians, to lay down policies which are specifically related to Chris
tianity?"157
Describing public secularists with precision is difficult, in part be
cause secularism was (and remains) not so much an articulated phi
losophy as an underlying, pervasive, and almost unconscious means of
organizing life and thought.158 In general, public secularists treated re
ligious belief as personal and in some sense private. They relegated
specific religious beliefs to the private sphere, often while endorsing a
vague public religiosity designed to include all - or at least to offend
none.159 Polling data round out the picture of this kind of secularism
and confirm its ubiquity. In a survey conducted in 1948, the vast ma
jority of respondents indicated that they believed in God and that re
ligion was "very important" in their lives. Yet 54 % of these respon
dents also said that their religious beliefs had no effect on their ideas
of politics and business.160 This paradox exemplified post-World War
II America. While the overwhelming majority of Americans professed
religious belief and claimed membership in one of the three American
religions, many also contributed to a pervasive public secularism.161 As
157. Statement of Samuel McCrea Cavert, quoted in HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA,
supra note 98, at 212. Cavert was the general secretary of the Federal Council of Churches,
which was founded in 1908 and at the time the leading and largest Protestant organization,
representing mainline and some Eastern Orthodox denominations and by extension millions
of individual Protestants. Id.; see also HANDY, UNDERMINED ESTABLISHMENT, supra note
95, at 118-21; HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 1 37, at 134. The Federal
Council of Churches has since been renamed the National Council of Churches and remains
the largest single organization of Protestants. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS,
supra note 1 1 , at 65-67; see also infra text accompanying notes 437-458.
158. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 13.
159. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 253-57; Herberg, Sec
tarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 459; Roy Wallis & Steve Bruce, Secularization: The Ortho
dox Model, in RELIGION AND MODERNIZATION 8 (Steve Bruce ed., 1992); Bryan R. Wilson,
Reflections on a Many Sided Controversy, in RELIGION AND MODERNIZATION 195 (Steve
Bruce ed., 1992). For an interesting and informative overview of secularization theory, which
defends the core idea that religion declined in social significance in the twentieth century,
see David Yamane, Secularization on Trial: In Defense of the Neosecularization Paradigm,
36 J. SCI. STUD. OF REL. 109 (1997); see also Wilson, supra, at 210 (observing that "histori
ans, sociologists, economists [and] psychologists" all "take secularization for granted," and
suggesting that it is possible that they "could be overlooking a social force of paramount im
portance" in the fields in which they are expert, "but I doubt it"). For explication of the idea
that religion has shifted from the public to the private realm, see JOSE CASANOVA, PUBLIC
RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 6-40 (1994) [hereinafter CASANOVA, PUBLIC
RELIGIONS].
160. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 85-86.
161. Id. at 13-14 (describing data indicating that while Bible distribution reached an all
time high during the five-year period from 1949 to 1953, and four-fifths of Americans polled
said they believe the Bible to be the "revealed word of God," a majority of Americans could
not name even one of the first four books of the New Testament). The paradoxical trend has
continued to the present today. As Godfrey Hodgson said of contemporary society, "deeply
embedded religious life flourishes in the midst of a society that is in its public, political, busi
ness, and cultural life firmly secular." HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note
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one commentator described, that secularism essentially involved
"thinking and living in terms of a framework of reality and value re
mote from the religious beliefs simultaneously professed."162
Public secularism also surfaced in a growing faith in what has been
called the "Religion of Democracy" or "the American Way of Life."163
Many Americans who self-identified as Protestant, Catholic, or Jew in
fact subscribed to a common structure of belief, synthesizing
all that commends itself to the American as the right, the good, and the
true in actual life. It embrace[d] such seemingly incongruous elements as
sanitary plumbing and freedom of opportunity, Coca-Cola and an intense
faith in education - all felt as moral questions relating to the proper way
of life.164

Among the ingredients in this secular religion was religion itself.
Although Americans increasingly disregarded (or transcended) their
specific religious affiliations, they were expected to profess belief in
God.165 As William Lee Miller put it, Americans' faith was "not in
God but in faith itself."166 The differences among religious beliefs re
ceded before the conviction that all three great religions supported the
overarching American faith in democracy and in itself.167 For many,
the three great religions represented simply "different boats heading
11, at 164; accord ANDREW M. GREELEY, RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN AMERICA 33 (1989);
Daniel 0. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role of Competing
Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J. L. & RELIGION 1 , 8-10 (1993-94).
162. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 14; see also MARTY,
AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 76-78. The Lynds' famous Middletown study sup
ports the secularism that Herberg describes. When they studied Middletown in the 1920s,
the Lynds discovered a significant gap between religious theory and actual practice; by the
mid-1930s the gap had developed into a chasm "so wide that the entire institution of religion
has tended to be put on the defensive." See HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA, supra note 98,
at 208.
163. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 87-104; MARTY,
AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 78-89.
164. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 88-89; see a/so
MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 78-83 (describing similar tenets of the
religion of democracy).
165. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 88, 97-98.
166. William Lee Miller, Piety A long the Potomac, THE REPORTER, Aug. 17, 1954,
quoted in HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 88 (He continued:
"[W]e worship not God but our own worshiping.").
167. OSCAR HANDLIN, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 222
(1954) ("Creedal differences still divided Americans into more than two hundred and fifty
distinct sects. But those differences now faded in importance."); HERBERG, PROTESTANT
CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 101 (suggesting that the three American faiths had come
to be seen by many "as three diverse, but equally legitimate, equally American, expressions
of an over-all American religion"); WILLIAMS, AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 156, at 337
(arguing that Americans had "a marked tendency to regard religion as good because it is
useful in furthering other major values," and thus the Christian and Jewish faiths were
prized insofar as they promoted values and standards of behavior that Americans were ex
pected to share).
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for the same shore."168 Dwight D. Eisenhower captured this relation
ship when he said that "[o]ur government makes no sense unless it is
founded in a deeply felt religious faith - and I don't care what it is."169
To a European, such a statement would have seemed heretical or silly,
but Americans understood their leader perfectly. Eisenhower was not
voicing indifference to religion but rather "the conviction that at bot
tom the three great faiths were really saying the same thing in affirm
ing the spiritual ideals and moral values of the American Way of
Life."17° For many Americans, religion had become merely the
"handmaiden to democracy."171 Aside from the vague sense that re
ligion was a good thing, national life was becoming increasingly secu
lar.
In this essentially secular concept of the role of faith, no denomina
tion could demand public support for specifically denominational
goals; to do so would have been an act of heresy against the common
religion of democracy.172 This is where the Catholic Church got into
trouble. To be sure, the secularization of faith and the reality of relig
ious pluralism influenced the American Catholic Church. The tradi
tional Catholic endorsement of church-state union remained in place
in church manuals throughout the first half of the twentieth century,
but American Catholic leaders increasingly took a different line, re168. MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 86.
169. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address Before Directors of Freedoms Foundation (Dec.
22, 1952), in N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1952, at 16. President George H.W. Bush made a similar
statement years later, when referring admiringly to this "Nation's Judaeo-Christian moral
heritage and . . . the timeless values that have united Americans of all religions and all walks
of life: love of God and family, personal responsibility and virtue, respect for the law, and
concern for others." Proclamation No. 6508, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2313 (Nov. 20,
1992).
170. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 98.
171. Arthur Mann, Charles Fleischer's Religion of Democracy, 16 COMMENT. 557
(1954). For further discussion of Mann's article, see MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION, supra
note 136, at 78.
172. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 98-99. Herberg argues
that, by mid-century, the notion that no single church or religion should be favored by the
state had become
something quite axiomatic to the American. This feeling, more than anything else, is the
foundation of the American doctrine of the 'separation of church and state,' for it is the
heart of this doctrine that the government may not do anything that implies the pre
eminence or superior legitimacy of one church over another.
Id. at 99; cf John Coleman Bennett, Patterns of Church-State Relations - Grounds for Sepa
ration, in CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN H ISTORY 174 (John F. Wilson & Donald L.
Drakeman eds., Beacon Press 1987) (1965). Writing in 1958, Bennett, who was president of
the influential and prestigious Union Theological Seminary in New York City, observed:
Today when Church-State problems are discussed in this country the one concern that ranks
above all others is the fear that one Church or a group of Churches may finally be able to
use the state to bring about discrimination against citizens on grounds of religion or to limit
the freedom of any religious bodies.
Id.
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nouncing any desire to establish Catholicism as the national religion in
the United States.173 Speaking for the Catholic hierarchy in 1948,
Archbishop John T. McNicholas declared: "We deny absolutely and
without qualification that the Catholic Bishops of the United States
are seeking a union of church and state by any endeavors whatsoever,
either proximate or remote. If tomorrow Catholics constituted a ma
jority in our country, they would not seek a union of church and
state." 1 74 Nevertheless, the Catholic Church during this period aggres
sively sought aid for Catholic schools. In so doing, they revived Protes
tant and Jewish anxieties about Catholic domination. Just as impor
tant, they threatened what had become the high church of the
Religion of Democracy: the public school.175
1.

The New Coalition Against A id to Religious Schools

In this post-Protestant America, where citizens feared the Catholic
Church and revered the public schools, the inherited antipathy for aid
to religious schools commanded wide support. In many ways, the
Catholic Church's growing strength proved to be a weakness, as it mo
tivated non-Catholics to oppose the Church's demand for school aid.
Thus, while the Church had limited success in securing state subsidies
for some parochial school expenses in the 1920s and 1930s, the effort

173. HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 164-65.
174. The Catholic Church in American Democracy, press release of the National Catho
lic Welfare Conference, Jan. 26, 1948, quoted in HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW,
supra note 137, at 165. Earlier Catholic leaders made similar statements, including Cardinal
Gibbons, who declared in 1916 that Catholics preferred the American form of government
to any other. "The separation of church and state in this country seems to [Catholics] the
natural, inevitable, and best conceivable plan, the one that would work best among us, both
for the good of religion and of the state. . . . No establishment of religion is being dreamed of
here, of course . . . " 1 JAMES CARDINAL G IBBONS, A RETROSPECT OF FIFTY YEARS 21011 (1916); see also Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 5-6 (describing
position of Catholic "Americanists," who supported religious pluralism and the separation of
church and state). Not all Catholic leaders agreed with the "Americanist" position, to be
sure, and some continued to argue in favor of the traditional Catholic state. See, e.g. , John A.
Ryan, Comments on the Christian Constitution of States, in THE STATE AND THE CHURCH
29-39 (John A. Ryan & M.F.X. Millar eds., 1922). Ryan argued that the "State should offi
cially recognize the Catholic religion as the religion of the commonwealth." Did this mean
that other religions would not be tolerated? Ryan's response could not have provided much
comfort to non-Catholics: "Much depends on circumstances," he wrote, "and much depends
upon what is meant by toleration." Id. at 34-35.
.

175. On reviving Protestant and Jewish fears, see, e.g., BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND
THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 23; Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 455-59;
and Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 1 1-13. On the status of the pub
lic school as the "church" of the religion of democracy, see MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND
DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 141 (noting that Dewey believed in the religion of democracy
and that the "high church of this civil religion . . . was the public school"); and MARTY,
AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 80 (Arguing that the religion of democracy "has
few temples or churches or synagogues. But it has an 'established church' in the field of pub
lic education.").
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to secure federal aid in the late 1930s provoked intense resistance. 176
During the 1940s and 1950s, certain States and cities (usually with sub
stantial Catholic populations) provided incidental aid to religious
schools, but the weight of opinion in the nation as a whole remained
decidedly hostile.177 Three powerful segments of society opposed the
Catholic position: almost all Protestants, who remained cohesive on
this issue; almost all Jews; and public secularists.178
The first and most important constituency in the anti-aid coalition
was the Protestant faithful. The demise of the informal Protestant es
tablishment in the early twentieth century did not cause Protestants to
rethink their views on school aid. If anything, Protestants became
more united in their opposition; mainline denominations and funda
mentalists, leaders and flocks, all came together to oppose public
funding of religious schools.179
In 1941, for example, three Baptist groups - the Southern Bap
tists, the Northern B aptists, and the National Baptists - formed the
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs.180 The Committee organ
ized to present a unified Baptist position on issues of church and state
and to combat the increasing power and influence of the Catholic
Church. 181 From the outset, the Committee took a strictly separationist
position, opposing the appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican,
lobbying (at least initially) against federal education bills that included
some aid to parochial schools, and arguing against the use of public
funds to provide transportation to parochial schools.182
One year after the creation of the Baptist Joint Committee, fun
damentalist and evangelical churches formed the National Association
of Evangelicals ("NAE"), which also favored strict separation of
church and state, "especially as the state might interrelate with the

176. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 23.
177. Id. ; Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 53-54.
178. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 121-23; MORGAN,
THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 81-88; Wilber G. Katz & Harold
P. Southerland, Religious Pluralism and the Supreme Court, 96 DAEDALUS 180, 188 (1967).
179. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 5.
1 80. Id. at 7; Stan Halsey, The History and Contributions of the Baptist Joint Committee
on Public Affairs, 20 BAPTIST HIST. & HERITAGE 35, 36-37 (1985); [hereinafter Halsey,
Baptist Joint Committee]; Walfred Peterson, The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs
and the Amicus Curiae Brief, 66 MID-AMERICA 121, 122 n.4 (1984) [hereinafter Peterson,
Baptist Joint Committee].
181. RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT: CHURCH AND
STATE IN AMERICA 54 (1968) [hereinafter MORGAN, POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT];
Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 7.
182. RICHARD V. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE: EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY AND
POLITICAL CONSERVATISM 67-68 (1970) [hereinafter PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE];
Halsey, Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 180, at 36-37; Peterson, Baptist Joint Committee,
supra note 180, at 122-24.
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Roman Catholic Church."183 The NAE opposed aid to religious
schools, as well as the appointment of an ambassador to the Vatican.184
On school-aid issues, the Baptist Joint Committee and the NAE allied
with the largest of all Protestant organizations, the National Council of
Churches ("NCC"), which represented the bulk of mainline Protes
tantism.185 Like its smaller counterparts, the NCC took a separationist
stance on aid to religious schools.186 Taken together, these three
groups represented an enormous and diverse constituency, from the
liberal mainline churches to the conservative fundamentalist ones.187
All saw the Catholic Church as a potential threat - a threat to Protes
tants, to the public schools, to religious freedom and, indeed, to de
mocracy itself.188
By the time the Court decided Everson in February of 1947, the
Protestant-Catholic battle over church and state, and especially over
the funding of religious schools, was well underway. Protestant groups
had helped kill a 1945 proposal to provide federal funds to private
schools, including religious ones.189 In 1946, Protestants protested en
masse against President Truman's decision to appoint an ambassador
to the Vatican.190 And in January of 1947, Protestant groups rose in
opposition to a bill introduced by Senator Taft of Ohio that would
have provided federal aid to religious schools where such aid was not
prohibited by state law.191 In explaining why Protestants should oppose
the bill, the editor of the Christian Century argued that preventing

"·

183. Boggs, History o f Americans United, supra note 138, a t 9 .
184. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, a t 72-80.
185. The National Council of Churches, created in 1950, was a successor organization to
the Federal Council of Churches, which was formed in 1908. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN
AMERICA, supra note 98, at 171-74, 221; Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note
138, at 7.
186. See, e.g. , General Assembly of NCC, Letter to Christian People of America, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1952, at 17 [hereinafter Letter to Christian People]; see also BOLES, THE
BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 233.
187. The NCC alone represented approximately thirty-five million Protestants. BOLES,
THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 233; HERBERG, PROTESTANT
CATHOLIC-JEW, supra note 137, at 139; Letter to Christian People, supra note 186, at 17. The
Baptist Joint Committee represented about fifteen million Baptists when founded in 1941,
and the NAE represented 1.5 million evangelicals and fundamentalists by 1947. Boggs, His
tory of Americans United, supra note 138, at 7-9.
188. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 120, 141-42;
MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 87-88; Boggs, History
of Americans United, supra note 138, at 33-34, 40.
189. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 21.
190. Id. at 14-16; MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at
85.
191. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 22-26.
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Catholics from getting public funds would help preserve America as a
Protestant nation.192
Everson both affirmed and affronted the Protestant position. On
the one hand, the separationist rhetoric of both majority and dissent
confirmed the understanding of American Protestants that the Consti
tution itself condemned school aid. Nothing in the opinions led Protes
tants to doubt either the historical foundation or the constitutional le
gitimacy of their position. To the contrary, the Everson opinions told
Protestants that hostility to parochial schools sprang not from sectar
ian rivalry or narrow self-interest but from high principle. On the
other hand, the actual result of the case - in which the Court ap
proved transportation funding for parochial schools - sparked alarm.
Protestant periodicals, organizations, and leaders issued dire warnings
about Catholic inroads on the separation of church and state. Editori
als in the Christian Century expressed the hope that Everson would
wake the mass of Protestants to Catholic encroachments on the wall of
separation,193 while Methodist, Baptist, and Presbyterian leaders spoke
ominously of the Catholic Church's "determined and adroit cam
paign" to alter the traditional American understanding of the proper
relationship of church and state.194
Protestant leaders formed a new organization to combat the
Catholic threat. In May of 1947, leaders of Protestant denominations
and organizations - including representatives from the Baptist Joint
Committee and the predecessor of the National Council of Churches
- launched Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separa
tion of Church and State ("POAU").195 Its sole purpose was "the
maintenance of the American principle of separation of church and
state."196 Although POAU tried (not always successfully) to refrain
from crass prejudice, it did not shrink from openly criticizing the
Catholic Church. Shortly after its founding, for example, POAU sent
the New York Times an "Open Letter" accusing Catholic leaders of
trying to subvert the Constitution.197 Similarly, POAU helped lead the
opposition to President Truman's reappointment of an ambassador to

1 92. CHARLES CLAYTON MORRISON, THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
(1947) (discussed in Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 25).
193. Editorial, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 26, 1 947, at 262-63.
194. This statement came from the Reverend Louis Newton, President of the Southern
Baptist Convention, and is quoted in MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, su
pra note 122, at 83. For similar statements by Methodist and Presbyterian leaders, see id. at
82-83; Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 28-30.
195. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 77; SORAUF, WALL OF
SEPARATION, supra note 1 46, at 33; Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at
42-43.
196. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 59.
197. PAOU, An Open Letter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1 948, at 20.
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the Vatican and aggressively fought against legislative or judicial ap
proval of any aid to religious schools.198
This unified and energized Protestant opposition to school aid was
strongly supported by American Jewry. Believing that Jewish freedom
depended on a secular society, Jewish groups were even more ada
mant than Protestants in demanding separation of church and state.199
Jews opposed any interaction of church and state when it came to
schools, and Jewish groups joined Protestants in court and before leg
islatures in arguing against any aid to religious institutions.200 This po
sition reflected not only the general Jewish preference for seculariza
tion of a largely Christian nation, but also a specific fear of the
Catholic Church and its burgeoning political strength. For Jews, the
Catholic Church remained the greatest threat to a secular society and
the source of the historic Christian intolerance of Jews. The Catholic
Church, in Jewish eyes, remained "the standard form of Christianity
and the prime symbol of Christian persecution. Deep down, it is
Catholic domination that is feared. "201 From this perspective, aid to
religious schools was another example of Catholic assertiveness and
political strength, and fighting against such aid preserved religious lib
erty.202
Protestants and Jews also resisted funding of religious schools in
order to protect public education. The desire to preserve the public
schools and their mission of assimilating students from diverse back
grounds reinforced less lofty reasons for opposing aid to parochial
education. Leaders of the forerunner of the NCC, for example, often
argued against aiding religious schools on the ground that doing so
would encourage more such schools and lead to further fragmentation
of education in the United States. "Public support for parochial
schools," said one NCC representative appearing before the Senate in
1947, "would divide the community into sectarian educational systems
198. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 47; Boggs,
History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 269-83.
199. Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 457.
200. On the Jewish position and their legislative advocacy, see BLANSHARD, RELIGION
AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 124; FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra
note 1 1 , at 48; and Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 457. As for their activities
in the Courts, various Jewish groups, such as the American Jewish Congress, have filed ami
cus briefs advocating the separationist position in a host of cases, including Engel, Schempp,
Allen, Lemon, and Sloan. See Mueller v. Allen 463 U.S. 388, 389-90 (1983); Sloan v. Lemon,
413 U.S. 825, 826 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1971); Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 204 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 421 (1962). In fact,
the American Jewish Congress has filed more amicus briefs before the U.S. Supreme Court
advocating separation of church and state than any other group. Dena S. Davis, Ironic En
counter: African-Americans, Jews, and the Church-State Relationship, 43 CATH. U. L. REV.
109, 1 12 (1993).
201. Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 459.
202. Id.
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and destroy the unity essential as democracy faces the totalitarian
threat to freedom."203 A similar statement appeared in the 1960 Doc
trines and Disciplines of the Methodist Church, which expressed the
Methodists' unalterable opposition "to the diversion of tax funds to
the support of private and sectarian schools. In a short time, this scat
tering process can destroy our public school system and weaken the
foundations of national unity."204
In seeking to protect the public schools, Protestants and Jews
aligned themselves with public secularists of all persuasions who had
come to identify the nation with its public schools. Many secularists
objected to aid to religious schools not specifically because it would
help Catholics, nor even more generally because it would help relig
ion, but because it would hurt public education. It is difficult to over
state the widespread support for, and belief in, public schools during
this period.205 It had become clear that "[t]he school, not the church,
would now Americanize ethnic minorities and culturally deprived
groups. The school, not the church, would now give instruction in pru
dence and morality - the basic niceties that became known as 'citi
zenship.' "206 To the many who saw public schools as crucial to Ameri
can democracy, funding religious schools seemed a dangerous
diversion.207 In a famous speech delivered in 1946, Dr. James Bryant
Conant, President of Harvard, argued that federal funds should go
203. Statement of Samuel Calvert, quoted in LUKE E. EBERSOLE, CHURCH LOBBYING
IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL 270 (1951). Similarly, in its Letter to Christian People, published
in the New York Times in 1952, the NCC stated that funding religious schools would "be a
devastating blow to the public school system, which must be maintained." Letter to Christian
People, supra note 186, at 17. Less than a decade later, the NCC released a similar state
ment, suggesting that funding religious schools would fragment education in the United
States, which in turn "would destroy the public school system or at least weaken it so gravely
that it could not possibly adequately meet the educational needs of all the children of our
growing society." Statement of NCC, Feb. 22, 1961, quoted in BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND
THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 124.
204. BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 247; see also
MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 89-90 (reporting that
Catholic criticism of public schools and advocacy of funding for religious schools alarmed
"wide sectors of the Protestant community and especially . . . Protestant educators"); Boggs,
History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 11 ("Protestants feared that if aid were
given the Catholic schools the result would be governmental support for private, church in
terests and, most importantly, would mean the destruction of the public schools.").
205. See WILLIAMS, AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 167, at 290-91 (describing the
"widespread faith in education" in this country and suggesting that "America's faith in uni
versal education is its greatest asset"); see also supra text accompanying note 187 (discussing
status of schools as the high church of the religion of democracy).
206. Edwin S. Gaustad, Consensus in America: The Church's Changing Role, 36 J. AM.
ACAD. OF RELIGION 28, 35-36 (1968).
207. E.g. , MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 85-88;
Robert F. Drinan, State and Federal Aid to Parochial Schools, 7 J. CHURCH & ST. 67 (1965)
("The argument [against aid to religious schools] today centers . . . on the asserted indispen
sability of the public school as an organ of national unity."); Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, su
pra note 141, at 456.
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only to public schools, because of their distinct contribution to democ
racy.208 Many educators shared this view.209 Indeed, some believed that
all children should be required to attend public schools "in order that
they might be protected against divisive cultural influences and helped
to acquire a common outlook."210 Leaders of the National Education
Association accordingly worked to secure money for public schools
while preventing funding of private schools, sectarian and nonsectar
ian alike; their support for the separationist position was largely a
function of their commitment to public education.211
Against this array of opinion, Catholic support for religious educa
tion proved ineffective. Given that almost all private religious schools
were Catholic, it was easy to picture aid to religious schools as a con
flict pitting Catholics against the rest of America. As described in 1963
by Paul Blanshard, a leader of the POAU and a strident critic of the
Catholic Church, the "sectarian financial issue is 99 percent a Catholic
issue . . . . Here is joined a Catholic versus American battle, with or
ganized world Catholicism committed to a program and a philosophy
of ecclesiastical education . . . while the law and tradition of the
United States favor support for public schools."212 Blanshard's rhetoric
may have been extreme, but it did not much overstate the position of
other Protestants, nor that of Jews and public secularists. As historian
Richard Morgan observed, on the issue of aid to religious schools, "all
sorts of Protestants, Jews, and secularists - those politically and doc
trinally conservative, and those with liberal persuasions . . . - could
make common cause. "213 Everson adopted that cause and read it into
the Constitution.
2.

The Secularization ofPublic Schools

The Supreme Court's campaign to oust religion from the public
schools was never as popular as its ban against aid to religious schools.
The project of public-school secularization did not begin in earnest un
til Engel and Schempp in the early 1960s. The project of public-school
secularization was never as popular as its ban against aid to religious
schools.214 The Court had glanced in this direction in 1948, when
208. See MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 88; Boggs,
History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 20.
209. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 25-26.
210. Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 456.
211. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 26; MORGAN, POLITICS OF
RELIGIOUS CONFLICT, supra note 181, at 58-59.
212. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 120.
213. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 85.
214. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
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McCollum struck down released-time programs in public school,215 but
McCollum did not have lasting impact. Just four years later, the Court
approved released-time programs held off school property, a ruling
that transformed the released-time controversy from one about relig
ious instruction in public schools into part of the larger fight over aid
to religious education.216 Left unanswered was the more inflammatory
question of prayer, Bible reading, and other religious observances in
public schools. In the early 1950s, the justices ducked the question.217
When they finally reached it in Engel and Schempp, they did so in a
political environment increasingly tolerant of secularization.218
The political forces arrayed against religion in the public schools
were roughly the same as the coalition against aid to religious educa
tion, with one dramatic difference. On this issue, America's Protes
tants were not united. During the 1940s and 1950s, leading Protestant
organizations seemed uncertain on the issue. Some groups, including
Baptist and Presbyterian organizations, publicly opposed school
prayer and Bible reading.219 Others, including the National Council of
Churches, expressed the hope that some "constitutional way" be
found to continue traditional observances.220 Still other groups said
nothing at all, including POAU, the staunchest opponent of aid to pa
rochial schools, whose board could not agree whether prayer and Bi
ble reading in public school classrooms violated their separationist
principles.221
Given the prominence of these issues after Engel and Schempp, it
may seem surprising that Protestant organizations did not stake out a
clearer position in advance of those decisions. At the time, however,
there were good reasons for separationists to keep a low profile. In
most places, public education had already become largely secular, and
Protestants generally were comfortable with this transformation.222
215. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
216. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding law that allowed students to
leave public schools during the day in order to receive religious education in church schools).
For discussion of Zorach and McCollum, see BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS,
supra note 136, at 80-81; and Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 109-30.
217. See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (deciding, by 6-3 vote, that tax
payer lacked standing to challenge New Jersey statute providing for the reading without
comment of verses from the Old Testament at the start of each school day). For discussion
of Doremus, see BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 86-91 .
218. LUCAS A . POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 378 (2000)
[hereinafter POWE, THE WARREN COURT] (noting that "(i]n the religiously pluralistic soci
ety of the 1960s, the Court had terrific support" for its prayer and Bible reading decisions).
219. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 64; BOLES, THE
BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 240-45.
220. NCC, Letter to Christian People, supra note 186, at 17.
221. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 196, 267-68.
222. BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 277 (describing how,
by the time of Engel and Schempp, "[t)he change to a secular public school system . . . was

320

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:279

Moreover, in the 1950s the nation became obsessed with fighting
communism at home and abroad. In the midst of a national crusade
against "godless alien communism," those who opposed religious ob
servances in schools risked being misunderstood as dissenters from the
American way of life.223 Thus, even those Protestant leaders who fa
vored completely secular public education had reason not to publicize
that position.
After Engel and Schempp, Protestant leaders could no longer
avoid taking a stand, and the waning passions of domestic anticommu
nism made it easier for them to do so.224 Accordingly, the vast majority
of Protestant leaders and organizations announced their support for
excluding official prayer and Bible reading from the public schools.
Baptist and Presbyterian leaders had already taken this position.225
Joining them were POAU, which hesitated briefly before endorsing
Engel, and the NCC, which eventually embraced both Engel and
Schempp .226 Protestant periodicals commended the decisions.227 After
Engel, one liberal publication featured a manifesto, signed by thirty
one Protestant leaders, arguing that the Court's ruling protected "the
integrity of the religious conscience and the proper function of relig
ious and governmental institutions."228 The glaring exception to the
near-consensus of Protestant opinion was the National Association of
Evangelicals. Conservative evangelicals decried the Court's decisions,

complete," and observing that, with "few exceptions, the public schools of this country no
longer conduct religious exercises"); Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 451 (ob
serving, in 1952, that "public school education . . . is no longer religious, neither Catholic, nor
Protestant, nor Jewish; it is, by and large, secularist, even militantly so").
223. POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 218, at 182; SORAUF, WALL OF SEPARA
TION, supra note 146, at 12-13; Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 60-62.
224. Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 60-62 (arguing that the
Court was reluctant in the 1950s to appear to be on the side of "atheistic communists" on
religious issues, but by 1962-63, "domestic anti-communism had become a largely spent
force").
225. See supra text accompanying note 219. The Southern Baptist Convention went so
far as to issue a statement after Engel, "thank[ing) the Supreme Court for this decision sim
ply because such a required prayer is using the government to establish religion." Quoted in
EDWARD L. QUEEN II, IN THE SOUTH THE BAPTISTS ARE THE CENTER OF GRAVITY:
SOUTHERN BAPTISTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1930-1980, at 109 (1991).
226. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 63-65; Boggs, His
tory of Americans United, supra note 138, at 509-11.
227. The conservative periodical Christianity Today, for example, ran an editorial de
fending Engel, which argued that the decision was "compatible both with a proper Christian
attitude toward government stipulation of religious exercises, and with a sound philosophical
view of freedom." Editorial, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Jul. 20, 1962. A similar editorial ap
peared on July 4, 1962, in the liberal periodical, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY.
228. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 66. This statement
was signed by, among others, a former president of the NCC, Methodist Bishops, and the
President of the Southern Baptist Convention.
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voicing grave fears over the increasing secularization of schools and
society.229
Jews joined mainline Protestant leaders in supporting Engel and
Schempp.230 Indeed, Jewish commitment to public secularism in an
overwhelmingly Christian nation led them to oppose school prayer
and Bible reading with as much intensity as they fought school aid.231
Jews insisted that public schools be hospitable to all faiths.232 They de
fended the Court's decisions with powerful claims for religious plural
ism, arguing that any sort of religious exercise - no matter how pur
portedly nondenominational - would offend their beliefs.233
Accordingly, as Paul Blanshard described, "[f]rom the very beginning
of the prayer controversy, the Jewish response was more articulate
than that of any other religious group supporting the Court."234
Separationist Protestants and Jews were joined by public secular
ists, who also sought to keep the public sch.ools free from religion.
Public secularists viewed opposition to school prayer and Bible read
ing as axiomatic, given that one of their defining beliefs was (and is)
that religion should be largely private.235 This principle applied with
special force in the public schools, where students were a captive audi
ence and any religious exercise would potentially be coercive. Ac
cordingly, public secularists defended the ban on school prayer and
Bible reading on the grounds of religious pluralism. As Paul Freund
argued in 1965: "With more than two hundred sects in the United
States, over eighty of t.hem having more than fifty thousand members

229. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 82; Boggs, History of Ameri
cans United, supra note 138, at 509-13.
230. Indeed, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, and the
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith filed amicus briefs in both cases supporting the
secularist position.
231 . Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 457 (describing Jewish position on
aid to religious schools and religion in public schools as staunchly separationist).
232. See Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 58-59 ("To most Jews,
school prayer and Bible reading remained exclusionary practices.").
233. BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 217-23 (noting that
most Jewish groups believed that any religious exercises or observances in public schools
would necessarily discriminate against minority religions); MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 125-26 (stating that Jews were not comfortable with any
religious observances in public schools); Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 45960 (describing how most Jews felt that public religious observances would relegate Jews to
the margins of society).
234. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 67; cf Klarman,
Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 58-59 (suggesting that the prayer and Bible
reading decisions "can be seen as a symbolic recognition of [Jews'] more complete accep
tance into American society").
235. See Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141, at 459 (observing that Jewish lead
ers shared "the basic secularist presupposition that religion is a 'private matter' "); see also
supra text accompanying notes 158-161.
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each, it is not easy to envisage a strictly nonsectarian exercise. One
man's piety is another's idolatry."236
If nondenominational religious exercises were truly impossible,
many secularists concluded, they should be avoided altogether. Both
the Washington Post and the New York Times argued that religion in
public schools would spark discord. The Post said that excluding re
ligious exercises "free[d] the public schools from an observance much
more likely to be divisive than unifying," while the Times noted that
"nothing could be more divisive .in this country than to mingle religion
and government in the sensitive setting of the public schools."237 The
broad consensus of elite opinion on this issue (as well as the close con
nection between Jews and public secularists) was demonstrated when
Leo Pfeffer, counsel for the American Jewish Congress, rounded up
110 law school deans and professors of law and political science to sign
a letter to the Senate Jt1:diciary Committee supporting Engel and op
posing school-prayer amendments on the ground that such obser
vances in public schools would endanger "the institutions which have
preserved religious and political freedom in the United States. "238
Reinforcing the desire to maintain secular education in the public
schools was the growing faith in the religion of democracy. In the nine
teenth century, Horace Mann and other common-school leaders
sought to maintain nondenominational (but Protestant) observances
because they thought religion essential to moral training. Truly secular
education would have lacked a moral compass. The desire for a moral
foundation continued in post-Protestant America, even as the pan
Protestantism of the early common-school movement became less and
less successful. But by the mid-twentieth century, many Protestants,
Jews, and public secularists thought of democracy, patriotism, and
"the American Way Life" as the moral basis for instruction.239 Just as
236. PAUL A. FREUND & ROBERT ULICH, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 14
(1965); see also BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 89 ("A mo
ment's reflection will show that in a society which is as pluralistic as ours there is virtually no
religious or ceremonial phenomenon that is not sectarian to somebody.").
237. Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 27, 1962; Editorial, WASH. POST, Jun. 29, 1962. These
editorials echoed what Justice Frankfurter had argued over a decade earlier in his concur
rence in McCollum. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Frankfurter argued against released-time on the ground that
religion interfered with the democratizing and assimilationist mission of public schools: "De
signed to serve as perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a het
erogeneous democratic people, the public school must keep scrupulously free from entan
glement in the strife of sects." Id. at 216-17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
238. The text of the statement appears in Prayers in Public Schools and Other Matters:
Hearing on S.J. Res. 205, S.J. Res. 206, S.J. 207, S. Con. Res. 81, S. Res. 356 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 167 (1962). A story on the statement appeared in the
New York Times. See 'Tampering' Seen in Prayer Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1 1 , 1962, at 134.
239. See BOLES, THE BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 202; MARTY,
AMERICAN RELIGION, supra note 136, at 80-82; Herberg, Sectarian Conflict, supra note 141,
at 451.
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Horace Mann had turned to uncommented Bible reading as a way of
uniting warring Protestants, his successors in the leadership of public
schools turned to the civil religion of democracy as a way of uniting
increasingly divergent faiths. Agnes Meyer, a strong advocate of
secularization, captured the idea:
If we bear in mind that the whole future of our democracy depends upon
moral solidarity, freedom of conscience, and freedom of inquiry, the
secularization of our schools becomes an act of .sublime courage and
sublime loyalty to the American faith that our institutions should be of
the people, by the people, and for the people.240

The coalition of Protestants, Jews, and secularists produced a re
markable array of elite opinion in favor of the Supreme Court's
school-prayer and Bible reading decisions.241 This coalition left out
conservative evangelicals - who were then Jess numerous, less well
organized, and far less influential than today - and Roman Catho
lics.242 The Catholic position requires explication. Historically, relig
ious observances in public schools had been distinctly Protestant, and
Catholics objected to them on that ground.243 In the 1940s, the church
changed its mind and began to call for religious content in public edu
cation. The switch sprang in part from the elimination of Protestant
specificity in religious exercises and in part from growing confidence
that Catholic students would not be "lost to the fold" if they said ecu
menical prayer.244 Partly, however, the change in position was strate
gic. Catholic leaders began highlighting the secularization of public
education in order to bolster the case for church schools. If public
schools could be portrayed as hostile to the devout, the argument for
funding religious education would be strengthened.245 This strategic
240. Agnes E. Meyer, The Clerical Challenge to the Schools, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1952, at 44. The Jesuit publication COMMONWEAL referred to Meyer as "the national
spokesman" for the emerging religion of democracy. Contra Gentiles, COMMONWEAL, Jun.
4, 1954, at 212. For further discussion of Meyer, see MARTY, AMERICAN RELIGION, supra
note 136, at 80-81.
241. E.g. , POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 218, at 358 ("There was a dominant
view shared by the well-educated - and therefore the justices of the Court - that religion
was a private matter, best left to the homes and the churches.").
242. The marginal status of conservative evangelicals at the time is confirmed by the fact
that two contemporary observers, in reviewing the "Protestant" reaction to the prayer and
Bible reading decisions, said nothing about the reaction of conservative evangelicals.
BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 62-66, 1 15-18; BOLES, THE
BIBLE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 90, at 226-50.
243. Leo Pfeffer, Amici in Church-State Litigation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 96
(1981) (noting that "before McCollum, practically every suit challenging religious practices
in the public schools was brought by Catholic parents").
244. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at 125.
245. E.g. , BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 58-62 (de
scribing how Catholic leaders and periodicals sought to use the decision in Engel "as a
weapon in the campaign for parochial school aid"); Editorial, CATHOLIC REGISTER, Apr.
22, 1962 ("An adverse decision [in Engel) may not be altogether bad. It should shock many
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motivation was not lost on commentators at the time: an editorial in
the New York Post, for example, suggested that Cardinal Spellman's
denunciation of Engel was prompted "not by the prohibition of a
prayer which many churchmen would agree has little religious value,
but by the potential impact of the decision on the aid-to-education
battle."246 That Catholic leaders actually cared more about funding
Catholic schools than they did about keeping religion in the public
schools became even more apparent when Catholic leaders either re
mained neutral or testified against constitutional amendments to vali
date school prayer.247
The fact that mainline Protestant leaders, Jews, and public secu
larists supported the Court's decisions against school prayer and Bible
reading does not mean that a majority of Americans agreed. On the
contrary, polls suggested that most Americans disapproved of the de
cisions, and some school districts ignored them.248 In addition, a ma
jority in Congress - but not the requisite supermajority - supported
constitutional amendments to authorize school prayer.249 These facts
would impeach the claim - if anyone were prepared to make such a
claim - that the Supreme Court slavishly follows popular opinion,250
but they do not negate the utility of looking at the Establishment
Protestants out of their old· complacency and dogged opposition of their leadership to any
aid to the religious school child."). The strategy employed by Spellman was similar to the
one pursued over a century earlier by Bishop Hughes, who sought ultimately to use the lack
of religion in public schools as a means of securing funding for Catholic schools. See supra
text accompanying notes 116-117.
246. Excerpts from Editorials on School Prayer Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 29, 1962, at
11.
247. POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 218, a t 361 (explaining that, "in 1963
Catholic leaders had their sights on far bigger game - federal dollars for parochial schools
- and were thus less inclined to worry about prayer in public schools"); Tyack, Onward
Christian Soldiers, supra note 83, at 246 (noting that the "great majority of Protestant,
Catholic, and Jewish leaders testifying on [the) prayer amendment[s) argued that the Court's
decision [in Engel] was a proper interpretation of the American experiment in religious lib
erty"); James E. Wood, Jr., Religion and Education in American Church-State Relations, in
RELIGION, THE STATE, AND EDUCATION 32-33 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1984) (noting that
"Roman Catholicism maintained an unsympathetic neutrality" regarding the prayer
amendments).
248. Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 15 (noting that polls re
vealed "that anywhere from sixty to eighty percent of the public favored" the practices out
lawed in Engel and Schempp); Gallup Poll, Sept. 1964, in Public Opinion Online, Roper
Center, Apr. 1 1 , 1990 (77% of those polled favored a constitutional amendment to legalize
school prayer); National Opinion Research Center, Oct. 1964, in Public Opinion Online,
Apr. 19, 1989 (57% of those polled strongly favored - and 26% somewhat favored school prayer).
249. SORAUF, WALL OF SEPARATION, supra note 146, at 312-13; Ellis Katz, Patterns of
Compliance with the Schempp Decision, 14 J. PUB. L. 396, 398-401 (1965).
250. The most prominent proponent of the view that the Supreme Court's work gener
ally confirms rather than contradicts majoritarian sentiment is Michael Klarman, and even
he does not deny that the Court "occasionally plays a limited countermajoritarian function."
Klarman, Rethinking the Revolutions, supra note 13, at 6, 15 (emphasis in original).

November 2001]

Establishment Clause

325

Clause in political context. At least three factors suggest why a Court
deeply influenced by societal attitudes would have moved to secularize
public education despite majority sentiment against that view.
First, polls and votes likely overstated the depth of support for
school prayer. The positions of the Catholic Church and the United
States Congress are especially telling. Catholic leaders strongly de
nounced Engel and Schempp, but when constitutional amendments
were proposed to reverse them, Catholic leaders sat on their hands.251
Similarly, many members of Congress found it impolitic to vote
against those amendments but recognized privately that reinstating
least-common-denominator school prayer would not bolster real
faith.252 Politicians, like the Catholic hierarchy, had reason to cham
pion the idea of school prayer, but many were not committed to put
ting that idea into practice.
Second, and more importantly, the controversy over school prayer
revealed a huge gap between the cultural elite and the rest of
America. People generally may have supported school prayer and
Bible reading, but the leadership class did not. Elite support for the
Supreme Court's secularization project was clearly visible in the activi
ties of law professors and deans, in the prominent newspaper editori
als endorsing Engel and Schempp, and most importantly in the views
of mainline Protestant leaders, who overwhelmingly supported the
prayer decisions and opposed efforts to overturn them.253 The contrary
opinions of many of the Protestant faithful, especially conservative
evangelicals, were less visible and less influential than the announced
positions of religious organizations and leaders.
Just how easily the cultural elite dismissed evangelical opinion is
captured in a wonderful quotation from Philip Kurland's Foreword to
the Harvard Law Review's survey of the Supreme Court's 1963 term.254
Kurland was no fan of the Warren Court. After vehement criticism of
its work, he admitted that the Court was "fortunate" in its enemies,
251. See infra text accompanying notes 261-262.
252. E.g. , BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 52-74 (de
scribing how members of Congress initially came out strongly against Engel but gradually
came to accept the decision after reading positions of religious leaders and opinions in lead
ing periodicals); POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 218, at 188-90, 361-63, 377-78 (de
scribing congressional reactions to Engel and Schempp and concluding that legislative pro
posals to overrule those decisions had no real chance of passing); Boggs, History of
Americans United, supra note 138, at 513 (noting that members of Congress were afraid to
vote against school-prayer amendments because "it was like voting against God"). As
Blanshard and Powe point out, part of what initially angered Southern members of Congress
was the fact that, as in desegregation, the Court was interfering with state control of educa
tion. BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 52; POWE, THE
w ARREN COURT, supra note 218, at 1 88-89.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 224-240.
254. Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative
and Executive Branch of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143 (1964)
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adding that "it is difficult not to help resist attacks from racists, from
the John Birch Society and its ilk, and from religious zealots who insist
that the Court adhere to the truth as they know it."255 As L.A. Powe
observed, the fact that a noted conservative scholar could so readily
lump "religious zealots" with racists and Birchers "says far more about
how mainstream thought . . . viewed the publicly religious than it does
about the publicly religious themselves."256 The Supreme Court and its
intellectual allies readily discounted popular support for school prayer.
To the justices, the broad consensus among mainline Protestants,
Jews, and public secularists would have seemed richly confirmatory of
the need to eliminate religious observances from public schools, even
if a majority of Americans disagreed. Not surprisingly (and not for the
last time), the justices championed the dominant views of the nation's
elite as against popular opinion.257
Although we have not found polling data from the 1960s that dis
aggregate school prayer opinion along class lines, subsequent data
strongly confirm a gap between popular and elite opinion.258 In 1991,
support for school prayer fell from 73% of those with less than a high
school education, to 63 % of those with a high school degree, to 44 %
of those who graduated from college, to only 31 % of those with a
graduate degree. And while a majority of persons with annual incomes
below $30,000 favored school prayer, a majority of those with incomes
above $75,000 opposed it.
Finally, the Supreme Court's own prior pronouncements influ
enced its insistence on excluding religion from public schools. The
Court could not reconcile school prayer with its high-flown separa
tionist rhetoric in Everson. The justices had only two choices: they
could either purge religion from the public schools or eat their own
words. As Edmond Cahn remarked at the time, when seen against the
background of Everson's version of history, "the Supreme Court's de
cision in Engel v. Vitale was about as close to predictable as the judi
cial process becomes. "259 Engel and Schempp not only followed the
255. Id. at 176, quoted in POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 21 8, at 358.
256. POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 218, at 358.
257. The description also fits the Court's work in obscenity, flag-burning, and other pro
tections of minority speech. See Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great Aboltt Constitlttional
ism, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 189-91 (1997) (describing ways in which the Court's decisions
reflect elite opinion); cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than
the villeins - and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the
lawyer class from which the Court's Members are drawn.").
258. National Opinion Research Center, Poll 1991, in Public Opinion Online, Roper
Center, Jan. 23, 1995.
259. Edmond Cahn, On Government and Prayer, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 981, 986 (1%2); cf
BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE SCHOOLS, supra note 136, at 79 ("The Court, having em
barked on its present interpretation of constitutional history . . . could not have reached any
other conclusion in the prayer case without contradicting its whole recent philosophy.").
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historical and rhetorical framework of Everson, but also fit comforta
bly within a broader trend of increasing protection for religious mi
norities, which was itself a response to the nation's increasing religious
pluralism. Most prominently, the Court had upheld the right of
Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse to salute the flag or pledge allegiance at
the start of the school day.260 The sensibility that sought to protect
Jehovah's Witnesses and other religious minorities from official coer
cion261 also motivated Engel and Schempp. The Court recognized that
in a religiously pluralistic society, any public observances were bound
to offend some believers and, in some contexts, would tend to coerce
them. Put another way, Engel and Schempp drew not only on the
imagined history and separationist rhetoric of the modern Establish
ment Clause but also on a concern for individual liberty of conscience
more readily identified with the Free Exercise Clause.
III. THE COMING REVOLUTION
"It is written in our country's constitution that church and state must be,
in this nation, forever separate and free."
Reverend W.A. Criswell, Pastor of
the First Baptist Church of Dallas,
the

largest

congregation

Southern Baptist Convention,

in

the

1960262

"I believe this notion of the separation of church and state was the fig
ment of some infidel's imagination."

1984263
For over three hundred years, Baptists and other Protestants in
sisted on strict separation of church and state. They unselfconsciously
tolerated religious exercises in public schools, but insisted on strict
separation when it came to funding religious schools. From the middle
of the seventeenth century until the middle of the twentieth, American
Protestants, with few exceptions, shared a vision of church-state rela
tions shaped not only by Protestant traditions and principles, but also
by mutual self-interest and a shared suspicion of Roman Catholics.264
- Reverend W.A. Criswell,

260. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
261. E.g. , Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (upholding the right of a Seventh Day
Adventist to receive unemployment benefits after being discharged for refusing to work on
Saturday); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (striking down Maryland law that re
quired all public officers to affirm a belief in God).
262. W.A. Criswell, Religious Freedom and the Presidency, ACTION, Sept. 1960, at 9-10.
263. Richard A. Pierard, The Historical Background of the Evangelical Assault on the
Separation of Church and State in the U.S.A., in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CHURCH AND STATE 65 (Menacham Mor ed., 1993).
264. See supra Sections II.B, ll.C; see also FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS,
supra note 1 1 , at 13-14; MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION, supra note 122, at
82-93.

328

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 100:279

Today, much has changed. Protestant opinion is now divided both
on aid to religious schools and on religious observances in the public
schools. Leaders of mainline Protestant denominations now take a
consistently separationist stance, opposing both aid to religious
schools and religion in the public schools. Evangelical Christians take
a consistently accommodationist position, advocating both aid to re
ligious schools and the reintroduction of religion into public educa
tion. Where there was once a nearly monolithic, if internally contra
dictory, Protestant position on church and state, there is now a great
schism, with each side staking out internally consistent but diametri
cally opposed positions.
This splintering of Protestant opinion might not have been of ma
jor consequence but for another change among Protestants: a dramatic
shift in energy and political power from mainline denominations to
evangelicals. The former have lost parishioners and political clout, so
much so that by the 1990s some suggested that the mainline denomi
nations had become the "sideline" denominations. Meanwhile, evan
gelical churches experienced explosive growth.265 Newly energized
evangelicals joined other faiths in alliances that would have been uni
maginable a few decades ago. Most remarkably, evangelical Christians
sided with Catholics and Orthodox Jews in supporting aid to religious
schools. We believe that this coalition will eventually produce a new
understanding of the Establishment Clause.266 Indeed, as Mitchell v.
Helms indicates, the transformation may already be underway.
A. The Supreme Court and Christian Academies
An irony in modern church-state politics is the Supreme Court's
unintended role in energizing the political forces that now seek to
overthrow its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Court itself
planted the seeds of revolution, first in ordering desegregation and

265. For descriptions of the simultaneous decline of mainline denominations and growth
among evangelical churches, see FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 ,
a t 42-43; ANDREW M . GREELEY, RELIGIOUS CHANGE I N AMERICA 3 3 (1989); HODGSON,
CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 11, at 165-66; and DONALD E. MILLER,
REINVENTING AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM: CHRISTIANITY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 4
(1997).
266. Sources for this paragraph include FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, su
pra note 11, at 29-148; AMY STUART WELLS, TIME TO CHOOSE: AMERICA AT THE
CROSSROADS OF SCHOOL CHOICE POLICY 138-39 (1993) [hereinafter WELLS, TIME TO
CHOOSE]; Bruce S. Cooper, The Changing Demography of Private Schools: Trends and Im
plications, 16 EDUC. & URBAN SOC'Y 429, 437-42 (1984) [hereinafter Cooper, Changing
Demography of Private Schools]; John Herbers, Activism in Faith: Big Shift Since '60, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1984, at B9 [hereinafter Herbers, Activism in Faith]; William J. Reese, Sol
diers for Christ in the Army of God: The Christian School Movement in America, 35 EDUC.
THEORY 175, 177, 194 (1985) (hereinafter Reese, Soldiers for Christ].
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later in excluding prayer and Bible reading from the public schools.267
These two lines of decision caused evangelicals to form their own
schools.268 The dramatic explosion of evangelical schools, in turn, drew
evangelicals from the pulpits into politics and helped transform their
views on separation of church and state. The story of the coming
revolution therefore begins with the rise of the Christian academy.
In the early days of this country, many Protestant denominations
experimented with church schools, but this effort gave way to the
common-school movement and the proliferation of public schools in
the late nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century, most Prot
estants no longer sponsored religious schools.269 A few evangelical
groups - the Missouri Synod Lutherans, the Seventh Day Adventists,
and the Calvinists (Christian Reformed) - continued to do so, but
their numbers were always small.270 Additionally, a few fundamentalist
churches, perhaps 150 nationwide, founded private schools in the first
half of the twentieth century.271 Overwhelmingly, however, religious
schools were Catholic schools.272 Until the late 1960s, almost all Prot
estants - whether liberal or conservative, mainline or evangelical attended public schools. These public schools reflected Protestant val-

267. The crucial desegregation decision was Green v. New Kent County School Board,
391 U.S. 430 (1968), in which the Court rejected a freedom-of-choice plan, indicated that the
time for "all deliberate speed" in desegregation had ended, and ushered in the phase of mas
sive desegregation in the South. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE:
THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, 78 (1979) [hereinafter
WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE]. The prayer and Bible reading decisions were, re
spectively, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) and Abington School District v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
268. That the two sets of decisions were linked in the eyes of some observers is apparent
from the statement of Representative George Andrews of Alabama, who stated after the
Engel decision: "They put the Negroes in the schools and now they're driving God out."
HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 1 1 , at 168.
269. James C. Carper, The Christian Day School, in RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN
AMERICA 1 1 1 (James C. Carper & Thomas C. Hunt eds., 1984) [hereinafter Carper, The
Christian Day School]; Susan Rose, Christian Fundamentalism and Education in the United
States, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY: RECLAIMING THE SCIENCES, THE FAMILY,
AND EDUCATION 452-53 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993) [hereinafter
Rose, Christian Fundamentalism]; Smith, Parochial Education, supra note 97, at 1 96-97.
270. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 175. See generally WALTER H. BECK,
LUTHERAN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: A H ISTORY OF THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS AND SYNODICAL EDUCATIONAL POLICIES AND
PROGRAMS (1939) (describing the creation and growth of Lutheran elementary schools).
271 . Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 1 1 1-12.
272. Donald A. Erickson, Choice and Private Schools: Dynamics of Supply and De
mand, in PRIVATE EDUCATION: STUDIES IN CHOICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 82, 86 (Daniel C.
Levy ed., 1986) [hereinafter Erickson, Choice and Private Schools]; Thomas C. Hunt &
Norlene M. Kunkel, Catholic Schools: The Nation 's Largest Alternative School System, in
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 1-7 (James C. Carper & Thomas C. Hunt eds., 1 984).
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ues, and some continued to sponsor pan-Protestant religious exer
cises.273
Enter school desegregation. The South met Brown v. Board of
Education with massive resistance.274 The ultimate threat in the
South's arsenal of reaction was to close the public schools altogether
and/or to create all-white private academies, perhaps with the help of
state-funded vouchers.275 By 1958, all Southern States except
Tennessee had enacted school-closing measures.276 Because of the suc
cess of Southern defiance and the glacial pace of school desegregation,
few public schools were closed, and correspondingly few segregationist
academies were opened, in the ten years after Brown.277 Notable ex
ceptions occurred, including the closing of the Prince Edward County
public schools in rural Virginia and the opening of private all-white
schools supported by state vouchers.278 But overall, Southern private
school enrollment remained nearly level in the decade after Brown.279
Change began in 1964, when desegregation first became a reality in
many parts of the South. Private schools began to multiply after the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ensuing increase in
court-ordered desegregation. In 1964 the Citizens Council (formerly
the White Citizens Council) opened the first of a chain of private seg
regation academies in Mississippi, and the first segregationist acade
mies opened in South Carolina in the same year.280 Over the next three
273. DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 17851954, at 90-91 (1987); Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 1 12-119; Reese,
Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 177-78; Tyack, Onward Christian Soldiers, supra note
83, at 216-19.
274. WILKINSON, FROM BROWNTO BAKKE, supra note 267, at 78-102.
275. NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 248-50, 275, 279, 281-84,
288-89 (1969) [hereinafter BARTLEY, MASSIVE RESISTANCE]; MATTHEW LASSITER,
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SECESSIONISM, THE SEGREGATED PRIVATE SCHOOL MOVEMENT
IN THE SOUTH 6-7 (Dec. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter
LASSITER, TWENTIETH-CENTURY SECESSIONISM); WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE,
supra note 267, at 82.
276. BARTLEY, MASSIVE RESISTANCE, supra note 275, at 288-89; LASSITER,
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SECESSIONISM, supra note 275, at 8.
277. BENJAMIN MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE: THE STORY OF INTEGRATION SINCE
THE SUPREME COURT'S 1954 DECISION 156-57 (1964) [hereinafter MUSE, TEN YEARS OF
PRELUDE).
278. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE, supra note 267, at 95-102; Jennifer E.
Spreng, Scenes from the Southside: A Desegregation Drama in Five Acts, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 327, 340-43 (1997). See generally BOB SMITH, THEY CLOSED THEIR SCHOOLS:
PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1951-1964 (1965). The Supreme Court put an end to
this form of resistance in Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), when it or
dered Prince Edward officials to reopen and fund racially nondiscriminatory public schools.
279. MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE, supra note 277, at 156-57; DAVID NEVIN &
ROBERT E. BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT: SEGREGATIONIST ACADEMIES IN
THE SOUTH 6 (1 976) [hereinafter NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT).
280. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 7; see also
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1974) (noting that, between the 1963-1964 school

November 2001]

Establishment Clause

331

years, enrollment in segregation academies increased ten-fold, and the
number of schools grew by nearly two hundred.281 Although some
were affiliated with churches, most were secular and located in rural
areas where total resistance to any integration held sway.282
By the late 1960s, both the rural and the urban South faced immi
nent desegregation. The result was a dramatic explosion in the number
of private schools and a turn to church-based education.283 Private
schools arose in rural areas when it became clear that freedom-of
choice plans and other means of token compliance would no longer
suffice. They arose in urban areas as they too faced orders to desegre
gate, often by forced busing.284 The demise of freedom-of-choice and
the advent of busing triggered a massive exodus of whites from public
schools and a scramble to find private alternatives.285 Those fleeing
public schools, particularly in urban areas, often turned to churches as
the organizing loci for new schools.286
The numbers tell the story. In 1954, fewer than 1 % of students in
the South attended private school. By 1971, that figure had grown to
6% across the region and 12% in certain States.287 If we narrow our fo
cus a bit, it becomes clear that the pace of private school enrollment
tracked the pace of school desegregation. A comparative focus clari
fies the role of school desegregation. Between 1961 and 1971, enroll
ment in private, nonsectarian schools in the twelve-state southeast re
gion grew by 242.2%, and enrollment in non-Catholic sectarian
schools grew by 167.7% .288 This dramatic explosion in private educayear and 1970, the number of private, non-Catholic schools in Mississippi grew from seven
teen to 155, with enrollment increasing from 2,362 to an estimated 42,000).
281. Kitty Griffith, Segregation Academies Flourish in South, SOUTH TODAY, Oct. 1969,
at 1 .
282. NEVIN & BILLS, T H E SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, a t 1 - 1 1 ;
Georgann Hansen Eglinski, Note, Section 1981 Applicable to Private School Admissions, 25
U. KAN. L. REV. 247, 251-52 (1977) [hereinafter Eglinski, Private School Admissions];
Jerome C. Hafter & Peter M. Hoffman, Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82
YALE L.J. 1436, 1441-48 (1973) [hereinafter Hafter & Hoffman, Segregation Academies].
283. LASSITER, TWENTIETH-CENTURY SECESSJONISM, supra note 275, at 6-10; John C.
Walden & Allen D. Cleveland, The South 's New Segregation Academies, 53 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 234, 234 (1971).
284. See NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 11.
285. Eglinski, Private School Admissions, supra note 282, at 251 ; Hafter & Hoffman,
Segregation Academies, supra note 282, at 1441.
286. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 7-8.
287. Eglinski, Private School Admissions, supra note 282, at 251 .
288. The figures in this and the preceding sentence are from the U.S. Office o f Educa
tion, and are reported in Hafter & Hoffman, Segregation Academies, supra note 282, at 1442
n.45. See also Virginia Davis Nordin & William Lloyd Turner, More Than Segregation
Academies: The Growing Protestant Fundamentalist Schools, 61 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 391
(1980) [hereinafter Nordin & Turner, Protestant Fundamentalist Schools] (describing the
rapid growth of Christian academies between 1961 and 1979).
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tion in the South was directly contrary to the contemporary experi
ence in the rest of the nation. In the five years following the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, while private school enrollment increased tenfold
in the South,289 it decreased 23 % nationwide.290
The most significant and enduring of the new private schools were
the Christian academies. Also known as Christian day schools, the
academies were sponsored by a range of evangelical Protestants; some
were affiliated with individual churches and others with local Christian
school societies.29 1 The most conservative wing of the evangelical
movement, the fundamentalists, sponsored a significant number of
academies, then and now.292 Although many evangelical and funda
mentalist churches do not affiliate with a particular denomination,
many are Baptist, and independent Baptist congregations sponsored a
large fraction of the Christian academies.293 The school founders used
the terms Christian day school or Christian academy to emphasize the
fundamentalist distinction between those who are "saved" (true Chris
tians) and those who are not.294 The schools usually had small enroll
ments, predominately of white children from middle-class and work
ing-class families. Though they had differing educational qualities and
facilities, Christian academies shared an emphasis on religion, obedi
ence to authority, and traditional conservative values.295
The academies were havens from all that conservative Protestants
found wrong with public education, and the first complaint was inte
gration. That desegregation prompted the creation of Christian
academies is sometimes disputed, perhaps because of lingering reputa-

289. Jeremy A. Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination: Federal Regulation of Private Education
by the Internal Revenue Service, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 138-39 (Neal E.
Devins ed., 1989) [hereinafter Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination].
290. Hafter & Hoffman, Segregation Academies, supra note 282, at 1442 n.45.
291. See Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 1 13; Erickson, Choice and
Private Schools, supra note 272, at 88-89; Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at
453.
292. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 453-54.
293. Peter Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l.R.S., 61 PUB. INT. 18, 21-23 (1980) [herein
after Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l.R.S.].
294. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 453. Christian academies
should also be distinguished from "Christian" schools begun by the Calvinists or Dutch Re
formed. Although they also refer to their schools as "Christian," Calvinist Day Schools be
.
gan much earlier than the Christian day schools, did not begin primarily as a protest against
public schools, and generally do not associate with Christian academies or their support or
ganizations. Id. at 454; see also Donald Oppewal & Peter P. DeBoer, Calvinist Day Schools:
Roots and Branches, in RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 58-80 (James C. Carper &
Thomas C. Hunt eds., 1984).
295. For descriptions of the schools and the families whose children attended them, see
NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 19-88; PAUL F.
PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS 3-110 (1987) [hereinafter PARSONS,
INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS]; Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, 177-87.
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tional damage,296 but the temporal connection between public-school
desegregation and the advent of Christian academies is too obvious to
ignore: Christian academies blossomed in the late 1960s, when deseg
regation became a reality in the South.297 Many conservative Chris
tians and commentators point to the prohibition of school prayer and
Bible reading as the motivations for creating Christian academies. Al
though these decisions doubtless played a part,298 they came down in
1962 and 1963, respectively.299 Christian academies - many of which
were begun quite hastily - did not appear in numbers until late in the
decade.300 It is implausible to believe that conservative Christians did
nothing for five or six years in response to the school-prayer and Bible
reading decisions, then suddenly leapt into action to organize private
schools, often on shoe-string budgets and in makeshift facilities. The
more plausible inference is that the precipitating event was the arrival
of blacks in large numbers in previously all-white public schools.
Geography reinforces this conclusion. Christian academies began
in the South.301 Within that region, they tended to be concentrated in
areas where flight to de facto segregated public schools was impossible
or inconvenient. In Memphis, for example, where avoiding school de
segregation meant moving across state lines, Christian academies
flourished; in Atlanta, where flight to a suburban jurisdiction was easy,
few private schools blossomed.302 If religion and not race were the
dominant motivation behind the initial wave of Christian academies,
both timing and location would have been different.
296. PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 1 16; James
C. Carper & Jack Layman, Black-Flight Academies: The New Christian Day Schools, 61
EDUC. FORUM 1 14, 1 15-16 (1997) [hereinafter Carper & Layman, Black-Flight Academies];
Skerry, Christian Schools v. IRS, supra note 293, at 28, 34-35.
297. A few specific examples help solidify the point. An article in The Nation in 1969,
described the "opening of 50 new 'Christian Academies' in North Carolina, the year before
it was clear that North Carolina must 'totally integrate its schools." Harry Golden, THE
NATION, Dec. 22, 1969, at 697. Another article, which generally downplays the connection
between school desegregation and Christian academies, nonetheless admits that "there is no
question that non-public enrollments in Louisville have increased substantially since the im
plementation of forced busing." Nordin & Turner, Protestant Fundamentalist Schools, supra
note 288, at 392.
298. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 26; Skerry,
Christian Schools v. the l.R.S., supra note 293, at 26.
299. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
300. On the haste with which Christian academies were erected, see NEVIN & BILLS,
THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 27-36; and Golden, supra note 297, at
697.
301. PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at xii.
302. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 1 1 -12. See
also PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 124-25 (de
scribing how a metropolitan desegregation plan in Little Rock, Arkansas, drove white par
ents from the school and led to the opening of Christian academies "all over the Little Rock
metropolitan area").
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Finally, many of those involved in creating Christian academies
spoke candidly about their motivations. "I would never have dreamed
of starting a school, hadn't it been for busing," reported Brother Floyd
Simmons, who created the Elliston Baptist Academy in Memphis
during the early 1970s.303 Other pastors admitted that "some parents
send their kids to Christian schools because they just don't like
blacks. "304 Some parents spoke with equal frankness. When asked why
she sent her children to a Christian academy, one parent responded: "I
am revolting against busing. "305
To be sure, integration was not the only thing that conservative
Christians tried to escape. They left public schools for other reasons
only partly based on racial discomfort: they also disliked the values
being taught to their children, the lack of discipline, and the danger
and chaos that many of them came to see in the public schools.306 As
an early study described, conservative Christians who fled to the
academies viewed the public schools as "horrid and dangerous places.
They believe schools are full of drugs, sexual license and fighting; that
white teachers are intimidated by black students, and black teachers
can't handle students of either race; that classrooms are chaotic, disci
pline has vanished and learning has stopped. "307
They also believed that public schools had become godless.308 Here
the formative hand of the Supreme Court again emerges. Many of
those supporting Christian academies pointed to the Court's prayer
and Bible decisions as their reason for abandoning public schools.309
North Carolina parents who were asked why they left public schools
most frequently cited the Court's school-prayer decision.310 That deci
sion, reinforced by the Court's Bible-reading decision the following
year, led many evangelicals to conclude that hostility to religion domi
nated the public schools.
303. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 30.
304. See Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l. R.S. , supra note 293, at 28.
305. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 25. We do
not mean to suggest that all opposition to busing reflected racial animus, but only that deseg
regation - and the means to achieve it - provoked white flight to Christian academies.
306. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 19-25;
Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 177-79; Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra
note 269, at 455-56; Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l. R.S. , supra note 293, at 26-28.
307. NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 21.
308. Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 88; Nordin & Turner,
Protestant Fundamentalist Schools, supra note 288, at 392; Rose, Christian Fundamentalism,
supra note 269, at 455; David Sikkink, The Social Sources of Alienation from Public Schools,
78 SOCIAL FORCES 51, 66 (1999).
309. RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 165-68 (1984); Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 1 1516.
310. Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l. R.S. , supra note 293, at 26.
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In the next two decades, more and more evangelicals came to
share this disdain for public education. By the late 1970s and 1980s,
the desire to escape the immorality and godlessness of public schools
augmented and reinforced the desire to avoid integration. While de
segregation provided the original impetus for Christian academies,
opposition to the secularization of public education gave them suste
nance.311 As conservative Christians came to dislike what their chil
dren were being taught in the public schools (as well as who attended
them), they became increasingly pointed in their criticisms. "We be
lieve public schools are immoral," said one private school activist in
Kentucky. "The public schools breed criminals. They teach [children]
they're animals, that they evolved from animals. Christianity has been
replaced by humanism in the public schools. It's disgusting."312 As this
statement suggests, conservative Christians often targeted humanism
- or so-called "secular humanism" - as the cause of moral decline in
the public schools. "Humanism has turned our public schools into a
jungle," said one parent from Nebraska, "in which any kind of animal
can do anything it wants. "313 There is no reason to doubt the sincerity
of such statements, but there is also no reason to ignore the echo of
racial unease they contain.
Growing disenchantment with public schools led evangelicals and
fundamentalists to seek private altematives.314 In the 1980s and 1990s,
Christian academies constituted the fastest growing segment of private
education.315 Precise enrollment figures are hard to come by, in part
because many schools refused to report information and in part be
cause the federal and state governments did not aggressively seek to
account for private-school enrollment.316 Nonetheless, estimates exist,

311. E.g., PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 126
("Clearly, the evidence suggests that the primary motivation for the continued existence of
Christian schools is religious and not racial.").
312. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 178.
313. Id. at 178-79.
314. The change in position regarding private schools represented not only a departure
from the traditional Protestant stance, but also a departure from the more recent stance
taken by fundamentalists toward Christian day schools. As one scholar reported, until the
early 1960s, "most right-wing Fundamentalist churches were officially opposed to the 'Chris
tian day school movement,' " insisting that fundamentalists should patronize public schools.
Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 90.
315. See Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 454. See generally Nordin &
Turner, Protestant Fundamentalist Schools, supra note 288, at 391; Reese, Soldiers for Christ,
supra note 266, at 180.
316. On reporting and monitoring difficulties, see NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT
FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 5-9; Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at
1 16; Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 89; and Rose, Christian Fun
damentalism, supra note 269, at 454-55.
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and all portray explosive growth.317 According to Professor Donald
Erickson, one of the most respected scholars of private education, in
1961-1962 no more than 250 or 300 Christian academies existed na
tionwide.318 By 1982-1983, there were approximate!y 10,740.319 The en
rollment figures are equally remarkable. In 1965, approximately
1 10,000 students attended Christian academies.320 By 1982, that figure
had grown to over 900,000.321 By 1985, approximately one million stu
dents - one-fifth of all private school students - attended Christian
academies. 322
Though concentrated in the South, Christian academies were not
confined to that region.323 They arose throughout the country, includ
ing in areas that never had to confront school desegregation.324 Today,
Christian academies exist in nearly every state, and their student bod
ies are increasingly diverse.325 Virtually every such school has adopted
a nondiscriminatory racial policy, and an estimated 75 % are at least
nominally integrated.326 In addition, a small but growing number of
black evangelical congregations have created their own schools.327

317. Although commentators arrive at different estimates regarding the growth and
numbers of Christian academies, they uniformly describe the growth as explosive or dra
matic. JEREMY RIFKIN & TED HOWARD, THE EMERGING ORDER: GOD IN THE AGE OF
SCARCITY 121-26 (1979); PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note
295, at 186; Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 1 16; Cooper, Changing
Demography of Private Schools, supra note 266, at 430; Erickson, Choice and Private
Schools, supra note 272, at 89; Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 175; Rose,
Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 455.
318. Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 89.
319. Cooper, Changing Demography of Private Schools, supra note 266, at 430.
320. Id. at 432; Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 87.
321 . Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 87.
322. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 175; Carper, The Christian Day
School, supra note 269, at 1 14-15. Growth in Christian academies has slowed in recent years,
as indicated by estimates of enrollment in the 1990s, which still hover around one million
students. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 33; Rose, Christian
Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 454.
323. Judith Cummings, Non-Catholic Schools Growing Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1983,
at Al (reporting statistics from National Center for Education that show enrollment in non
Catholic religious schools grew by 47% in the Northeast during the 1970s, while enrollment
quadrupled during this period in the South).
324. PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 126; Nordin
& Turner, Protestant Fundamentalist Schools, supra note 288, at 391-92; Skerry, Christian
Schools v. the l.R.S. , supra note 293, at 18.
325. Carper & Layman, Black-Flight Academies, supra note 296, at 1 15-16; see also
PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 186.
326. Carper & Layman, Black-Flight Academies, supra note 296, at 1 15-16.
327. Id. at 1 15-18.
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Nonetheless, enrollment at most Christian academies remains over
whelmingly white.328
Importantly, the surge in Christian academies occurred during a
period when enrollment in Catholic schools declined dramatically. Un
til 1965, to say you were enrolled in a private school was to say, essen
tially, that you attended a Catholic parochial school. In 1965, 6.3 mil
lion students attended private schools; of that number, 5.5 million almost 90% - attended Catholic parochial schools.329 Of those re
maining, 350,000 attended nonreligious institutions, and slightly more
than 450,000 went to religious schools not associated with the Catholic
Church. Thus, while Catholic schools accounted for nearly 90% of all
private-school enrollment, all other religious schools combined including Protestant schools of all denominations and Jewish schools
- accounted for only 7% of that figure.330
Over the next two decades, the demographics of private schools
changed dramatically, with Catholics and Protestants passing each
other at the schoolhouse door. As conservative Christians led a mass
exodus from the public schools, many Catholics deserted parochial
education in favor of public school.331 Between 1965 and 1983, while
Christian academies grew by over 700%, Catholic schools lost nearly
half their enrollment, with the number of students falling from 5.6 to
three million.332 Many causes account for this drop in enrollment, in
cluding a declining birthrate, the Church's failure to build schools in
the suburbs, and the growing acceptability of public schools, which
had lost their Protestant identification.333 Whatever the precise cause,
the result was clear: By the mid-1980s, private schools were no longer
overwhelmingly Catholic. Indeed, by 1984, there were 1,300 more
Christian academies than Catholic parochial schools, although the lat
ter had a majority of private-school students because of higher aver
age enrollment.334
The rise of Christian academies and decline of parochial schools
has had three important consequences for church-state politics. First,
Catholic schools no longer dominate the private school landscape. In
328. PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 126; Carper
& Layman, Black-Flight Academies, supra note 296, at 1 15; Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra
note 266, at 187.
329. KENNETH A. SIMON & W. VANCE GRANT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUC. AND WELFARE, D IGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS 32 (1968).
330. Id.
331. Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 1 1 1 .
332. Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, a t 87.
333. SORAUF, WALL OF SEPARATION, supra note 146, at 322-23; JOSEPH P. VITERITTI,
CHOOSING EQUALITY 81-82 (1999) [hereinafter VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY);
Erickson, Choice and Private Schools, supra note 272, at 86-88.
334. Cooper, Changing Demography ofPrivate Schools, supra note 266, at 430.
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the 1997-1998 school year, 27,400 private schools existed nationwide,
serving nearly five million students - approximately 10% of total
elementary and secondary school enrollment.335 For the first time in
this century, Catholic schools accounted for less than half of private
school enrollment. Other religious schools, most of which are Chris
tian academies, enrolled 34.8% of private-school students. Although
precise figures on enrollment in Christian academies are not available,
a conservative estimate puts it at no less than 20% of the total of all
private-school students.336 This growing diversity among private
schools opened the door to political alliances that previously had been
unthinkable and eased the path to doctrinal reform by altering the
practical effects of government aid to religious institutions.
The second consequence of the rise of Christian academies was an
upsurge in political activity as evangelicals and fundamentalists fought
to protect their fledgling schools. As we discuss below, Christian
academies played a crucial role in the formation of a politically active
religious right. The third consequence was that conservative Protes
tants now had an incentive to rethink their traditional hostility to
school aid and to soften their stance on church-state separation. Over
time, and with some limited exceptions, this is exactly what transpired.
B.

The New Politics of Protestantism

In hindsight, it seems inevitable that the growth of Christian
academies would lead to a splintering of the Protestant position on
church-state separation. Evangelicals now had schools of their own,
which desperately needed financial support. Mainline denominations
did not. But the disintegration of the Protestant coalition - and the
shift in political power away from mainline denominations to evan
gelicals - occurred more gradually than deterministic hindsight might
suggest.

335. These figures and the additional ones cited in this paragraph all come from a report
published by the National Center for Education Statistics. NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT.,
1997-98 PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY 1-4 (Aug. 1999).
336. This estimate derives from commentators' estimates, e.g. , FOWLER ET AL.,
RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 33; Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note
269, at 454; as well as from the figures reported in the NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STAT., su
pra note 335, at 3. The latter indicates that non-Catholic religious schools enrolled 34.8% of
private-school students. Of these, those unaffiliated with any major denomination consti
tuted 9.4%; those affiliated with a national denomination were 10.9%; and those affiliated
with a conservative Christian school association were 14.5 % . Not all Christian academies are
affiliated with a conservative Christian school association; some are affiliated only with a
national denomination and some are not affiliated at all. Based on the estimates given by
Rose and Fowler, it thus seems reasonable to conclude that Christian academies enroll about
one million students.
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Evangelicals and the Religious R ight

The advent of Christian academies did not lead to instant calls for
government aid, because the initial impulse behind these schools was
resolutely separationist. Those creating and attending Christian
academies wanted to separate themselves from the public schools and
from the dominant secular culture they reflected. To take financial as
sistance from the government would have exposed Christian acade
mies to the secular control and influence that had polluted the public
schools and driven evangelicals away.337 The immediate aim of the
Christian academies was thus not to secure ; government aid but to
fight government regulation.338
Throughout the 1970s, evangelicals sought to secure private fund
ing and resist government supervision, including accreditation and
teacher certification requirements.339 Christian academies waged doz
ens of court battles against state regulators, many of them successful.340
Evangelicals argued that their schools were an extension of their min
istries, and that schools and churches could . not be distinguished. As
Moral Majority leader Jerry Falwell said in 1981, when helping to fight
state regulation of Christian academies in _Nebraska, "to submit to
state certification is to submit to licensure and the right of the state to
license a church and its Christian ministry. We believe the church and
the church school are all the church."341 Falwell, like other evangelical
leaders, would change his tune (or whistle out of the other side of his
mouth) when it came to seeking government assistance for religious
schools. That ambition, of course, required that a religious school not
be seen merely as an extension of the church. But in the early days of
the Christian academies, the dominant concern of evangelicals was
captured by Falwell's statement in Nebraska. Evangelicals resisted

337. As one Pentecostal minister in Kentucky explained, "(w]e don't want any state
money," because "[w]e don't want their nose in our business all the time." Reese, Soldiers
for Christ, supra note 266, at 193.
338. Perhaps that is why NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note
279, written in the mid-1970s, does not once suggest that these schools were interested in
securing government aid.
339. For descriptions of these fights, see Carper, The ,Christian Day School, supra note
269, at 121-22; Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 181-83; Rose, Christian Funda
mentalism, supra note 269, at 464 (calling this issue a "cause celebre" among evangelicals
and fundamentalists); and B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Private Schools Provoking Church-State
Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1978, at Al.
340. These cases are discussed i n PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS,
supra note 295, at 146-52; Carper, The Christian Day School, supra note 269, at 121-22;
Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 182.
341. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 182; see also PARSONS, INSIDE
AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 141 (explaining that, to fundamental
ists, "a church school is not a separate entity from the church, not an agency of the church,
not an arm of the church. Rather, it is the church itself in action.").
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government regulation on the ground that their academies had been
"accredited by the Lord."342
Their position on school aid began to change when evangelicals
organized politically. The impetus for that organization came, appro
priately enough, from a fight over regulations proposed by the epit
ome of government officiousness, the IRS.343 Spurred by a lawsuit, the
IRS in 1970 decided to deny tax-exempt status to nonprofit private
schools that discriminated on the basis of race. In 1975, the IRS ex
tended this policy to private religious schools. Enforcement, however,
was notoriously lax. Civil rights advocates pressed for stringent guide
lines to assure that private schools not only considered black appli
cants but made special efforts to attract them. In 1978, at the behest of
the Carter administration, the IRS proposed new regulations that
would have presumed that schools begun during a period of desegre
gation were segregationist. The schools could rebut this presumption
only by actually enrolling a certain quota of African-American stu
dents or by documenting substantial recruiting efforts.
The proposal ignited a political firestorm. Christian conservatives
were outraged, and not simply because the loss of tax-exempt status
would hurt their schools financially. Perhaps more importantly, they
saw the government attempting to control the Christian academies.
They "were shocked to be told that their schools must alter their cur
riculum or provide special scholarships for minorities to avoid gov
ernment harassment."344 With the help of Jerry Falwell, at the time a
relatively unknown televangelist, Christian conservatives mounted an
assault on the IRS. Falwell supplied the Christian Action Coalition
with a mailing list of his contributors, and the Coalition organized a
writing campaign. The IRS received 150,000 letters of protest, many

342. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 183. For similar statements, see
PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 147-48.
343. The information in this paragraph comes from NEVIN & BILLS, THE SCHOOLS
THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 15-19; PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN
SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 119-22; Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination, supra note 289, at 13947; Skerry, Christian Schools v. the l.R.S., supra note 293, at 31-40.
344. Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination, supra note 289, at 145. It is difficult to tell whether
conservative evangelicals were more upset by the prospective loss of tax-exempt status or by
the symbolic effect of being taxed, but the latter may have been the more irksome. Most
Christian academies received relatively modest donations from individuals, NEVIN & BILLS,
THE SCHOOLS THAT FEAR BUILT, supra note 279, at 13-15, 29-36, who did not receive much
financial benefit from the deductibility of donations and thus would not likely be deterred
from giving money by a change in the law. Instead, it seems that conservative evangelicals
viewed the tax-exempt status of private schools as a neutral baseline and considered the
proposal to tax such schools as an effort to control them. PARSONS, INSIDE AMERICA'S
CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 123 (explaining that "Christian school proponents
argue that the power to tax is the power to control"). The 1978 IRS proposal surely only
strengthened this perspective, as it obviously attempted to use the carrot and stick of tax ex
emptions to induce Christian academies to embrace affirmative action.
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more than they had ever received regarding any proposal. The opposi
tion succeeded when Congress prohibited the IRS regulations.345
Even more important than the victory over the IRS was the culture
war inspired by that battle. Success against the IRS prompted Falwell
and Warren Billings, the leader of the Christian Action Coalition, to
found the Moral Majority.346 A highly publicized and controversial or
ganization, the Moral Majority launched what we now call the "relig
ious right" - an affiliation of like-minded conservative religious indi
viduals and organizations that would influence the Republican Party
and emerge in the 1990s as a potent force in American politics.347 In
this way, the Christian academies helped create a political movement
that increased the influence of evangelicals.348 The Moral Majority,
and later the Christian Coalition, provided an organizing locus for
what otherwise might have remained a diffuse collection of mostly in
dependent churches and schools. Through the major organizations of
the religious right, evangelicals and fundamentalists could present a
unified front.349 The political mobilization and growing political influ
ence of the religious right meant that the conservative evangelical po
sition on church-state relations suddenly mattered.
Though the organizational origins of the religious right lay in the
fight to protect Christian academies, the Supreme Court's decisions on
abortion helped energize the movement.350 Legalizing abortion, like
removing prayer and Bible reading from the schools, confirmed evan
gelical fears that America was deserting Christianity. To the faithful,
these decisions were ominous signals "that the country had fallen into
345. For a description of Falwell's participation and the letter writing campaign, includ
ing the reaction of Congress, see Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination, supra note 289, at 144-45.
346. Id. at 144.
347. On the rise of the religious right, see CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note
159, at 135-66; and FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 79-82, 90-91 ,
142-48. See generally N o LONGER EXILES: THE RELIGIOUS NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (Michael Cromartie ed., 1993) (a collection of essays and responses on the growth
and future of the religious right).
348. HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 1 1 , at 175-78 (arguing that
government regulation of Christian schools, both threatened and real, was the primary rea
son why conservative Christians became politically active).
349. This is not to say that all evangelicals are members of the religious right and sup
port its goals, nor that the religious right consists only of conservative evangelicals. Although
identifying with precision those individuals or groups who make up the religious right is im
possible, the religious right essentially consists of those evangelicals and fundamentalists
"who participated in or sympathized with the movement [begun in the late 1970s] to bring
conservative moral and social change to the United States, in line with their religious val
ues." Robert Booth Fowler, The Failure of the Religious Right, in No LONGER EXILES: THE
RELIGIOUS NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 60 (Michael Cromartie ed., 1993).
350. See, e.g., A. James Reichley, The Evangelical and Fundamentalist Revolt, in PIETY
AND POLITICS: EVANGELICALS AND FUNDAMENTALISTS CONFRONT THE WORLD 69, 76
(Richard John Neuhaus & Michael Cromartie eds., 1987) [hereinafter Reichley, Evangelical
Revolt].
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the hands of secular elites who were hostile to traditional faith and its
norms. "351
When the Moral Majority began in 1979, therefore, the time was
ripe for political activism. Conservative evangelicals, especially fun
damentalists, traditionally viewed politics as a distasteful engagement
with a sinful world.352 Although many evangelical churches encour
aged members to vote, they did not invest much effort in politics, be
yond the occasional fight over alcohol or gambling.353 During the civil
rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, for example, while mainline
denominations offered active assistance and support for voting and
civil rights for African Americans, Falwell and other conservative
evangelical leaders remained on the sidelines.354 In 1979, however,
Falwell and compatriots began a campaign to convince fellow believ
ers to abandon what was now called "the myth" that fundamentalists
should avoid politics.355 The religious right conducted an intensive and
largely successful campaign to convince conservative evangelicals that
their religious commitment to church-state separation did not pre
clude them from entering the political arena. "The pulpit should be in
politics," leaders of the Moral Majority argued, adding that "when you
baptize a child you should register him to vote."356 Falwell and other
leaders spread their message through publications, such as Falwell's
book Listen, America!, which urged evangelicals to become active po
litically.357 They also used their ubiquitous television broadcasts to
reach literally millions of viewers.358
351. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 142.
352. CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note 159, at 147-49; FOWLER ET AL.,
RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 40; HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY,
supra note 11, at 159; Reichley, Evangelical Revolt, supra note 350, at 74-75.
353. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 40; Reichley, Evan
gelical Revolt, supra note 350, at 74-75.
354. CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note 159, at 148-49; HODGSON,
CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 11, at 180; RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE
NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 10 (1984).
355. John Herbers, Moral Majority and Its Allies Expect Harvest of Votes for Conserva
tives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1984, at A38 [hereinafter Herbers, Moral Majority and Its Allies];
see also FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 40; Reichley, Evangeli
cal Revolt, supra note 350, at 88.
356. Herbers, Moral Majority and Its Allies, supra note 355, at A38.
357. JERRY FALWELL, LISTEN, AMERICA! (1980). For a thorough exegesis of Falwell's
book, see CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note 159, at 150-54.
358. Evangelicals and fundamentalists cornered the market for religious broadcasting in
the 1970s. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has always required television
stations to devote some airtime to religious programming, but in the 1970s the stations, with
FCC approval, began charging for the time. Mainline denominations declined to enter the
market, which was quickly dominated by evangelical and fundamentalist preachers. See
Reichley, Evangelical Revolt, supra note 350, at 74-75. The importance of television to the
rise of the religious right cannot be gainsaid. "Had the Religious Right not enjoyed the tech
nologies of religious television," observed sociologist Robert Wuthnow, "it might never have
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As Falwell and other leaders of the religious right succeeded
within the churches, they gained power elsewhere. The reason is not
hard to fathom: white evangelical Protestants constitute approxi
mately one-fourth of the American electorate.359 Most evangelicals are
politically conservative. Despite theological and political differences,
evangelicals represent a broad coalition that generally supports con
servative Republican politics.360 As evangelicals mobilized politically
through various organizations of the religious right, politicians heard
their call.361 As early as the 1980 election, Ronald Reagan courted
their support. At a convention of televangelists in 1980, Ronald
Reagan acknowledged that they, as religious leaders, might be unable
to endorse a political candidate, but, he declared, "I endorse you."362
In response, evangelicals abandoned their born-again brother, Presi
dent Carter, and supported Reagan's victorious presidential bid.363
Reagan responded by endorsing their agenda and by including promi
nent evangelicals, such as Gary Bauer, in his administration.364
Although it stumbled at times, particularly in the late 1980s, the
religious right has maintained support and influence. The Moral Ma
jority, which generated a lot of publicity and at one point claimed four
million members, always rested on shaky financial grounds and dis-

become the powerful movement it did." Robert Wuthnow, The Future of the Religious Right,
in NO LONGER EXILES: THE RELIGIOUS NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 41 (Michael
Cromartie ed., 1993).
359. See FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 92; HODGSON,
CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 1 1 , at 1 84; Reichley, Evangelical Revolt, supra
note 350, at 72. Though African Americans are overwhelmingly Christian, predominately
Protestant, and a substantial portion are evangelical Protestants, they do not tend to support
the Republican Party. In increasing numbers, however, they do support aid to religious
schools through measures such as vouchers. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, su
pra note 1 1 , at 1 1 1-12.
360. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 41 ; Robert Dugan,
Comment, in No LONGER EXILES: THE RELIGIOUS NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 82
(Michael Cromartie ed., 1993) [hereinafter Dugan, Comment] ("evangelicals are more con
servative, generally, than are most other segments of the population"); Kathleen Murphy
Beatty & B. Oliver Walter, Fundamentalists, Evangelicals, and Politics, 16 AM. POL. Q. 43
(1988); Corwin Smidt, Evangelical Voting Patterns, 1976-1988, in NO LONGER EXILES: THE
RELIGIOUS NEW RIGHT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 97-100 (Michael Cromartie ed., 1993). See
generally PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182 (describing how, by the 1960s,
evangelical Christians were ideologically in tune with conservative politicians).
361 . Dugan, Comment, supra note 360, at 82-83 (describing how, beginning in 1979,
"Republicans have been actively cultivating evangelicals"). The Democratic Party, by con
trast, has rebuffed overtures from evangelical groups such as the National Association of
Evangelicals. Id. at 83.
362. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 1 19.
363. Id. at 101; HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 11, at 169.
364. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 473.
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banded in 1986.365 Despite premature obituaries, however, the larger
movement did not wither. Instead, the Christian Coalition, led by Pat
Robertson and Ralph Reed, emerged in the late 1980s as the premier
organization of the religious right. By the mid-1990s, Reed had helped
build an organization with over one million members, affiliates in
every state in the country and in 900 localities, an active lobby in
Washington, and a budget exceeding twenty million dollars.366 The
Christian Coalition has since been joined by other groups, including
the Family Research Council (led by Gary Bauer) and Focus on the
Family (led by James Dobson), along with the Southern Baptist Con
vention and the National Association of Evangelicals.367 These organi
zations help shape the Republican Party's national agenda and exert
influence in local and state political contests, including placing conser
vative Christians on local and state boards of education.368
Just what, exactly, has the religious right been fighting for? From
the beginning, protecting religious schools and prohibiting abortion
have topped the agenda.369 Less obviously, given their separationist
tradition, they also want to restore school prayer.370 More surprisingly
still, the protection of Christian academies quickly came to include not
simply shielding them from state regulation but also securing govern
ment financial assistance. By the late 1970s, Falwell and other leaders
of the religious right began to flip on church-state separation; where
they once had argued that financial aid to religious schools violated
the Establishment Clause, they now clamored for increased govern
mental assistance, typically in the form of tuition tax credits or vouch
ers.371 In 1978, for example, a tuition tax-credit bill debated in
365. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 79-82; BARBARA B.
GADDY ET AL., SCHOOL WARS: RESOLVING OUR CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION AND
VALUES 23 (1996) [hereinafter GADDY ET AL., SCHOOL WARS).
366. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 142-48.
367. For a description of the various groups comprising the religious right, see
CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS, supra note 159, at 146-47; GADDY ET AL., SCHOOL WARS,
supra note 365, at 17-32; Richard V. Pierard, The Historical Background of the Evangelical
Assault on the Separation of Church and State in the U.S.A., in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CHURCH AND STATE 65-68 (Menachem Mor ed., 1993); and People for
the American Way, Who's Who on the Religious Right, http://www.pfaw.org/issues/right/
bg_groups.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2001).
368. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 81-82, 148; GADDY, ET
AL., SCHOOL WARS, supra note 365, at 55-61; Dugan, Comment, supra note 360, at 82-83.
369. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 464; Charles Austin, Religious
Right Growing Impatient with Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1982, at A13 [hereinafter
Austin, Religious Right Growing Impatient].
370. E.g. , FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION: THE CIVIL
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND DISSENTERS 19-43 (1999) (describing the religious
right's campaign to restore school prayer).
371. See Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 193-94; School Tax Credits: Mak
ing New Converts, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Sept. 22, 1 978, at 37-38 [hereinafter School Tax
Credits]. As Reese points out, the new stance on aid to schools taken by evangelical leaders
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Congress received strong support not only from Catholic groups, but
also from Jerry Falwell and evangelicals.372
This is not to suggest that all conservative evangelicals changed
their minds on school aid. The issue remained controversial within this
community, and some fundamentalists continued to oppose any form
of governmental assistance on the ground that it would lead to gov
ernmental control.373 But since the 1980s, the religious right increas
ingly has supported government aid for religious schools. In 1982 the
New York Times reported that allowing school prayer, prohibiting
abortion, and securing tuition tax-credits topped the agenda of relig
ious conservatives.374 Similar reports appeared two years later375 and
continued through the Reagan and Bush Administrations, as leaders
of the religious right supported tax credits and vouchers.376 Conserva
tive evangelicals also joined in litigation designed to secure benefits
for parochial schools.377 By the mid-1990s, the religious right and aid to

placed them in the awkward position of simultaneously opposing any government regulation
of Christian academies and advocating for government subsidies. Reese, Soldiers for Christ,
supra note 266, at 193. The inconsistency of this position - and therefore perhaps the extent
to which evangelicals had reversed course on church-state separation - was tempered
somewhat by the fact that evangelical leaders initially confined their support to indirect aid
through tax credits or vouchers, rather than direct aid to religious schools. Vouchers and tax
credits, at least formally, aid parents, who then decide how to use them. They may therefore
not be regarded as equivalent to direct financial subsidies. Nonetheless, as Reese and others
explain, supporting tax credits and vouchers represented a new stance for evangelicals. Id. at
193; School Tax Credits, supra, at 37.
372. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 193. As an article in Christianity Today described:
Floyd Robertson, public affairs director of the National Association of Evangelicals, super
church pastors Robert Schuller and Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson, talk show host and
head of the Christian Broadcasting Network, all favored the bill. Even evangelist Billy
Graham voiced loud support for this bill that would give federal income tax credit for school
tuition. Evangelical support for the bill was an about face for some people who in the past
would have opposed the bill on grounds of separation of church and state; tax credits
money subtracted from taxes due - would especially benefit students in parochial schools.
-

/

School Tax Credits, supra note 371, at 37. Mainline Protestant groups, including the Baptist
Joint Committee on Public Affairs, opposed the bill. See Private Education: A Tax Break,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Apr. 21, 1978, at 43 [hereinafter Private Education: A Tax Break].
373. Reese, Soldiers for Christ, supra note 266, at 193; see also PARSONS, INSIDE
AMERICA'S CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, supra note 295, at 152 (citing a principal of one funda
mentalist school who, in the 1980s, refused any government assistance "because government
intervention always follows government handouts").
374. Austin, Religious Right Growing Impatient, supra note 369, at A13.
375. Herbers, Activism in Faith, supra note 266, at B9.
376. E.g. , PETER W. COOKSON, JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL
OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 6-7, 29-30, 65 (1994) [hereinafter COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE] .
See also VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 92-113.
377. The Christian Legal Society, for example, which represents the interests of evan
gelical Christians, has appeared as amicus in numerous court cases, arguing in support of
prayer at school graduation and aid to religious schools. In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992), it filed an amicus brief, joined by the National Association of Evangelicals, in sup-
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religious schools were inextricably linked. Indeed, in 1995, Ralph
Reed, at a press conference attended by Newt Gingrich and Phil
Gramm, announced the Christian Coalition's Contract with the
American Family.378 Following the form of the Republicans' Contract
with America, the Coalition listed ten goals, the first three of which
concerned schools. They were, in order: securing a constitutional
amendment to allow prayer in schools and at other public events,
eliminating the department of education, and providing vouchers for
private schools.379
In fighting for school aid, religious-right political organizations
such as the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition were joined by
conservative religious groups. These included the Southern Baptist
Convention, which is the leadership organ of the nation's largest Prot
estant denomination, and the National Association of Evangelicals.380
For both organizations, these positions represented an about-face
from their traditional stand on church-state separation.
Until the 1980s, the Southern Baptist Convention was a faithful
constituent of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, organ
ized in 1941 to fight for separation of church and state.381 The South
ern Baptist Convention and the Baptist Joint Committee played key
roles in the creation of Protestants and Other Americans United for
the Separation of Church and State, an organization specifically de
voted to maintaining complete separation.382 In the 1980s, however,
fundamentalists won control of the Southern Baptist Convention, and
the Convention soon began to distance itself from the Baptist Joint
Committee.383 Throughout the 1980s, the Convention endorsed the
port of allowing prayer at school graduations. It also filed amicus briefs in Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997) and Mitchell v. Helms, 593 U.S. 793 (2000) . The NAE joined both.
378. The Christian Coalition Signs on the Dotted Line, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 1995, at
A45.
379. Id. In 1998, Randy Tate, who succeeded Ralph Reed as executive director of the
Christian Coalition, indicated that his organization's members ranked school choice as only
second in importance to pro-life issues. Ted C. Olsen, Voucher Victory, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY, Sept. 7, 1998, at 2, available at http://www.christianityonline.com/ct/8ta/8ta072.html
[hereinafter Olsen, Voucher Victory].
380. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 65-68; DAVID STRICKLIN, A
GENEALOGY OF DISSENT: SOUTHERN BAPTIST PROTEST IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
150-51 (John B. Boles ed., 1999) (hereinafter STRICKLIN, SOUTHERN BAPTIST PROTEST].
381. EDWARD L. QUEEN II, IN THE SOUTH THE BAPTISTS ARE THE CENTER OF
GRAVITY: SOUTHERN BAPTISTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1 930-1980, at 102-10 (Jerald c.
Brauer & Martin E. Marty eds., 1991) (hereinafter QUEEN, SOUTHERN BAPTISTS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE].
382. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 76-77; Peterson, Baptist Joint
Committee, supra note 180, at 128-30.
383. NANCY AMERMAN, BAPTIST BATTLES: SOCIAL CHANGE AND RELIGIOUS
CONFLICT IN THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION 69-72 (1990); Herbers, Moral Majority
and Its Allies, supra note 355, at A38.
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Republican Party's positions on church-state issues, including a return
to organized school prayer and government funding for religious
schools.384 In the early 1990s, the Southern Baptist Convention severed
all ties with the Baptist Joint Committee.385 The Convention is now a
staunch advocate of school prayer and aid to religious schools.386
Like the Southern Baptist Convention, the National Association of
Evangelicals ("NAE") traditionally supported strict separation of
church and state. Formed in 1948 and now representing twenty million
evangelicals from seventy-four denominations and 50,000 churches,387
the NAE's original constitution endorsed "the preservation of separa
tion between church and state."388 With the Southern Baptists, the
NAE was an early and active supporter of Protestants and Others
United for the Separation of Church and State.389 In 1979, however,
the leadership of the NAE linked with the newly founded Moral Ma
jority.390 In the 1980s and 1990s the NAE publicly supported prayer in
public schools and government assistance for religious schools.391 The
384. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 67-68; QUEEN, SOUTHERN
BAPTISTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 381, at 112.
38S. STRICKLIN, SOUTHERN BAPTIST PROTEST, supra note 380, at lSO-Sl.
386. E.g. , Agostini v. Felton, S21 U.S. 203 (1997) (appearing as amicus, along with the
Christian Legal Society, the National Association of Evangelicals, and the Catholic League,
to argue in favor of overturning Aguilar and allowing public school teachers to provide re
medial instruction in religious schools); Lee v. Weisman, SOS U.S. S77 (1992) (appearing as
amicus to argue in favor of allowing prayer at graduation ceremonies).
387. See Brief of Amici Curiae NAE et al. at 2, Mitchell v. Helms, S30 U.S. 793 (2000)
(No. 98-1648).
388. EVANGELICAL ACTION: A REPORT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF EVANGELICALS FOR UNITED ACTION 42-43, 104, 112 (Executive Commit
tee ed., 1942).
389. See Editorial, Defending Religious Liberty!, 7 UNITED EVANGELICAL ACTION 12
(Mar. 1 , 1948) ("[W]e not only heartily endorse 'Americans United' but we intend to work
with them to preserve our liberty."). Until the late 1970s, the NAE worked with Americans
United to oppose aid to parochial schools and diplomatic relations with the Vatican.
PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 72-80 (identifying anti-Catholic senti
ment as the main motivation for the NAE's separationist stance).
390. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 68.
391. Religious Freedom Protection: Hearing on H.J. Res. 184 Before the House Sub
comm. on the Constitution & Comm. on the Judiciary, lOSth Cong. 97-180 (1996) (statement
of Forest Montgomery, Counsel, Office for Governmental Affairs, Nat'I Ass'n of Evangeli
cals) (supporting amendment to allow school prayer and funding of private religious
schools); PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 66; William Bentley Ball, Eco
nomic Freedom of Parental Choice in Education: The Pennsylvania Constitution, 101 DICK.
L. REV. 261, 262-63 & n.4 (1997); Joyce Price, Wisconsin Wants Parochial Schools in Choice
Program; Strong Challenges Expected on Church-State Grounds, WASH. TIMES, Jan 16, 199S,
at Al (quoting the head of NAE's office of Public Affairs in praise of vouchers). An edito
rial in 1998 in CHRISTIANITY TODAY, a magazine devoted to evangelical positions on
church-state issues, similarly praised vouchers and argued that including private religious
schools did not violate the Establishment Clause. See Editorial, Religious Schools Make the
Grade: Give Wisconsin an A for Saying No to Secularist Nonsense, CHRISTIANITY TODAY,
Aug. 10, 1998, at 28, available at http://www.christianityonline.com/ct/8t9/8t9028.html.
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NAE has also participated as an amicus in Supreme Court cases, ar
guing in support of prayer at graduation ceremonies and direct federal
financial assistance to religious schools.392
Christian schools themselves joined the phalanx of supporters of
school aid. They are represented by two leading groups: the American
Association of Christian Schools ("AACS"), founded in 1972, and the
Association of Christian Schools International ("ACSI"), founded in
1978 through the merger of a number of smaller organizations.393 The
ACSI is the larger and more pluralistic of the associations, while the
AACS is smaller and more fundamentalist.394 While the AACS has
tended to keep a low profile in legislative and legal battles, the ACSI
has been active in both.395 It belongs to the Council for American Pri
vate Education - an umbrella organization that lobbies for increased
aid for private schools - whose state chapters filed an amicus brief in
Helms supporting government aid to religious schools.396 In 1992, the
ACSI joined with nineteen other secular and religious groups to form
the National Coalition for Improvement and Reform in Education,
which supported President Bush's school-choice proposal.397
Why did evangelicals and fundamentalists switch sides on the ques
tion of aid to religious schools? The obvious answer is self-interest: as
Christian academies proliferated and the need for financial assistance
increased, conservative evangelicals reassessed their earlier opposition
392. Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Life Commission et al., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000) (98-1648) (joining Christian Legal Society to argue for including religious schools
in federal funding program); Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Life Commission et al., Agos
tini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (96-552) (joining Christian Legal Society, Catholic League,
and Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission in arguing to overrule Aguilar); Brief of
Amici Curiae Christian Life Commission et al., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (901014) (joining brief of Christian Legal Society in favor of prayer at graduation).
393. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 455.
394. The ACSI represents over 2,000 schools and close to 400,000 pupils; the AACS
represents about 1 ,400 schools with approximately 200,000 students. Carper & Layman,
Black-Flight Academies, supra note 296, at 118; Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note
269, at 455.
395. This is not to suggest that the AACS has been dormant on the issue. In 1988, for
example, it joined nearly thirty other organizations, including the National Association of
Evangelicals, the U.S. Catholic Conference, and Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum, to form
Americans for Educational Choice (AEC). One of the AEC's objectives is to secure gov
ernment financing of religious schools. See Sidney Goetz, 'Parental Choice' Could Destroy
Public Education, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 10, 1990, at A2 [hereinafter Goetz, Parental
Choice]. The AACS has been less visible, however, in court cases, not having appeared as
amicus in any of the recent Supreme Court decisions involving prayer or aid to religious
schools.
396. Council for American Private Education, http://www.capenet.org/member.html
(listing members); Amicus Brief of Arizona Council for American Private Education et al.,
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648).
397. WELLS , TIME TO CHOOSE, supra note 266, at 138-39; Mark Walsh, Private School,
Religious Groups Join to Back President's Choice Proposal, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 29, 1992, at
23.
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to state aid.398 Additionally, the enemy changed. The historic Protes
tant hostility to school aid sprang, at least in part, from antipathy to
ward Roman Catholics. Conservative evangelicals were less commit- ,
ted to the abstract principle of separation than to the practical goal of
preventing Catholics from acquiring political power.399 Beginning with
the school-prayer decisions, conservative evangelicals came to see
secularists as their real enemies.400 Catholics joined evangelicals in op
position to the increasing secularization of American public life,
seeking tbe reintroduction of prayer in schools, aid to religious educa
tion, and an end to abortion.401 Thus, the enemy of the enemy became
a friend, and much of the emotional energy for opposing school aid
evaporated.402
Finally, political engagement fed on itself. As conservative evan
gelicals became more engaged politically, they overcame their
squeamishness about political involvement in a secular world and be
came more insistent that the government advance their policies. Not
only did conservative evangelicals begin to argue for government aid
to their schools; they also called for a return to school prayer.403 The
very act of political engagement appears to have helped shape the
politics of evangelicals, transforming a separatist agenda into one that
sought government endorsement - of their schools, through financial
assistance, and of their moral views, through prohibition of abortion
and reintroduction of school prayer.404
398. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 65 (arguing that "Fundamentalists
support vouchers for the obvious reason that they would like to be able to receive state
funds to subsidize their schools"); Reichley, Evangelical Revolt, supra note 350, at 76 (argu
ing that the "financial needs of the [Christian] schools . . . weakened the Evangelicals' long
standing opposition to government aid for church-sponsored education"); Interview with
Forrest Montgomery, Office for Governmental Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals
(NAE) (Sept. 8, 2000) (suggesting that the NAE went from opposing aid to parochial
schools to supporting it in the 1980s because, by then, there were a large number of Christian
evangelical schools).
399. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 120.
400. In 1963, for example, the NAE Office of Public Affairs issued a statement criticiz
ing the Court's school prayer decision, arguing that it "augments the trend toward complete
secularization." Don Gill, Capital Commentary, 22 UNITED EVANGELICAL ACTION 2 (Aug.
1963). The NAE then played an active role in supporting various efforts, including a consti
tutional amendment, in 1963 and 1964 to overturn the school prayer decisions. PIERARD,
THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 82.
401. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 70-74; Herbers, Activ
ism in Faith, supra note 266, at B9; John Herbers, Church Issues Spread to State Races, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1984, at B9 [hereinafter Herbers, Church Issues].
402. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 249-51. For further
discussion on the alliance between Catholics and conservative Evangelicals, see infra notes
460-465 and accompanying text.
403. Austin, Religious Right Growing Impatient, supra note 369, at Al3.
404. Rose, Christian Fundamentalism, supra note 269, at 480 (observing that, "as fun
damentalists have reasserted their presence and influence in the last two decades, they have
become less separatist").
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In terms of concrete achievements, the record of the religious right
has been mixed. Although the movement has begun to have some suc
cess on the question of aid to religious schools, it has made little prog
ress in restoring prayer to the public schools. In the legislative sphere,
the impact of the religious right has been slight. At the federal level,
none of the various proposals to grant tuition tax-credits or vouchers
for private schools have been enacted.405 The religious right, working
in tandem with a diverse group of school choice supporters, has been
more successful at the state level, where several voucher programs
have been adopted.406
But this less-than-impressive legislative record should not mask the
remarkable success that the religious right has had in setting the
agenda of the Republican Party on school prayer and aid to religious
education. Beginning with the Reagan Administration, the Republican
Party has strongly endorsed the goals of restoring prayer in public
schools and providing financial assistance to parents who wish to send
their children to religious schools.407 Reagan supported a constitu
tional amendment to allow school prayer and various proposals for
tuition tax-credits.408 Bush, although at first lukewarm to the religious
right, made amends with that group by introducing a school-choice

405. The current Bush administration has continued the Republican tradition of sup
porting vouchers for use at religious schools. The administration proposed a voucher plan of
its own, which it eventually abandoned in light of opposition from Congress. See Lizette
Alvarez, Senate Rejects Tuition Aid, a Key to Bush Education Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 13,
2001, at A26. The Bush administration also filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari in a case challenging the constitutionality of the Cleveland voucher pro
gram, and to issue a decision upholding the use of vouchers at religious schools. Linda
Greenhouse, White House Asks for Voucher Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2001 , at Al9. The
Court has recently granted the petition and will hear the case in early 2002. See supra note 1 .
406. Voucher programs, which allow parents to use state-funded vouchers at private,
religious schools, exist in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Florida. Evangelicals actively sup
ported the programs in each state. E.g. , COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 6468 (describing Milwaukee program); VITERITII, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at
92-113 (describing Milwaukee and Cleveland programs, as well as privately funded voucher
programs); HURBERT MORKEN & Jo RENEE FORMICOLA, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL
CHOICE 168-93 (1999) (describing political activities of evangelicals regarding school
choice).
407. Both goals have been a part of the Republican Party platform since 1980. See Re
publican Platform 2000, Education and Opportunity: Leave No American Behind, available
at http://www.expandnato.org/rp2.html; Republican Platform: Prosperity, Self Government,
and 'Moral Clarity,' 52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 021, 032 (1996); The Platform: Party Stresses
Family Values, Decentralized Authority, 48 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 78A, 80A-81A (1992); Re
publican Party Issues Detailed, Long Platform, 44 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 46A, 54A, 57A
{1 988); Text of 1984 Republican Party Platform, 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 418, 50B (1984);
1980 Republican Platform, 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 58B, 63B (1980).
408. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 6-7, 17-18, 29-30 (describing
Reagan's support of funding private school choice); Herbers, Church Issues, supra note 401 ,
at B9 (describing how Reagan embraced both fundamentalist Protestants and conservative
Catholic positions on abortion, homosexuality, and aid to parochial schools).
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proposal of his own in 1992.409 And Republicans (and a few Demo
crats) in Congress have introduced various school-prayer amendments
and school-choice proposals and, in 1996, sought to amend the Consti
tution to allow for both.410
This proposed amendment, entitled the Religious Freedom
Amendment, shows just how far conservative evangelicals and the
Republican Party have moved on aid to religious schools.411 In the
1870s, the Republican Party, backed by Protestants of all stripes, sup
ported the Blaine Amendment, which would have explicitly prohibited
any and all forms of financial assistance to religious schools. More
than a century later, a different Republican Party again sought to
amend the Constitution, only this time to ensure that religious schools
would be entitled to any and all government benefits that would flow
to similar institutions.412 Like the Blaine Amendment, the Religious
Freedom Amendment failed to pass despite majority support in the
House.413 But just as the Blaine Amendment expressed Republican
and Protestant hostility toward religious (meaning Catholic) schools in
the nineteenth century, the Religious Freedom Amendment captured
the fervor with which conservative evangelical Protestants now sup
ported aid to religious schools.414 It also revealed the extent to which
·
evangelicals managed to influence the Republican Party, at the ex409. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 7; FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND
POLITICS, supra note 11, at 120, 143; VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at
87-88. As Fowler describes, Bush, an Episcopalian, did not like to talk much about his relig
ion and when forced to do so, sometimes appeared awkward. Retelling his experience of
being shot down as a Navy pilot in World War II, for example, Bush said that, while floating
in the Pacific Ocean: "I thought of my family, my mom and dad, and the strength I got from
them. I thought of my faith and the separation of church and state." FOWLER ET AL.,
RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 120 (quoting Bushisms: President George
Herbert Walker Bush, in His Own Words (New Republic ed., 1992)).
410. On school prayer amendments, see, e.g., Steve Benent, Injudicious Committee:
Istook Religion Amendment Clears House Judiciary Panel, Heads for Floor, 51 J. OF CH. &
ST. 4 (1998) [hereinafter Benent, Injudicious Committee]; and Rep. Delay Attacks Church
State Separation, 53 J. OF CH. & ST. 19 (2000). On school choice proposals, see, e.g.,
VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 88; and Rob Boston, Congressional
Alert, 52 J. OF CH. & ST. 13 (1999) [hereinafter Boston, Congressional Alert].
411 . For background on the Religious Freedom Amendment, also called the Istook
Amendment after its main sponsor, Representative Ernest Istook (R-Okla.), see Benent,
Injudicious Committee, supra note 410; and Rob Boston, Istook Amendment Defeated!, 51 J.
OF CH. & ST. 8 (1998) [hereinafter Boston, Amendment Defeated].
412. The Amendment would guarantee the right to pray "on public property, including
schools," and would prohibit denying "equal access to a benefit on account of religion." The
intent of the latter provision, according to supporters of the amendment, was to guarantee
that religious schools would "be treated the same as secular schools are treated" and would
be entitled to receive public funding. See Benent, Injudicious Committee, supra note 410
(quoting Henry Hyde).
413. The vote was 197 Republicans and twenty-seven Democrats in favor, twenty-eight
Republicans and 175 Democrats against. See Boston, Amendment Defeated, supra note 411.
414. Religious right organizations such as the Christian Coalition strongly supported the
Amendment. See id.
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pense of mainline denominations, which saw their political influence
wane.415
2.

Other Protestants: From Mainline to Sideline

Over the past four decades, the experience of mainline Protestant
denominations has been the opposite of that of conservative evangeli
cals. While conservative evangelicals have become more accommoda
tionist on church-state issues, mainline Protestants - or at least their
leadership - have become more consistently separationist. And while
conservative evangelicals have seen their political influence grow,
mainline Protestants have seen theirs diminish.
In Part II, we described the origins of the three leading Protestant
groups on church-state issues - the Baptist Joint Committee, Protes
tants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and
State, and the National Council of Churches. The subsequent histories
of these groups all demonstrate increased commitment to separation
of church and state and (perhaps partly as a consequence) decreased
political clout.
As noted above, in 1941 the Southern Baptist Convention, the
Northern Baptist Convention, and the National Baptist Convention
formed the Baptist Joint Committee. The founders organized the
Committee to present a unified position on issues of church and state
and to counter the growing political power of the Catholic Church.
From the outset, the Committee took a strictly separationist position
on church-state issues, opposing both aid to religious education and
prayer in public schools.416 With slight deviations - including its even
tual endorsement of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education
Act, which provided some aid to religious schools - the Baptist Joint
Committee has maintained a separationist stance.417 The Committee
415. Some opponents in Congress described the vote on the Amendment as a Republi
can Party payback to aggressive religious right groups like the Christian Coalition, Focus on
the Family, and the Family Research Council. As Representative Boehler! (R-N.Y.) as
serted: "The Religious Freedom Amendment has nothing to do with acknowledging the
power of God and everything to do with asserting the power of special interest groups that
are all too human and flawed." Boston, Amendment Defeated, supra note 411.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 182 and 219.
417. For descriptions of the role played by the Baptist Joint Committee in assisting the
passage of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act ("ESEA"), including the
Committee's acceptance of religious schools as beneficiaries of federal financial aid, see
PHILIP MERANTO, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION IN 1965, at 72-74;
Peterson, Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 1 80, at 131-32. Also, see generally Dean M.
Kelley & George R. Lanoue, The Church-State Settlement in the Federal Aid to Education
Act, in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 110-65 (Donald A. Gianella ed., 1965). Despite
eventually supporting the inclusion of religious schools within the act's provisions, the
Committee became an early critic. In 1966, for example, the Committee argued that the law,
as applied, violated principles of church-state separation. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Bap
tist Joint Committee at 2, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648). The Com
mittee's criticism of the act continued for the next three decades, culminating in an amicus
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publicly supported the Court's school-prayer and Bible reading deci
sions and opposed efforts to overturn those decisions by constitutional
amendment.418 The Committee has since appeared as amicus advocat
ing separatist positions in cases involving religion in the public
schools.419 It has also consistently opposed public funding for religious
education, testifying against federal aid proposals and arguing in court
cases involving aid to religious schools.420
While the Baptist Joint Committee remains one of the most active
groups on church-state issues,421 it has lost its largest constituency. In
the early 1990s, the Southern Baptist Convention severed all ties with
the Joint Committee. In consequence, the Committee lost the largest
part of its membership and its main source of funding.422 It also lost
(any pretense of) the ability to speak for all Baptists. In two of the
Court's most recent Establishment Clause cases - Lee v. Weisman
and Agostini v. Felton - the Baptist Joint Committee and the South
ern Baptist Convention filed amicus briefs presenting diametrically
opposed views.423

brief in Helms arguing that successor legislation was unconstitutional. Id. For a description
of the Committee's stance on tax exemptions for churches, and the decision by the Commit
tee to file a brief in support of this position in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970),
see Peterson, Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 180, at 135-36.
418. QUEEN, SOUTHERN BAPTISTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 381, at 102-110;
SO RAUF, WALL OF SEPARATION, supra note 146, at 314.
419. E.g. , Brief Amicus Curiae of Baptist Joint Comm., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
579-80 (1992).
420. E.g. , Private Education: A Tax Break, supra note 372, at 43 (noting Committee's
opposition to 1978 bill that would provide tuition tax credits); see also Brief of Amicus Cu
riae Baptist Joint Committee, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648) (oppos
ing federal program that provides educational and instructional materials, including comput
ers, to private religious schools); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Jewish Congress et al.,
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Nos. 96-552, 96-553) (opposing federal program that
sends public school teachers into parochial schools for remedial instruction and supporting
Aguilar); Brief of Amicus Curiae Baptist Joint Committee et al., Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (No. 83-990) (opposing state program that sent public school
teachers into parochial schools); Brief of Amicus Curiae Baptist Joint Committee, Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (No. 82-195) (opposing state income tax deduction for tuition).
421 . FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 213-14.
422. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 67-68; see also Walfred
Peterson, Religious Pressure Group: An Examination of the Baptist Joint Committee on Pub
lic Affairs, 15 J. Church and State 271, 273, 287 (1973) (reporting that in 1970 Southern Bap
tists accounted for over half the membership of the Baptist Joint Committee and that the
Southern Baptist Convention contributed 90% of the funds for the Committee's budget).
423. Compare Brief of Amici Curiae American Jewish Congress et al., Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Nos. 96-552, 96-553), and Brief of Amici Curiae American
Jewish Congress et al., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014), with Brief of
Amici Curiae Christian Legal Society et al., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Nos. 96552, 96-553), and Brief of Amicus Curiae Southern Baptist Convention Christian Life Com
mission, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae
Baptist Joint Committee at 2, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1 648) (noting
that "the Baptist Joint Committee does not purport to speak for all Baptists").
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Just as the Baptist Joint Committee lost the ability to speak for all
Baptists, Americans United for the Separation of Church and State
failed to maintain a united position for Protestants generally. The
twisting fate of Americans United over the last four decades provides
a fascinating glimpse of the upheavals in Protestant thinking on church
and state. Born in the bosom of the Baptist Joint Committee in 1947,
Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church
and State ("POAU") aimed to counteract the growing political power
of the Catholic Church.424 POAU originally drew support from main
line Protestant groups as well as from evangelicals. During the 1960s,
however, POAU's anti-Catholic vigor and unswerving devotion to
separation drove away many mainline Protestant groups, including the
Baptist Joint Committee and the National Council of Churches.425 The
thaw in Protestant-Catholic relations made mainline Protestants un
comfortable with POAU's anti-Catholic rhetoric.426 The fight over the
inclusion of religious schools as beneficiaries of the 1965 Elementary
and Secondary School Act widened the split when the Baptist Joint
Committee and National Council of Churches somewhat grudgingly
supported the Act. The POAU harshly criticized them for doing so427
and in tum found itself attacked as inflammatory.428 The Baptist Joint
Committee effectively ended its working relationship with POAU
when the Committee's representative resigned his position on
POAU's board of directors.429
Evangelicals and fundamentalists, by contrast, were less uncom
fortable with POAU's anti-Catholic baggage. By the mid-1960s,
POAU's core support had shifted to conservative, rural, evangelical
Protestants.430 But while conservatives shared POAU's strident hostil
ity to school aid, they soon parted company over school prayer. When
POAU endorsed the Supreme Court's decisions in Engel and
Schempp, conservative evangelical groups jumped ship.431 As a result,
POAU's membership and revenues declined dramatically. By 1969,

424. PIERARD, THE UNEQUAL YOKE, supra note 182, at 77; SORAUF, WALL OF
SEPARATION, supra note 146, at 33; Boggs, History of Americans
. United, supra note 138, at
42-43.
425. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 403-21.
426. Id. at 414, 501-17.
427. For descriptions of the involvement of the Baptist Joint Committee and the Na
tional Council of Churches in the passage of the ESEA, as well as the POAU's criticism in
response, see Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 501-06; and Peterson,
Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 180, at 131-33.
428. See Editorial, P. 0.A . U. Should Fight Hard but Fair, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
Feb. 5, 1964, at 167.
429. Peterson, Baptist Joint Committee, supra note 180, at 133-35.
430. Boggs, History of Americans United, supra note 138, at 507.
431. Id. at 509-10.
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POAU had lost backing from both mainline denominations and con
servative evangelicals.432
Over the last three decades, POAU has managed to remain active
by reinventing itself. It now relies chiefly on non-Protestants, including
atheists, Jews, and humanists, a switch that prompted the group in
1971 to shorten its name to Americans United for Separation of
Church and State ("AU").433 AU continues to file amicus briefs advo
cating strict separation, but it rarely teams up with Protestant organi
zations. Instead, it usually appears alone or with liberal Jewish
groups.434 AU also continues to advance its views publicly, through its
Journal of Church and State, and to involve itself in legislative battles
involving church-state issues,435 but its identity has been transformed
and its influence curtailed. Where POAU once represented mainline
Protestant thought before the Supreme Court, AU now operates as a
liberal interest group, a junior cousin to the American Civil Liberties
Union with only 60,000 members nationwide.436
Although the National Council of Churches ("NCC") has not ex
perienced the dramatic upheavals of the Baptist Joint Committee and
AU, it has long been hampered by a schism between the liberal lead
ers of the NCC and their more conservative members. Created in 1908
as the Federal Council of Churches, the NCC has sought to promote
unity among non-Catholic Christians, representing, at least nominally,
the bulk of mainline Protestants. In 1963, the NCC sponsored its first
conference on church-state issues; which was attended by delegates
from twenty-four Protestant and Orthodox denominations.437 In pub
lished "findings," the delegates recognized that religious pluralism in
American society raised "crucial questions concerning both the sepa
ration and interaction of church and state."438 They answered those
questions with a broadly separationist response. Specifically, they en-

432. Id. at 532-40.
433. Id. at 541.
434. Americans United filed solo amicus briefs in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208
(1997); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 403 (1985), Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 374 (1985), and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 389 (1983). It filed amicus briefs
with Jewish groups in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
756 (1995), and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,
822 (1995).
435. Boston, Amendment Defeated, supra note 411 (describing AU's efforts to defeat
Religious Freedom Amendment).
436. See Brief of Amici Curiae AU et al. at 1, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)
(No. 98-1648).
437. National Council of Churches, Separation and Interaction of Church and State, 6 J.
OF CHURCH & ST. 147 (1964) [hereinafter NCC, Separation and Interaction].
438. Id. at 148.
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dorsed the Supreme Court's school-prayer and Bible reading decisions
and opposed funding for religious schools.439
Whereas POAU's stance on church-state separation arose princi
pally from opposition to Catholics, the NCC's stance on church-state
separation in the 1960s seems to have stemmed from devotion to pub
lic education "as a major cohesive force in our pluralistic society."440
The conference delegates justified their opposition to school aid on
precisely this ground. Aid to religious schools, the delegates argued,
"may well have the result of further fragmentation of the educational
system and weaken the role and position of the public schools. "441
Published in 1963 by the Board of the NCC, a policy statement enti
tled "The Churches and the Public Schools" confirms the importance
of public education in the formulation of the NCC's position on
church-state separation. In that statement, the Board reaffirmed its
support of the public school system and called on Christian churches
and Christian parents, including those who send their children to pri
vate schools, "to strengthen and improve the American system of
public education."442 The Board also expressed its belief that neither
official prayers nor the devotional use of the Bible were necessary to
promote either "true religion [or] good education,'' but said it wished
to leave local school boards discretion as to whether prayers would be
offered on special occasions.443
Over the next four decades, the NCC became, if anything, more
separationist. In 1992 the NCC argued in Lee v. Weisman that prayers
at graduation should be disallowed, a position at odds with the more
relaxed view expressed in 1963. Like the Baptist Joint Committee and
AU, the NCC fought school aid and opposed legislative attempts to
amend the Constitution to allow school prayer.444 Although the NCC
still nominally represents a large constituency of mainline Protestants,
estimated in 1998 to number nearly fifty-two million,445 it has become
progressively less active in recent debates about public schools and the
439. Id. at 148, 151-52.
440. National Council of Churches, The Churches and the Public Schools, 6 J. OF CH. &
ST. 176, 177 (1963) (policy statement of Board of NCC) [hereinafter NCC, Churches and
Public Schools].
441. NCC, Separation and Interaction, supra note 437, at 151-52.
442. NCC, Churches and Public Schools, supra note 440, at 176-79.
443. Id. at 178.
444. E.g., SORAUF, WALL OF SEPARATION, supra note 146, at 314 (describing opposi
tion to school prayer amendments); National Council of Churches, The Churches and the
Public Schools at the Close of the Twentieth Century: A Policy Statement (Nov. 1 1 , 1999), at
http://www.ncccusa.org/about/edpol.html (stating that, "as a general rule, public funds
should be used for public purposes" and cautioning against further government aid to paro
chial schools) [hereinafter NCC, Policy Statement].
445. Steve Kloehn, Protestants Take Aim at Vouchers, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 1 1 , 1998, at
lN.
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funding of private alternatives.446 In a 1999 Policy Statement on
Churches and the Public Schools, the NCC recognized that "in recent
years the voices of our churches have been largely absent from the on
going debate about the meaning and future of our nation's schools."447
The NCC's silence stemmed in part from the continuing disagreement
among member churches on the propriety of vouchers. Indeed, in
1997, the General Assembly of the NCC rejected a proposed policy
statement that would have reaffirmed the traditional position that
"public moneys should be used only for public schools." Every
speaker at the meeting criticized the statement, prompting one ob
server to comment that he felt like he "was attending a meeting of the
National Association of Evangelicals."448
NCC's intramural controversy over funding religious schools sig
nals a decline of faith in the public schools among mainline Protes
tants. The strictly separationist position of the NCC in the mid
twentieth century was tied to a strong belief in public schools; as that
belief has faltered, some NCC leaders have begun to rethink the ques
tion of funding. As the NCC admitted in its 1999 Policy Statement,
some NCC members "understandably feel" that minority students are
unfairly trapped in failing urban schools and will remain so without
some public funding to help them attend private schools.449 Instead of
attempting to resolve its differences over this issue, the NCC simply
stated its "conviction that, as a general rule, public funds should be
used for public purposes. "450 This statement reflects a weakening of
the NCC's traditional opposition to school aid,451 a shift replicated
among public secularists, as described below.
The disagreement among churches within the NCC over aid to re
ligious schools also suggests a larger failure of mainline Protestant
leaders to maintain cohesion among their followers. In the 1950s and
1960s, many Protestant leaders embraced the ideal of the social gospel
446. It has filed amicus briefs in the Court, although its appearances in this venue have
been more sporadic than those of other pro-separation groups. The NCC joined amicus
briefs, for example, in Ball in 1985, arguing against a program that sent public school teach
ers into parochial schools, and in Lee in 1992, arguing against allowing prayer at school
graduations. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 579-80 (1992); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 374 (1985). It has not filed or joined briefs, however, in the two most re
cent parochaid cases, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997).
447. NCC, Policy Statement, supra note 444, at 1 .
448. Michael M . McManus, Church Council Moderates Positions, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 22,
1997, at A13.
449. NCC, Policy Statement, supra note 444, at 2.
450. Id.
451. Cf. NCC, Separation and Interaction, supra note 437, at 152 (stating unequivocally,
in 1963, that "government funds should not be authorized or appropriated for overall sup
port of [parochial] schools" and that the state has no obligation to support parental choice of
religious schools).
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and worked to address society's injustices, including poverty, racism,
and sexism.452 While the mainline clergy largely retain a liberal orien
tation, their flocks are often more conservative.453 They are also dwin
dling. In 1960, more than 40% of all whites claimed membership in
mainline denominations, compared to 27% who belonged to evangeli
cal churches.454 Today, thanks partly to the changing character of the
Southern Baptists, evangelicals and fundamentalists outnumber main
line Protestants. White evangelicals constitute one-fourth of the
population, while mainline Protestants comprise only about one-fifth.
Additionally, one-tenth of the population are African-American Prot
estants, and a majority of this group are evangelicals.455
The cleavage between mainline Protestant leaders and their fol
lowers has weakened the political influence of mainline clergy and of
the groups that they dominate. Mainline clergy are thus depicted as
"generals without armies."456 At the very least, they are generals with
often indifferent or rebellious troops and no clear mandate to lead. As
a result, while mainline Protestants continue to tilt toward the Repub
lican Party, as they have for more than a century, that party has be
come noticeably less responsive to the demands of their leaders.457
Politicians "often discount the pronouncements of mainline clergy be
cause they know few of them have lay support. "458 The inability of
mainline clergy to influence the Republican Party and the corre
sponding success of evangelicals are demonstrated by Republican po
sitions on restoring prayer in public schools and providing aid to re
ligious schools - both measures that mainline clergy generally oppose
and evangelical leaders support.
3.

New Alliances

As the Protestant consensus on church-state relations fell apart,
different elements of the Protestant majority allied with other groups.
The result is a radically new landscape of church-state politics. At one
452. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 42-43, 65-67;
HODGSON, CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY, supra note 1 1 , at 166.
453. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 43, 67-68.
454. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 97.
455. Id. at 34-39, 97. In addition, as church attendance is much lower in mainline
churches than in evangelical ones, the membership figures for mainline Protestants exagger
ate the numbers who are actually involved in church life. Id. at 97. Given the connection be
tween participation in church activities and political activism, see Verba study, cited in id. at
32, the greater church attendance rates among evangelicals also helps explain why they have
been relatively more active in politics in the last few decades than have their mainline coun
terparts.
456. Id. at 43.
457. Id. at 43, 104.
458. Id. at 43.
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end of the spectrum stands a broad coalition of accommodationist
opinion. It is opposed by a similar, though smaller, coalition of separa
tionists. In between are public secularists, a characterization that in
cludes both those without religious affiliation and those (probably
more numerous) who merely seek to confine religion to a private
sphere.
Accommodationists include white evangelicals, most Roman
Catholics, Orthodox Jews, and a growing number of African
Americans. With a shared interest in obtaining school aid, fighting
abortion, and restoring school prayer, evangelicals and Catholics
shelved their mutual antipathy and began to work together.459 As early
as 1984, the New York Times reported a dramatic shift among Catho
lic and Protestant allegiances since 1960, the most important feature of
which was the agreement among conservative Catholics and funda
mentalist Protestants on such issues as abortion and aid to private
schools.460 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, evangelicals and Catholics
collaborated on aid to religious schools. In 1988 the Catholic League
for Religious and Civil Rights joined the National Association of
Evangelicals in forming Americans for Educational Choice, a group
dedicated to securing government assistance for parents who send
their children to religious schools.461 In five of the Supreme Court's
most recent Establishment Clause cases, conservative evangelicals and
Catholic organizations have appeared as amici advocating accommo
dation.462 Indeed, in the 1997 case of Agostini, the Catholic League
joined the amicus brief of the Christian Legal Society, along with the
Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission and the National Asso
ciation of Evangelicals.463 That same year, Catholic Bishops, evangeli
cal Protestant leaders, and religious-right luminaries - such as Gary
Bauer, Ralph Reed, and James Dobson - issued "A Statement of
459. John Swomley, One Nation Under God: National Council of Bishops Seeking to
Influence Policy, 58 THE H UMANIST, May-Jun. 1998, at 6-7 (1998) (describing successful ef
forts of Catholic Bishops to form alliances with "the Southern Baptist Convention, the
Mormons, and numerous other groups led by Protestant evangelists, including Pat
Robertson, Jerry Falwell, and James Kennedy, and lay leaders, including Missouri Senator
John Ashcroft of the Assemblies of God").
460. Herbers, Activism in Faith, supra note 266, at B9; Herbers, Church Issues, supra
note 401, at B9.
461. Goetz, Parental Choice, supra note 395, at A2. Catholic school associations and
evangelical school associations, including the Association of Christian Schools, have also
joined together in the Council for American Private Education ("CAPE"), a group that ac
tively supports vouchers. See CAPE website, at http://www.capenet.org/member.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2001).
462. See Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208
(1997); Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757 (1995); Rosenberger v. Rector of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822 (1995); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 579-80 (1992).
463. Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Legal Society et al., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997) (Nos. 96-552, 96-553).
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Christian Conscience and Citizenship," criticizing the Supreme
Court.464 While "strongly affirm[ing] the separation of church and
state,'' the statement attacked the Court's "specious interpretation"
under which "our public schools are denuded of moral instruction and
parents are unjustly burdened in choosing a religious education for
their children. "465
Orthodox Jews add to this pietist alliance. The Jewish proportion
of the United States population is quite small, roughly two percent,
and the majority of Jews are politically liberal and strongly committed
to separation of church and state.466 In recent years, however, Ortho
dox Jews have begun to assert views at odds with those of liberal Jews
and consistent with those of evangelical Protestants and conservative
Catholics, especially on abortion, gay rights, and public prayer. In par
ticular, the Rabbinical Council - a national organization representing
Orthodox congregations - has become outspoken in support of aid to
religious schools.467 Additionally, Orthodox Jews have filed amicus
briefs supporting prayer at school graduations, aid to religious schools,
and the right of states to create school districts for a single, religiously
homogeneous (Hasidic Jewish) community.468
African Americans are the final constituency in the accommoda
tionist camp, and they are particularly significant in the debate over
vouchers. African Americans are overwhelmingly Protestant and gen
erally more devout than any other ethnic group: nine out of ten report
that religion is very important in their lives, and over half say that they

464. We Hold These Truths: A Statement of Christian Conscience and Citizenship, FIRST
THINGS, Oct. 1997, at 51-53, available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9710/articles/
documentation.html [hereinafter Statement of Christian Conscience]. Conservative Catholic
leaders, to cite another example, also supported the Istook Amendment. See, e.g. , John Dart
& Lee Romney, High Court's Ruling May Give Proposed Amendment a Boost, L.A. TIMES,
Jun. 28, 1997, at B4; Letter from Deacon Keith A. Fournier, President, Catholic Alliance, to
Rep. Ernest Istook (Apr. 23, 1998) (on file with authors). Not all Catholic leaders, however,
supported the Amendment. The Interfaith Alliance, for example, which includes one Catho
lic Bishop on its Board, opposed the Amendment. See Clergy Speak Out Against /stook
Amendment, Talking Points Prepared by Interfaith Alliance (Jul. 22, 1997) (on file with
authors).
465. Statement of Christian Conscience, supra note 464.
466. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 48-49, 75-76; Dena S.
Davis, Religion in the Public Arena: Black Political Leaders and Jewish Voters, in
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHURCH & STATE 52-54 (Menachem Mor ed., 1993).
467. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 49, 76, 1 10. Two of the
cosponsors of 1997 bill that would have provided vouchers to low-income students in
Washington, D.C. were Floyd Flake, a black Protestant minister and Democratic Represen
tative from New York, and Joseph Lieberman, an Orthodox Jew and Senator from
Connecticut. See VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 88-89.
468. The National Jewish Commission on Legal and Public Affairs filed amicus briefs in
Lee, Kiryas, Joel, Agostini, and Helms. See Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208 (1997); Bd. of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 689 (1994); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992).
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pray several times a day.469 Although black voters . are more liberal
than white Protestants on social welfare and economic issues, they
tend to be conservative on issues such as abortion, gay rights, and
school prayer.470 Most importantly, a growing number of African
Americans support school vouchers. This represents a dramatic
change from the 1950s and 1960s, when African Americans were
heavily invested in public schools as the vehicle of societal desegrega
tion and deeply distrustful of private alternatives. Recently, however,
black support of public schools has waned in light of the harsh realities
of many poor urban schools, such that today African Americans sup
port school vouchers more strongly than whites.471 A recent poll indi
cated that 72% of black parents supported school vouchers, compared
to only 48% of the general public.472 That fact has helped reshape the
voucher debate, which increasingly concerns not only the propriety of
government funding for religious schools, but also the question of
whether vouchers will improve the educational opportunities of disad
vantaged students.473
On the other side are the committed separationists. They include
mainline Protestant clergy and many of their followers, most Jews, and
those we call "ideological secularists." We offer that term to describe
those persons, usually with little or no personal religious commitment,
whose opposition to school aid stems from a broader ideological
commitment to a secular society. Examples include members of the
ACLU, the National Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty ("PEARL"), and People for the American Way ("PFAW"),
three politically liberal interest groups that actively oppose aid to re-

469. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 1 1 1 .
470. Id. a t 39, 1 11-12.
471. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 65-66; FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION
AND POLITICS, supra note 11, at 1 1 1 ; VITERITII, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at
88.
472. See James Brooke, Minorities Flock to Cause of Vouchers for Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 1997, at Al (reporting survey results); NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 2001 (back-page adver
tisement for African-American group supporting school choice).
473. E.g., VITERITII, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 209-13 (describing "the
growing consensus that seems to be emerging among people of different political persua
sions . . . that supports a policy of targeted choice designed specifically to benefit economi
cally disadvantaged children"); William Galston & Diane Ravitch, Scholarships for lnner
City School Kids, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1996, at A23 [hereinafter Galston & Ravitch, Schol
arships] (arguing for a national experiment with means-tested vouchers); Olsen, Voucher
Victory, supra note 379, at 6 (reporting that Charles Glenn, Professor at Boston University's
School of Education and a minister, has suggested that voucher supporters should "argue the
justice side of school choice" and point out that " [s]chool choice already exists, but not for
the poorest students"); William Raspberry, Let's At Least Experiment with School Choice,
WASH. POST, Jun. 16, 1997, at A21 [hereinafter Raspberry, Let's Experiment] (arguing that
vouchers should be tried for the sake of poor students in central cities).
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ligious schools.474 These three groups often team up with liberal Jewish
organizations, including the American Jewish Committee and the
American Jewish Congress, as well as with Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, to contest government financing of
religious schools.475
Between these two poles lie the public secularists. Though secu
larists comprise only about 15% of the electorate, they have exerted a
strong influence over public policy since World War 11.476 In the 1950s
and 1960s public secularists strongly supported public education. They
opposed aid to religious schools chiefly out of fear that government
support for private education would undermine the assimilative and
democratizing mission of public schools.477 Over the last two decades,
however, many public secularists have lost confidence in the public
schools.478 This loss of faith seems tied to numerous factors, including
474. The ACLU described itself, in an amicus brief in Helms, as "a nationwide . . . non
partisan organization with nearly 300,000 members dedicated to the principles of liberty and
equality embodied in the Bill of Rights, including the separation of church and state." Brief
of Amici Curiae ACLU et al. at 1, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648)
(hereinafter ACLU Helms Amici Brief]. PFAW, in the ACLU's amicus brief in Helms, de
scribed itself as founded "by a group of religious, civic, and educational leaders devoted to
our nation's heritage of tolerance, pluralism, and liberty," and consisting of over 310,000
members nationwide. Id. at 4. In another amicus brief in Helms, PEARL described itself as a
"national coalition of organizations sharing the objective of preserving religious freedom
and the separation of church and state," and listed among its members the American Hu
manist Association, the American Jewish Committee, United Church of Christ, and the
Council for Secular Humanism. Brief of Amici Curiae PEARL et al. at 1 , Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648).
475. An amicus brief filed in Helms provides a perfect illustration. Joining a single brief,
which argued against allowing federal assistance to religious schools, were the ACLU, the
American Federation of Teachers, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish
Congress, AU, the Anti-Defamation League, the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, and
PFAW. See ACLU Helms Amici Brief, supra note 474, at 1-4.
476. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 92, 107-08.
477. See supra text accompanying notes 205-211; see also ALEXANDE R BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 120-51 ( 1970). Bickel argued that the
Supreme Court's prohibition of funding religious schools - like the Court's unwillingness to
tolerate tuition grants to support secular segregation academies - rested on the notion that
public schools served the unique function of assimilating and Americanizing a diverse range
of students. Id. The notion was that only public schools could properly prepare students to
become responsible American citizens. Bickel also foresaw that "the insistence on the as
similationist mission of public schools which are unable to perform it cannot be maintained,"
and he further suggested that once this assimilationist mission is abandoned, decisions pro
hibiting religion in public schools or financial support of religious schools "must also go." Id.
at 149.
478. E.g. , CAROL ASCHER ET AL., HARD LESSONS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND
PRIVATIZATION 1 ( 1996) (hereinafter ASCHER ET AL., HARD LESSONS] (stating, in the first
line of the book, that "[m]any Americans have lost faith in public schools"); COOKSON,
SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 1-9 (describing loss of faith in public institutions, in
cluding public schools); MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 16-20 (de
scribing various groups who have lost faith in public schools). It is worth noting that all three
of these books defend public schools and that the authors depict themselves as arguing
against the popular grain.
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disappointment over the limited success of desegregation, the contin
ued existence of poorly performing, racially isolated, and by any
measure dismal urban schools, and evidence that Catholic parochial
schools often outperform their public counterparts, even when edu
cating racially and economically diverse students.479 The loss of faith in
public education also appears tied, at a more fundamental level, to a
loss of faith in the civic purposes of public schools. Today, many public
secularists appear to believe that the primary purpose of schools is not
to assimilate students and prepare them for citizenship, but to teach
them skills and prepare them for the workforce.480 As public secular
ists have come to doubt that public schools are performing these tasks
well, they have become open to alternatives.481
As a result, an increasing number of public secularists have aban
doned their opposition to school aid. The shift is most visible in the
fight over vouchers. Although only a few voucher programs exist as
yet, voucher programs enjoy much stronger and more widespread
support than they did two decades. ago.482 That support comes not only
479. E.g. , ASCHER ET AL., HARD LESSONS, supra note 478, at 2-3 (describing various
causes of dissatisfaction with public schools); MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST supra
note 87, at 129 (suggesting that "today's loss of faith in public schools" is tied in part to
"large and anonymous" city schools); VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at
80-86 (describing how the literature on the academic performance of Catholic schools
"would prove to have a great bearing on the question of educational equality" and school
choice). James Coleman has conducted the most well-known research comparing public and
private schools, including Catholic parochials schools. See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN ET
AL., HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT: PUBLIC, CATHOLIC, AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS
COMPARED (1982); JAMES S. COLEMAN & THOMAS HOFFER, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SCHOOLS: THE I MPACT OF COMMUNITIES (1987). Research by Coleman and others on
Catholic schools has not gone unnoticed by members of the popular media. E.g. , James
Traub, What Can Public Schools Learn?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, sec. 7 (book review), at
13 (describing data demonstrating that "impoverished minority children were significantly
likelier to graduate, and to go on to college, if they attended Roman Catholic rather than
comparable public schools").
480. MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87, at 16-26 (describing the ar
guments of various supporters of school choice). As Macedo observes, "[w]hat is striking in
debates over public school reform is that the emphasis on markets, choice, and cultural di
versity often seems accompanied by a profound loss of faith in civic purposes." Id. at 16. See
generally COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 4-9.
481 . Peter Cookson captured this view when he described how Americans traditionally
shared a "firm belief that public schools are the mediators of merit and the cradles of de
mocracy. With the weakening of the consensus [on this point], traditional methods of educa
tional reform appear inadequate" and more and more people become open to market-based
alternatives. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 9; see also Stephen Macedo,
Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal
Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417 (2000) (expressing qualified support for vouchers);
Galston & Ravitch, Scholarships, supra note 473 (offering qualified support for vouchers);
Raspberry, Let's Experiment, supra note 473 (same). It is especially telling that Macedo sup
ports vouchers, given that his impressive book, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, is dedicated to
establishing that schools should still attempt to forge a shared civic culture. See MACEDO,
DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST, supra note 87.
482. See generally COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE; supra note 376 (describing history of
school choice movement). E.g. , VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 80-116
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from religious groups, but also from a politically diverse array of pub
lic secularists. Supporters thus include not only libertarian and conser
vative groups and individuals, such as the Manhattan Institute, the
Heritage Foundation, the Institute for Justice, William Bennett,
Robert Bork, and Ed Meese.483 They also include more politically lib
eral individuals such as former Clinton Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles,
former Clinton Domestic Policy Adviser William Galston, Washington
Post columnist William Raspberry, Martin Luther King III, and
Howard Fuller, an African American who was the superintendent of
the Milwaukee schools and "the father" of its voucher program.484 Bil
lionaire Theodore J. Forstman, a strong voucher proponent, has en
listed Bowles, King, and Fuller, among others, to form the "Campaign
for America's Children," which advocates school choice through both
newspaper and television advertising.485 The television advertisements
typically feature minorities and depict the question of vouchers as
largely one about equalizing educational opportunities.486 This view of
vouchers has been endorsed by other politically liberal secularists, in
cluding Robert Reich, Clinton's former Labor Secretary, who wrote
an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal making the case for what
he termed "progressive vouchers. "487
This is not to say that all public secularists now favor aid to private
schools. Vouchers are opposed by powerful secular organizations,
such as the teachers' unions, as well as by traditional civil rights
groups, such as the ACLU and the NAACP.488 But the shift in opinion
among public secularists, who at one time almost uniformly supported
public schools and opposed religious alternatives, is both real and im
portant. It also stands in sharp contrast to what has (not) occurred on
the issue of religion in public schools. Although many public secular(describing various school choice initiatives undertaken since 1980); Jodi Wilgoren, School
Vouchers: A Rose by Any Other Name, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Wil
goren, School Vouchers] (noting that " [p]ublic opinion polls have registered a growing inter
est in vouchers in recent years" and describing existing voucher programs and proposals).
483. COOKSON, SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 376, at 30-33; Boston, Congressional Alert,
supra note 410; Getz, Parental Choice, supra note 395, at A2.
484. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 91-92 (describing support of
Raspberry and Galston); Wilgoren, School Vouchers, supra note 482, at Al (describing sup
port of Bowles, King, and Fuller).
485. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 91-92; Wilgoren, School
Vouchers, supra note 482, at Al.
486. Id. at 91-92; Wilgoren, School Vouchers, supra note 482, at Al.
487. Robert B. Reich, The Case for 'Progressive' Vouchers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2000, at
A26. Although vouchers remain associated largely with conservative Republicans, registered
Democrats, according to a 1998 poll, are actually more sympathetic to vouchers than are
Republicans. The Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll indicated that 51 % of Democrats endorsed
vouchers, whereas only 48% of Republicans did. Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll, The Public's
Attitudes Toward the Public Schools 1 998, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 2000.
488. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 101-10, 171-72.
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ists have softened or abandoned their opposition to funding religious
schools, their hostility to religious exercises in public schools has not
decayed.489 We see no movement among secularists to reintroduce
prayer into public schools. We see no wealthy entrepreneurs, for ex
ample, bringing together a collection of prominent and diverse indi
viduals to advocate returning religion to the classroom. Nor do we see
the conservative foundations and think-tanks that advocate vouchers
simultaneously working to restore school prayer. Even personally de
vout intellectuals, such as Yale Law Professor Stephen Carter, who
argue that religion should be taken more seriously in public life and
who support school vouchers, do not advocate a return of school
prayer.490
Today, it seems likely that the alignment of these groups is pro
ducing a new political majority in favor of school aid. Although we
cannot attach precise numbers to those who belong to one faction or
another, estimates are possible. The current electorate is roughly 25 %
Catholic, 25 % white evangelical Protestant, 20% mainline Protestant,
1 5 % secular, 10% black Protestant, 2 % Jewish, and the remaining 3 %
Mormons, Muslims, and others.491 Catholics and white evangelical
Protestants combined thus represent about half the population of the
United States. Not all of them are committed accomrnodationists, but
they are joined by Orthodox Jews, many black Protestants, and some
secularists. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that today, in sharp
contrast to the situation at the time of Everson, well over half of the
current citizens in the United States support greater accommodation
of religion.492
489. E.g. , VITERITII, CHOOSING EQUALITY, supra note 333, at 195-96 (arguing against
religion in public schools and for providing funds to parents to send their children to private,
religious schools).
490. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAw AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 15 (1993).
491. FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1 1 , at 34-35, 75, 92, 1 1 1 -12.
492. Polls on religious issues support this estimate, as they reveal majority support for
prayer in public schools and majority support for the use of vouchers at religious schools.
For polling data on prayer in public schools, see supra note 482. Polls on vouchers are nu
merous and often tell contradictory stories, depending on how the question is posed. They
also indicate that the public at this point knows very little about vouchers, making current
polls even more unreliable. See STEVE FARKAS ET AL. PUBLIC AGENDA, ON THIN ICE:
How ADVOCATES AND OPPONENTS COULD MISREAD THE PUBLIC'S VIEWS ON VOUCHERS
AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 9-12 (1999); see also Carl Campanile, NYers Support School
Choice, N.Y. POST, Aug. 25, 2000, at 20 (reporting results of recent poll indicating that about
75% of city residents familiar with school vouchers support them, but that only 55% of those
polled were familiar with the use of vouchers). With those caveats in mind, the Phi Delta
Kappa/Gallup Poll revealed that, in 1998 and 1999, 51 % of those asked supported allowing
parents to send their children to private schools, including church-related schools, with
the government paying all or part of the tuition. In 2000, however, that percentage
dropped to 45 % . See Lowell C. Rose & Alec M. Gallup, 32nd Annual Phi Delta
Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, at
http://www.pdkintl.org/kappan/kpol0009.htm. Stronger support for vouchers was found in a
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Looking Back, Looking Ahead

We think it likely that the seismic shift in the politics of church
state relations will, sooner or later, have a profound effect on Estab
lishment Clause doctrine. The emerging majority in favor of school aid
is a major new fact in American politics, and one that we think will
eventually influence the Supreme Court. Moreover, other factors rein
force the new majority's support for school aid. Today, religious
schools are no longer invariably Catholic, and school aid no longer fa
vors one religion. It can no longer be understood (or misunderstood)
as bringing public policy into the orbit of a particular church. In these
changed circumstances, any set of justices, whatever their backgrounds
and predispositions, would find it easier to tolerate public funding of
religious schools than did their predecessors of 1947.
Also easing the path toward accommodation is the declining faith
in public schools. In recent years, the public schools have undergone
intense and not undeserved criticism for failing to prepare students
adequately for higher education or the workforce. At the same time,
the hope of using schools to achieve the social goal of desegregating
American society has faded, as has the belief in the public-school mis
sion to inculcate democratic virtues. In this more critical and less op
timistic atmosphere, the idea of seeking alternatives to public schools
has become more attractive not only to white, conservative evangeli
cals, but also to African Americans and to many public secularists,
both conservative and liberal - including, importantly, the secular
elite, the class from which most justices hail.493 As alternatives to pub
lic schools have become more appealing, secularist opposition to pri
vate school aid has declined.
The stage seems set, therefore, for a transformation in the Court's
approach to the issue of funding religious schools. The changes that
began in the late 1970s have been compounding ever since. As one
would expect, given the age of the justices and the pace of judicial ap
pointments, the Supreme Court did not respond immediately as the
political ground shifted. Through the 1980s and the early 1990s, the
Court continued along a twisting path of prohibiting all but incidental
aid to religious schools. The Court's two most recent aid decisions,
survey done in 1999 by Public Agenda. In that poll, 68% of parents, 57% of the general pub
lic, and 51 % of community leaders endorsed vouchers. PUBLIC AGENDA, ON THIN ICE, at
13-14. Perhaps the most revealing poll, however, asked respondents to assume that their
state government were starting a voucher program, and then asked whether the vouchers
should be limited to nonreligious schools or should be available for religious schools as well.
A remarkable 78% of those surveyed stated that parents should be able to use the vouchers
at religious schools as well. PUBLIC AGENDA, ON THIN ICE, at 17-18. This last poll indicates
quite clearly that, while there is still a division of opinion about whether to institute a
voucher program, there is a great deal of support for the principle that any voucher program
adopted should include religious schools.
493. See supra text accompanying notes 471-472, 478-481 .
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however, suggest a change of direction. Decided in 1997 and 2000,
Agostini v. Felton494 and Mitchell v. Helms495 reveal four justices willing
to allow even pervasively sectarian institutions to receive government
aid, whenever that aid is also available to secular institutions on the
same terms. Two other justices refuse to go that far but appear willing
to tolerate substantial aid that certainly would have been prohibited
ten years ago. Both Agostini and Helms, moreover, depart from the
Court's earlier practice of distinguishing, often in plainly unpersuasive
ways, unfavorable precedents. Instead, Agostini and Helms expressly
repudiate prior decisions.
Of course, Agostini and Helms do not prove that the Court will
embrace a major restructuring of Establishment Clause doctrine,4% but
they may well signal that the Court is beginning to rethink its ap
proach. Our prediction of a coming revolution does not, however, de
pend primarily on what the Court has already said. More important, in
our view, are the shifting fundamentals - the emergence of a strong
new coalition in favor of school aid, the proliferation of religious di
versity among the potential recipients of that aid, and the declining
confidence in the monopoly of public education. Based primarily on
these factors, we predict that the use of vouchers at private, religious
schools will, sooner or later, be upheld.
While these factors suggest radical change on the question of aid to
religious schools, they do not support any comparable prediction of
radical change for religious observances in the public schools. That
branch of the modern Establishment Clause remains intact, and the
Supreme Court has made no move toward reconsideration. Several
factors suggest that the Court likely will maintain that position in the
foreseeable future. For one thing, the politics of this issue are different
from those regarding school aid. The political alignment regarding re
ligious exercises remains the same as it was when Engel and Schempp
were decided: Protestants remain split on the issue, with conservative
evangelicals joining Catholics and Orthodox Jews in support of prayer,
while both ideological and public secularists, most Jews, and mainline
clergy oppose it. To be sure, conservative evangelicals have acquired
more political influence during the last generation, but the weight of
elite opinion continues to oppose them on this issue.
More importantly, our nation's ever-increasing religious pluralism
has very different implications for the two branches of Establishment
Clause doctrine. The growing religious pluralism among private
494. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
495. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
496. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which recently struck down the
Cleveland voucher program by a divided vote, did not read Helms and Agostini as estab
lishing the constitutionality of vouchers. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d. 945 (6th
Cir. 2000) cert. granted, No. 00-1751, 2001 WL 576235 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2001).
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schools bolsters the case for government funding by removing the
taint of state aid to a particular church. And given the fact that aid
would also flow to nonreligious schools, of which there are a healthy
number, school aid may also be seen as neutral as between religion
and irreligion. In contrast, the growing religious pluralism of
American society makes it less likely that our nation will return to of
ficially sponsored religious observances in public education. In a na
tion of many faiths and none, it is hard to square officially sponsored
school prayer and Bible reading with any viable conception of neu
trality. It may be true, as some argue, that excluding prayer from pub
lic schools implicitly supports antireligious or nonreligious viewpoints
as against the religious,497 but reinstituting prayer would do precisely
the reverse. In this context, no meaningful opportunity for complete
neutrality as between religion and nonreligion exists. More impor
tantly, officially sponsored school prayer would threaten the ideal of
government neutrality among religions. Any religious exercise or
statement would be offensive to some. Today, even more than in the
1960s, officially sponsored prayer or Bible reading in the public
schools would necessarily favor some beliefs over others. The prohibi
tion of religious observances in public school therefore functions as a
prophylactic against coercion of religious minorities and nonbelievers.
As such, the Supreme Court's policy against school prayer and Bible
reading responds to diversity of belief, and diversity of belief has only
increased in the years since Engel and Schempp.
We believe, therefore, that the two propositions that make up the
modern Establishment Clause are beginning to diverge. The ban
against aid to religious schools is already fraying and may well col
lapse. The purging of religious observances from public education, in
contrast, seems secure. Both predictions arise not from the internal
logic of Establishment Clause doctrine but from consideration of the
underlying political and sectarian forces that gave that doctrine birth.
CONCLUSION
This Article offers an external, or "political," account of the mod
ern Establishment Clause. Our analysis differs from most existing
scholarship in the field in at least three respects. First, it does not serve
any normative agenda. Most investigations of the history of the Estab
lishment Clause construct the past to support some vision of the fu, ture. This conjoining of the positive and the normative is invited, if not
coerced, by the Supreme Court, which has consistently cast its Estab497. E.g. , Stephen Carter, The Free Exercise Thereof, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1627,
1627 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115, 122 (1992); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal lllusions: Establish
ment Neutrality and The "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 278 & n.60 (1987).
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lishment Clause decisions in historical terms. A lawyer or scholar who
wishes to engage the justices on their own terms must therefore speak
the language of history, even if doing so merely disguises a normative
argument. Our analysis, in contrast, is entirely positive. We have tried
to understand what has happened and to predict what will happen
with as little regard as possible for normative concerns or implications.
We do not pretend to have achieved some ideal of objectivity or
"truth," but that has been our aim.
Second, our analysis differs from existing literature in the relative
weight it gives to various periods of history. As the Supreme Court's
reliance on the past stems from some version of original intent, atten
tion is focused on the late eighteenth century. Indeed, many accounts
of the history of the Establishment Clause take a direct flight from
James Madison to the present, with perhaps a brief detour to buzz the
airport of Reconstruction. These accounts pass over the long stretches
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as featureless terrain of little
interest. Our understanding is precisely the reverse. Neither the Bill of
Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment had much to do with the es
tablishment of religion. The origins of the modern Establishment
Clause lay not in the late eighteenth century, but in the nineteenth and
twentieth. Accordingly, any attempt to understand where we are and
how we got here must focus on exactly those periods that conventional
history neglects.
Most important, we have not focused on the internal structure and
logic of Establishment Clause doctrine. Instead, we have charted the
broad correspondences between that doctrine and the history of
church and state in America. We believe that this external perspective
provides a richer and more informative account of the modern Estab
lishment Clause than any analysis that resides within the decisions of
the Supreme Court. We do not wish to be understood, however, as
suggesting that internal factors played no role. Reasoning, doctrine,
and precedent matter, and they have certainly figured in the history of
the Establishment Clause.
The interplay between external and internal factors is especially
vivid in the case of Everson . We think it plain that the separationist
project begun in Everson did not result from legal analysis. Neither
the constitutional text nor demonstrable original intent nor pre
existing doctrine or precedent determined that decision. To under
stand Everson, one must seek an external account. There is no other
choice. But the decision, once rendered, surely influenced future cases.
Everson traced a line backward from the mid-twentieth century to the
framing and projected future controversies along the same trajectory.
Justices who came to the Court without ironclad commitments on
church and state found the direction of decision clearly marked. The
disagreement between the Everson majority and dissent was so trivial,
as compared to the questions deemed settled, that a justice who took
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his cue from prior decisions would have found the area of choice quite
constrained. Absent some fundamental shift in perspective or social
context, debate over small-scale disagreements within the existing doc
trinal framework might continue indefinitely, as Everson survived
without serious challenge for almost fifty years. Radical change awaits
the conviction that existing doctrine is radically wrong and that the
right response is not refinement but repudiation.
We have not tried to follow the paths by which such convictions
reach the Supreme Court. To do so would require a massive excursion
into judicial biography. The broad outlines of that process, however,
are not obscure. Part of the story turns on presidential elections and
on the array of political opinion to which presidents respond. Part of it
- especially in recent decades - turns on the disposition of the
Senate and on the likelihood that particular commitments will arouse
support or opposition. The choice between one presidential candidate
and another, or between one Supreme Court nominee and another,
obviously influences the course of constitutional law, and indeed often
is made on just that basis.
Part of the story, however, turns on political choices over time.
Supreme Court justices chosen from a younger generation will have
experiences and perceptions different from their predecessors, re
gardless of political party or inclination. We do not suppose that sit
ting justices routinely change their minds to conform to new political
alignments or social realities, but neither do we believe that justices
chosen in an era of changed political alignment or altered social reality
will be unaffected by it.
Thus, for example, no Supreme Court justice chosen in 1900, 1930,
or 1950 would have doubted that aid to religious schools meant aid to
Roman Catholic schools. The correspondence was nearly exact and
was everywhere so perceived. In contrast, no Supreme Court justice
chosen in the year 2000 could see aid to religious schools as favoritism
to one religion. The previously controlling assumption is no longer
tenable. The social reality has changed, and the social and political
content of Everson separatism has changed with it.
The story of the changing social reality of church and state in
America and the corresponding changes in constitutional doctrine is
the political history of the Establishment Clause. This history, we be
lieve, is a far better guide to understanding the modern Establishment
Clause than anything actually said on its behalf in the opinions of the
Supreme Court.

